Oliver v. State

Full title: JEREMY LADERALL OLIVER, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas

Date published: Jun 19, 2003

No. 05-01-00507-CR (Tex. App. Jun. 19, 2003)

Opinion

No. 05-01-00507-CR

Opinion Filed June 19, 2003 Do Not Publish

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F98-01314-TI. DISMISSED

Before Chief Justice THOMAS¹ AND Justices MOSELEY and LANG.

1 Justice Ed Kinkeade was a member of the submissions panel before his retirement from the Court on November 18, 2002. Chief Justice Thomas has reviewed the briefs and the record in this case.

OPINION

Opinion By Chief Justice Thomas.

Jeremy Laderall Oliver waived a jury trial and entered a negotiated nolo contendere plea to sexual assault of a child. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.011 (Vernon 2003). Pursuant to the plea bargain agreement, the trial court deferred adjudication of guilt, placed appellant on three years probation, and assessed a $500 fine. Subsequently, the State moved to proceed with adjudication, alleging appellant violated four terms of his probation. The trial court found the allegations true, adjudicated appellant guilty, and sentenced him to four years' confinement. In a single point of error, appellant contends the judgment deferring adjudication should be reformed because it incorrectly states appellant entered a guilty plea. A defendant granted deferred adjudication probation may raise issues relating to the original plea proceeding only in appeals taken when the order granting deferred adjudication is first imposed, not after adjudication of guilt. See Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661-62 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999).² Accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction to address appellant's complaint. We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

2 Although the order deferring adjudication of guilt does incorrectly state appellant entered a guilty plea when, in fact, appellant pleaded nolo contendere, once the trial court adjudicated guilt, that order had no force or effect because the judgment adjudicating guilt set aside the previous order deferring adjudication of guilt. See McCoy v. State, 81 S.W.3d 917, 919 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2002, pet. ref'd); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 5(b) (Vernon Supp. 2003).