Therefore, on the basis of res judicata, the agreed state court rulings must be accorded a preclusive effect. Old Orchard Bank Trust Co. v. Levin, 124 Ill. App.3d 443, 79 Ill.Dec. 819, 464 N.E.2d 723 (1st Dist. 1984). Dalip cannot relitigate in this Court issues already determined by the state court including his entitlement to homestead and wild card exemptions. There is no contention that the state court proceeding, where he was represented by counsel, failed to provide him with a full and fair opportunity to litigate, nor is there any contention that the state court proceeding and agreed order were not final. Since the state court of competent jurisdiction entered a final ruling on the merits through the Agreed Order, Dalip is bound by res judicata both as to matters decided and matters as to state law exemptions which could have been raised by him.
Capitol Bank Trust of Chicago v. Fascetta, 771 F.2d 1077, 1078, 1080 (7th Cir. 1985); Home Federal Savings Loan Assn. v. Zarkin, 89 Ill.2d 232, 238, 59 Ill.Dec. 897, 901, 432 N.E.2d 841, 845 (1982); Old Orchard Bank Trust Co. v. Levin, 124 Ill.App.3d 443, 445, 79 Ill.Dec. 819, 821, 464 N.E.2d 723, 725 (1st Dist. 1984); see also People v. Chicago Title Trust Co., 75 Ill.2d 479, 488, 27 Ill.Dec. 476, 479, 389 N.E.2d 540, 543 (1979).
Therefore, based on the specific circumstances, both res judicata and collateral estoppel could apply to bar a claim or action. See Old OrchardBank Trust Co. v. Levin (1984), 124 Ill. App.3d 443. This court considered a case factually similar to the instant action in Consol Builders Supply Co. v. Ebens (1975), 24 Ill. App.3d 988.
The doctrine is based on the principle that the law grants every man an opportunity to present his case on the issues in question, but requires him to put forth all grounds of recovery he has. Pedigo v. Johnson (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 392, 395, appeal denied (1985), 106 Ill.2d 556; Pratt v. Baker (1967), 79 Ill. App.2d 479, 485, cert. denied (1967), 389 U.S. 874, 19 L.Ed.2d 157, 88 S.Ct. 165. This principle of finality applies not only to questions which were actually litigated in the earlier proceeding, but extends also to those questions which could have been raised or determined. ( Spiller v. Continental Tube Co. (1983), 95 Ill.2d 423, 432; Old Orchard Bank Trust Co. v. Levin (1984), 124 Ill. App.3d 443, 446; Bond v. Dunmire (1984), 129 Ill. App.3d 796, 800; Neuberg v. Michael Reese Hospital Medical Center (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 93, 99, appeal denied (1984), 96 Ill.2d 568.) Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment in a prior suit may be conclusive as to all questions which could have been litigated in that action. Yaw v. Beeghly (1982), 109 Ill. App.3d 627, 632; Thornton v. Williams (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 544, 546.