Opinion
No. CV-06-2429-PCT-LOA.
May 2, 2007
ORDER
The Court has received an unfiled personal letter from the pro se Plaintiff, dated "07-17-2007," accompanied by a CD, and an unfiled pleading-appearing document, dated April 27, 2007, containing the caption of the case and the statements " Did you understand? Why was case denied?" to the right of the caption. (emphasis in original) The Court will deem the pleading-appearing document to be a motion for reconsideration of the Court's April 12, 2007 Order dismissing this case.
Except for this Order, the letter which expresses, among other things, how "very disappointed" Plaintiff is with the Court's April 12, 2007 Order, and the CD will be filed herein with no action or response taken by the Court. Plaintiff is directed to comply with Rule 5(a), FED.R.CIV.P., regarding all future pleadings, letters or other writings in this matter and to reflect such mailings on the pleading or document itself.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
A motion to reconsider must provide a valid ground for reconsideration by showing two elements. All Hawaii Tours Corp. v. Polunesian Cultural Ctr., 116 F.R.D. 645, 648-49 (D. Haw. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 855 F.2d 860 (1988). First, it must demonstrate some valid reason why the Court should reconsider its prior decision. Id. Second, it must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the Court to reverse its prior decision. Id. Courts have distilled three (3) major grounds justifying reconsideration. They are: 1) an intervening change in the controlling law, 2) the availability of new evidence, and 3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D.Cal. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987); Hegler v. Borg, 50 F.3d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1029 (1995); Kennedy v. Lubar, 273 F.3d 1293, 1299, fn. 6 (10th Cir. 2001); See generally C. Wright, A. Miller E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 4478 at 790. A motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity to present facts that were known to the party on the earlier motion, nor new legal theories in place of the ones used earlier that did not prevail. L.I Head Start Child Development Services, Inc. v. Kearse, 96 F.Supp.2d 209, 211-212 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). "Nor may the party merely reiterate or repackage an argument previously rejected by the court; that argument is for appeal." PAB Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 2000 WL 1240196 at *1 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).Plaintiff has provided no valid reason why the Court should reconsider its prior decision. The motion for reconsideration will be denied.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED directing the Clerk to file the attached letter, motion for reconsideration and CD in the Court's file. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall mail or electronically deliver a complete copy of this letter and motion for reconsideration to the pro se Plaintiff and all counsel of record.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
James R. Oliver,
c/o 116 East L. Street
Chula Vista, California, 91911
619-422-0351 messages
Case No. CV-06-2429-PCT-LOA
Dear L. Anderson-Magistrate
I was very disappointed by your decision. Imagine how it feels to be told that someone who has wronged you cannot be touched because they have "absolute immunity". In my original case I pointed out that the Arizona Constitution forbids immunities that do not belong to all citizens equally. It seems you have granted these tyrants a title of nobility to rule as they see fit and have immunity form any prosecution. I can only imagine how the magistrates heads will swell in their summary court that denies TRUE due process of law.
I had tried before to get a lawsuit against these people using the 5th amendment as my basis. All filings were denied, one wrote an actual conclusion of law, one was a friend of Ms. Wagner and only "considered and denied" protecting his friend from any action brought before her.
The words of the legislature mean exactly what they say. If you had followed the example I gave you, that would have been enough to deny their motions. I am including a few quotes form case law that say the same thing. To conclude, if Section 1983 et seq. does not apply to these magistrates, then who does it apply to?
_________________________ James R. Oliver Date 07-17-2007 Included: 3 pages of precedents Total 4 pages. and Audio CDCV-06-2429
The laws simply mean what they say.
Here is a group of U.S. Supreme Court cases which prove that the words in the laws mean what they say. Also, this can tie into the `void for vagueness' point, as it is then a concrete concept of law that the laws mean exactly what they say as this is the federal standard of statutory construction, and any law which cannot be understood must be void, as the law is not communicating a required act or prohibited act.
"For purposes of statutory construction, a statute's subsequent legislative history is an unreliable guide to legislative intent. "CHAPMAN v UNITED STATES, 500 US 114 L Ed 2d 524, 111 S Ct (1991)
"Going behind the plain language of a statute in search of a possibly contrary congressional intent is " a step to be taken cautiously" even under the best of circumstances." Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 US 1, 26, 51 L Ed 2d 124, 97 S Ct 926 (1977). (emphasis added)
"The name given to a congressional enactment by way of designation or description in the act or the report of the committee accompanying the introduction of the bill into the House of Representatives cannot change the plain implication of the words of the statute." (emphasis added) [For other cases, see statutes, 154-160, 249-255, 354-372, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]
". . . courts do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear" Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 US ___, p. ___, 126 L Ed 2d 615 (1994). (emphasis added)
"The title of a statute and the history leading up to its adoption, as aids to statutory construction, are to be resorted to only for the purpose of resolving doubts as to the meaning of the words used in the act in case of ambiguity." Fairport, P. E. R. Co. v. Meredith., 292 US 589, p. 589, 78 L 1434. (1934) (emphasis added)
"In deciding a question of statutory construction, we begin of course with the language of the statute." Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 US 184, 112 L Ed 2d 608, 111 S Ct 599, (1991) (emphasis added)
" When the words of a statute are unambiguous, the first canon of statutory construction — that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there — is also the last, and judicial inquiry is complete." Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503 US ___, p. ___, 117 L.Ed 2nd 391 (1992) (emphasis added)
"Rules of statutory construction are to be invoked as aids to the ascertainment of the meaning or application of words otherwise obscure or doubtful. They have no place, as this court has many times held, except in the domain of ambiguity." Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U. S. 414, 421, 44 L. Ed. 219, 222, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 155; United States v. Barnes, 222 U. S. 513, 518, 519, 56 L. Ed. 291-293, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 117. Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States., 261 US 514, pp. 517.
CV-06-2429 James R. Oliver
"In construing a federal statute, it is presumable that Congress legislates with knowledge of the United States Supreme Court's basic rules of statutory construction." MCNARY v HAITIAN REFUGEE CENTER, 498 US 479, 112 L Ed 2d 1005, 111 S Ct 888, (1991) (emphasis added)
2
As in all cases involving statutory construction, " our starting point must be the language employed by Congress," Reiter v Sonotone Corp., 442 US 330, 337, 60 L Ed 2d 931, 99 S Ct 2326 (1979) (emphasis added), and we assume "that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used." Richards v United States, 369 US 1, 9, 7 L Ed 2d 492, 82 S Ct 585 (1962) (emphasis added).
Thus "[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 US 102, 108, 64 L Ed 2d 766, 100 S Ct 2051 (1980). (remarks of Sen. Dirksen). As Senator (emphasis added)
"When the terms of a statute are unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete except in rare and exceptional circumstances." FREYTAG v. COMMISSIONER, 501 US, 115 L Ed 2d 764, pp. 767 — (1973)
"In a statutory construction case, the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue, judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning — in all but the most extraordinary circumstance — is finished; courts must give effect to the clear meaning of statutes as written." Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 US 120 L Ed 2d 379, 112 S Ct 2589 (1992) (emphasis added)
" It is not a function of the United States Supreme Court to sit as a super-legislature and create statutory distinctions where none were intended." AMERICAN TOBACCO CO. v PATTERSON, 456 US 63, 71 L Ed 2d 748, 102 S Ct 1534 (emphasis added)
"(T)he court's task is to determine whether the language the legislators actually enacted has a plain, unambiguous meaning. "Beecham v. United States, 511 US 128 L Ed 2d 383 (1994). (emphasis added)
"The United States Supreme Court cannot supply what Congress has studiously omitted in a statute." FEDERAL TRADE COM. v SIMPLICITY PATTERN CO., 360 US 55, p. 55, 475042/56451 (emphasis added)
"The starting point in any endeavor to construe a Statute is always the words of the Statute itself; unless Congress has clearly indicated that its intentions are contrary to the words it employed in the Statute, this is the ending point of interpretation." Fuller v. United States 615 F. Supp. 1054 (D.C. Cal 1985), West's Key 188 quoting Richards v. United States 369 US 1, 9, 82 S. Ct. 585, 590, 7 L.Ed. 2d 492 (1962) (emphasis added)
"The starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself; absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." PRODUCT SAFETY COMM'N v. GTE SYLVANIA, 447 US 102, 64 L Ed 2d 766, 100 S Ct 2051 (1980) (emphasis added)
" Words used in the statute are to be given their proper signification and effect." Washington Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U. S. 112, 115, 25 L. Ed. 782, 783. (emphasis added)
"The construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong, especially when Congress has refused to alter the administrative construction, and such deference is particularly appropriate where an agency's interpretation involves issues of considerable public controversy and Congress has not acted to correct any misperception of its statutory objectives." CBS, INC. v FCC, 453 US 367, p. 367, 69 L Ed 2d 706, p. 709 190155/564515 (emphasis added)
"We are not at liberty to construe any statute so as to deny effect to any part of its language. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that significance and effect shall, if possible, be accorded to every word. As early as in Bacon's Abridgment, § 2, it was said that `a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word, shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant. This rule has been repeated innumerable times." Justice Strong, United States v. Lexington Mill E. Co., 232 US 399, pp. 409. (1914) (emphasis added)CV-06-2429-PCT-LOA Did you understand? defendants
Words of Legislature Must be Obeyed
Magistrate Anderson,My case was supported by the United States Supreme Court in that, "When the words of a statute are unambiguous, the first canon of statutory construction — that courts must presume that legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there — is also the last, and judicial inquiry is complete."
Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503 US ___, p. ___, 117 L.Ed 2nd 391 (1992)
I thought you would be aware of this fact and the list I sent last week contained over 20 S Ct cases that say the same thing. So the clouding of the legislature was done to deny me my right to the case.
I was also aware that in your "Order" you failed to mention the equity law that is used by states, no mention of the Arizona Constitution forbidding special immunity and that since I have no contract, how can I be forced into a jurisdiction that uses contract/equity law on it subjects? There are no regulations in Arizona for drivers license, registration, insurance. These regulations that are referred to in Thompson v Smith 154 SE 579, 580 as that only way States can control the issue of drivers license, registration etc. It is the equity law that denies rights.
When you denied my case it is as if an error was made. Or maybe it took you as long as it did to get help with your decision. I do not know what happens in your chambers but it seems as if my rights are denied as part of a plan or secret law known to only lawyers and judges.
I declare under penalty of perjury and the Laws of the United States of America that the forgoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.April 27, 2007 __________________________________ James R. Oliver Date: