Opinion
Civil Action No. 98-1277 (NHP).
August 26, 1999
Gary Thompson, Esq., DUNNE THOMPSON, P.C., Kearny, N.J., Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Mary B. Rogers, Esq., PITNEY, HARDIN, KIPP SZUCH, Morristown, N.J., Attorneys for Bell Atlantic-New Jersey, Robert Lommasone, Len Lauer.
LETTER ORDER ORIGINAL ON FILE WITH CLERK OF THE COURT
Dear Counsel:
This matter comes before the Court on the motion by defendants Bell Atlantic-New Jersey, Inc., Robert Tommasone and Len Lauer for summary judgment. This Court heard oral argument on May 24, 1999. For the reasons stated more particularly herein, the motion by defendants Bell Atlantic-New Jersey, Inc, Robert Tommasone and Len Lauer for summary judgment is DISMISSED and this case is REMANDED to the Superior Court, Law Division in Essex County, docket number ESX-L-753-98.
DISCUSSION
On January 21, 1998, plaintiff Mary Oliver filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division in Essex County against defendants Bell Atlantic-New Jersey, Inc., Robert Tommasone and Len Lauer ("defendants") wherein she alleged claims of gender discrimination pursuant to the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1, et seq. ("NJLAD") and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"), as well as, various tort claims arising under state law. See Complaint filed January 21, 1998. On March 11, 1998, plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint against defendants. See Second Amended Complaint filed March 11, 1998.On March 20, 1998, defendants removed this case to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey based upon federal question jurisdiction. See Notice of Removal dated March 20, 1998. In the Notice of Removal, defendants contended that plaintiff's claims were removable because plaintiff alleged claims arising under Title VII (Count Two) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001,et seq. ("ERISA") (Count Three). See id. More specifically, defendants argued that the basis for removal was:
8. That plaintiff alleges in the Second Count of her Second Amended Complaint that defendants discriminated against her and harassed her because of her sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Accordingly, this is a civil action arising unde the laws of the United States of which the United States District Courts have original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and therefore, these claims may be removed to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and (b) (emphasis added).
9. That plaintiff alleges in the Third Count of her Second Amended Complaint that defendants discriminated against her because of her sex by refusing to allow her to participate in the Force Management Program ("FMP") and/or the Reduction in Force ("RIF") provisions of the Bell Atlantic Separation Pay Plan, an employee benefit plan within the meaning of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. Accordingly, this is a civil action arising under the laws of the Unite[d] States of which the United States District Courts have original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and therefore, these claims may be removed to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and (b) (emphasis added).See id.
On May 3, 1999, defendants filed the subject motion for summary judgment contending, inter alia, that because a two-year statute of limitations applies to discrimination claims brought pursuant to the NJLAD, plaintiff's claims are time-barred. In opposition, plaintiff contended that a six-year statute of limitations governs discrimination claims brought pursuant to the NJLAD and, therefore, her claims are not time-barred.
During oral argument, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Counts Three through Seven of her Second Amended Complaint which included her ERISA and Title VII claims. See Transcript dated May 24, 1999 at pages 3-4. As a result, plaintiff's only potentially viable claims were various allegations of discrimination made pursuant to the NJLAD.
In light of plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of her federal claims during oral argument, this Court will refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (West 1999). The threshold issue before this Court, whether plaintiff's discrimination claims brought pursuant to the NJLAD are time-barred, is an important question of state law more appropriately addressed by the state courts at this time.
For the foregoing reasons and because diversity jurisdiction does not exist amongst the parties in this case, this Court will DISMISS the motion by defendants for summary judgment and will REMAND this case to the Superior Court, Law Division in Essex County, docket number ESX-L-753-98 for determination. Accordingly, this case is CLOSED.
SO ORDERED.