It is questionable whether the state was even required to reveal the name of this informant. "Where the disclosure of the informant's identity would at most serve only to furnish possible testimony impeaching the officer's testimony, disclosure of the informant's identity is not required. Oliver v. State, 146 Ga. App. 798 ( 247 S.E.2d 487) (1978)." Black v. State, 154 Ga. App. 441 (2) ( 268 S.E.2d 724) (1980).

In failing to make the required showing of all of the requirements of the code, the trial court cannot be faulted for refusing to grant the motion for a continuance. Alderman v. State, supra; Harrison v. State, supra; accord Oliver v. State, 146 Ga. App. 798 (1) ( 247 S.E.2d 487); Harris v. State, 142 Ga. App. 37, 39 ( 234 S.E.2d 798). See O'Neal v. State, 254 Ga. 1, 2 ( 325 S.E.2d 759), for applicant failing to use due diligence in ascertaining the expected testimony of the missing witness.

However, appellant made no showing that the missing witness' testimony would be of probative value, thus obviating the need for a continuance. See Oliver v. State, 146 Ga. App. 798 (1) ( 247 S.E.2d 487) (1978). As for the motion to inspect the drugs, it was not made until the day of trial; therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the motion as being untimely.

OCGA § 17-8-25 (former Code Ann. § 81-1410) contains eight statutory requirements which must accompany an application for a continuance. Oliver v. State, 146 Ga. App. 798 (1) ( 247 S.E.2d 487). "It was pointed out in Hobbs v. State, 8 Ga. App. 53, 54 ( 68 S.E. 515) that continuances in criminal cases are not governed by the strict rules of civil cases and that the motion should be granted `whenever the principles of justice appear to demand a postponement.' Nevertheless, in civil and criminal cases alike, there is some discretion upon the part of the trial court, and this court is limited to the decision merely of whether the decision as made constitutes an abuse of discretion." Scoggins v. State, 98 Ga. App. 360, 362 ( 106 S.E.2d 39).

Here, where it appears that disclosure of the informant's identity would at most serve to provide possible testimony to impeach the agent's testimony, we do not find nondisclosure an abuse of discretion by the trial court. See Oliver v. State, 146 Ga. App. 798 ( 247 S.E.2d 487) (1978). Judgment affirmed. Deen, P. J., and Carley, J., concur.

2. Appellant further contends that the police officer should have been compelled by the trial court to reveal the identity of his confidential informant who accompanied him to Black's apartment and was present when two of the drug sales were made. Where the disclosure of the informant's identity would at most serve only to furnish possible testimony impeaching the officer's testimony, disclosure of the informant's identity is not required. Oliver v. State, 146 Ga. App. 798 ( 247 S.E.2d 487) (1978). 3. The general grounds are also without merit.

Under these circumstances, such disclosure was not required. See Connally v. State, 237 Ga. 203 ( 227 S.E.2d 352) (1976); Oliver v. State, 146 Ga. App. 798 (2) ( 247 S.E.2d 487) (1978). Judgment affirmed. Bell, C. J., and Webb, J., concur.