"The statute plainly extends the liability of an owner beyond his liability at common law, which was only for habits of which he had reason to know." Oldham v. Hussey, 27 R.I. 366, 368, 62 A. 377, 378 (1905) (per curiam) (quoting Kelly v. Alderson, 19 R.I. 544, 45, 37 A. 12, 12 (1896)). That statute is now embodied in § 4-13-16.

Id. Plaintiffs argue that because the Security and Housing personnel, as managing agents of military housing, maintained possession and control of the property and because they knew of Chester's presence, the government should be liable as a harborer or keeper, or more precisely as the owner of the dog. See Lindsay v. Crohan, 508 A.2d 674, 676 (R.I. 1986); Oldham v. Hussey, 27 R.I. 366, 368, 62 A. 377 (1905). Contrary to the D.C. Circuit's decision in Nelson v. United States, supra, plaintiffs contend that this knowledge and control amounts to legal ownership, and that ownership, in and of itself, imposes liability.

Our state law concerning liability for a dog bite is well settled, with cases dating back over a century, providing that, so long as the dog was within a proper enclosure of the owner, as the dog was here, the defendant is entitled to protection under the "one-bite rule." E.g., Ferrara, 823 A.2d at 1137; Montiero, 813 A.2d at 981-82; Oldham v. Hussey, 27 R.I. 366, 368, 62 A. 377, 378 (1905). Had the General Assembly wished to expand liability for incidents occurring within enclosed areas, it could have done so when enacting the strict-liability statute pertaining to incidents outside of enclosures, or at any later time, but it has not.

This statute imposes the same liability on the harborer of a dog as on the owner but does not itself apply to the owner. Oldham v. Hussey, 27 R.I. 366, 368, 62 A. 377, 378 (1905). The facts of the case before us are that defendant was the owner of the dog.

This court has always understood the regulations provided under chapter 13 of title 4 to be measures of general applicability, not to be undermined or displaced by contrary ordinances regarding dogs enacted by particular cities or towns. See Wilbur v. Gross, 55 R.I. 473, 182 A. 597 (1936); Oldham v. Hussey, 27 R.I. 366, 62 A. 377 (1905); Harris v. Eaton, 20 R.I. 81, 37 A. 308 (1897). As a consequence these statutes must be given effect in any conflict with local legislation that also bears upon the activities of dogs or their ownership.

In this state by virtue of statute the common-law rule does not apply where the attack occurred outside the enclosure. Oldham v. Hussey, 27 R.I. 366; Wilbur v. Gross, 55 R.I. 473. In the case at bar there was conflicting evidence on the questions of the dog's vicious propensity and defendants' knowledge thereof.

Likewise the effect of the repetition of that definition in the opinion of this court in Whittet v. Bertsch, supra, to be discussed infra, is much lessened because that opinion relied upon Dudley v. McKenzie, supra, which had been overruled by Davis v. Mudgett, supra. The case of Oldham v. Hussey, 27 R.I. 366, (1905), simply held that by section 5 of the same statute, "On Dogs," the keeper or harborer of a dog was made subject to the same liability as was imposed on the owner of a dog by section 3 and did not impose "a liability for acts of the dog committed within the enclosure of the owner or keeper of such dog beyond his common-law liability." In Palmer v. Saccocia, 33 R.I. 476, (1912), a dog chained inside the defendant's premises had been released by his son and allowed to go on the highway without the defendant's permission, and there attacked and injured the plaintiff.