Timeliness ¶ 4 Rash first argues the superior court erred by dismissing his statutory special action after finding the thirty-day time limit for bringing an appeal in Rule 9(a), Ariz. R. Civ.App. P., was applicable to his special action through Rule 7(i), Ariz. R.P. Spec. Actions, titled “Special Appellate Court Provisions.” Although we review a grant of dismissal for an abuse of discretion, Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. New Falls Corp., 224 Ariz. 526, ¶ 9, 233 P.3d 639, 641 (App.2010), “we review de novo questions involving the interpretation of court rules and ‘evaluate procedural rules using principles of statutory construction,’ ” Haroutunian v. Valueoptions, Inc., 218 Ariz. 541, ¶ 6, 189 P.3d 1114, 1117 (App.2008), quoting Fragoso v. Fell, 210 Ariz. 427, ¶¶ 7, 13, 111 P.3d 1027, 1030, 1032 (App.2005). Where a rule's terms are ambiguous, we consider in our interpretation the rule's “ ‘context, language, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose.’ ” Hornbeck v. Lusk, 217 Ariz. 581, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 323, 325 (App.2008), quoting Estancia Dev. Assocs. v. City of Scottsdale, 196 Ariz. 87, ¶ 11, 993 P.2d 1051, 1054 (App.1999).

Because we conclude the court did not err in finding Webb's claim was time barred, we need not address the nonjural-entity issue. See Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. New Falls Corp., 224 Ariz. 526, ¶ 19, 233 P.3d 639, 643 (App. 2010) (court of appeals will affirm "trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss if it is correct for any reason"). ¶5 "[W]e generally do not consider issues, even constitutional issues, raised for the first time on appeal."

On this record, and in comparison with the reported cases analyzing a failure to prosecute, the passage of three months does not support a finding that Faraji had abandoned his case. See Slaughter v. Maricopa Cty., 227 Ariz. 323, 326-27, ¶¶ 15, 17, 258 P.3d 141, 144-45 (App. 2011) (affirming a dismissal for lack of prosecution because the plaintiff had not prosecuted the case for more than two years since she first amended her complaint); see also Price, 57 Ariz. at 145, 112 P.2d at 211 (four years); Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. New Falls Corp., 224 Ariz. 526, 530, ¶ 16, 233 P.3d 639, 643 (App. 2010) (two and a half years); Copeland v. Ariz. Veterans Mem'l Coliseum & Exposition Ctr., 176 Ariz. 86, 88, 859 P.2d 196, 198 (App. 1993) (fourteen months). On the other hand, the City has not proffered any evidence or arguments demonstrating that the City had suffered any prejudice as a result of the scheduling or disclosure delay.

With actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor.¶7 We review the dismissal of a Writ of Garnishment for an abuse of discretion. Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. New Falls Corp., 224 Ariz. 526, 528, ¶ 9, 233 P.3d 639, 641 (App. 2010). We defer to the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.

Thus, the trial court erred by dismissing Wolfson's complaint on the grounds that such documents do not fall within the scope of A.R.S. § 33-420(A). Nonetheless, we may affirm the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss if it is correct for any reason. Old Republic Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. New Falls Corp., 224 Ariz. 526, 530, ¶ 19, 233 P.3d 639, 643 (App. 2010). ¶15 We reject Wolfson's claim that the recorded documents had no effect because they were executed in the wrong order.

We will affirm the dismissal of Salerno's complaint if it was correct for any reason. See Old Republic Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. New Falls Corp., 224 Ariz. 526, 530, ¶ 19, 233 P.3d 639, 643 (App. 2010). ¶6 Defendants argue that we should affirm because the trial court could have properly dismissed Salerno's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to a federal statute, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.

In the absence of a transcript, we presume the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing supports the trial court's decision. Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. New Falls Corp., 224 Ariz. 526, 531, ¶ 23 n.4, 233 P.3d 639, 644 (App. 2010). Therefore, as the record does not contain any evidence to support Goltsman's contention there is no basis for the injunction, we cannot find the trial court abused its discretion by continuing the injunction in place.

Citing the new law, Aspen moved to "reverse" this appeal. ¶10 We denied Aspen's motion, noting that issues concerning the three-year statute of limitations under A.R.S. § 12-1134(G) and the savings statute remained unresolved. We ordered supplemental briefing on those issues and now address them, because we may affirm the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss if it is correct for any reason.See Old Rep. Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. New Falls Corp., 224 Ariz. 526, 530, ¶ 19, 233 P.3d 639, 643 (App. 2010). ¶11 The Arizona Private Property Rights Protection Act provides a three-year statute of limitations as follows:

¶8 As the superior court noted, after the Fentons were designated plaintiffs, five years passed in this lawsuit without any activity. No disclosure statements were exchanged during that time, no discovery conducted, and no documents filed with the court. Courts have granted dismissal motions following substantially shorter periods of inactivity. See Price, 57 Ariz. at 148, 112 P.2d at 212 (four years); Paul v. Paul, 28 Ariz. 598, 603, 238 P. 399, 401 (1925) (sixteen months); Copeland v. Ariz. Veterans Mem'l Coliseum & Exposition Ctr., 176 Ariz. 86, 87-88, 859 P.2d 196, 197-98 (App. 1993) (fourteen months); Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. New Falls Corp., 224 Ariz. 526, 530, ¶ 16, 233 P.3d 639, 643 (App. 2010) (two and one-half years). ¶9 The Fentons nevertheless justify their inactivity by pointing to a lack of resources and insufficient time to pursue the matter due to their extensive work on the home.

In addition, Maricopa County Local Rule 3.6(a)(3) states a "civil action shall be dismissed for failure to prosecute upon written motion and notice to opposing counsel, at the discretion of the court" based on "appropriate reasons." See also Paul v. Paul, 28 Ariz. 598, 603, 238 P. 399, 401 (1925) (finding sixteen-month period during which plaintiff took no action indicated abandonment of suit and was sufficient to warrant dismissal for lack of prosecution); Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. New Falls Corp., 224 Ariz. 526, 531, ¶ 23, 233 P.3d 639, 644 (App. 2010) (finding no abuse of discretion in trial court's dismissal for lack of prosecution where plaintiff took no action for more than two years). ¶ 15 Here, there is no indication that Slaughter prosecuted her claims against the County beyond filing the complaint.