Olcott v. Headrick

15 Citing cases

  1. Kennedy v. Roundtree

    63 S.C. 395 (S.C. 1902)

    Mr. Allen J. Green, contra, cites: Court first obtainingjurisdiction retains it: 46 S.C. 126. Judgment cannot becollaterally attacked: 34 S.C. 452; 40 S.C. 69. Courthas jurisdiction until confirmation of report on sales: Foster's Fed. Pr., 316; Bail. Eq., 16; 24 Fed.R., 215; 141 U.S. 543; 2 Foster's Fed. Pr., sec. 379; 59 S.C. 549; Dud. Eq., 24; 22 S.C. 589; 36 S.C. 151; Rice, 376; 28 S.C. 101. Injunction will not be granted to stay an illegalsale: 32 S.C. 509; 10 S.C. 261. As to merger: 47 S.C. 305; 15 Ency., 314; 28 S.C. 486; 16 S.C. 330; 57 S.C. 182 April 10, 1902.

  2. Texas Pacific Railway v. Johnson

    151 U.S. 81 (1894)   Cited 41 times

    The power in such cases to make orders limiting the time for presentation of claims in order that they shall be chargeable upon the surrendered property has been clearly recognized by this court. Olcott v. Headrick, 141 U.S. 543, and cases cited; Union Trust Co. v. Morrison, 125 U.S. 591. See also Pine Lake Iron Co. v. Lafayette Car Works, 53 F. 853.

  3. United States v. Elliott

    57 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1932)   Cited 5 times

    In re Anderson, supra, page 529 of 279 F.; People v. Hopkins, supra. It has been the practice of equity courts to abrogate the time limit for filing claims where a reasonable explanation is offered for failing to comply and to let in claimants upon such terms as might be imposed as long as the fund is in court. Daniels Chy. Pl. Prac., supra, p. 1205; In the Matters of Howard, 9 Wall. (76 U.S.) 175, 184, 19 L. Ed. 634; Johnson v. Waters, 111 U.S. 640, 674, 4 S. Ct. 619, 28 L. Ed. 547; Olcott v. Headrick, 141 U.S. 543, 548, 12 S. Ct. 81, 35 L. Ed. 851; Grinnell v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 16 N.J. Eq. 283, 284; Brooks v. Gibbons, 4 Paige (N.Y.) 374; Burchard v. Phillips, 11 Paige (N.Y.) 66; see, also, Wechsler v. U.S., 27 F.2d 850, 851 (C.C.A. 3); U.S. v. Birmingham Trust Savings Co., 258 F. 562, 564 (C.C.A. 5). We do not think that the government in seeking to collect taxes should be treated with less favor than general creditors.

  4. In re Banner Brewing Co.

    24 F. Supp. 675 (E.D. Mich. 1938)   Cited 2 times

    In re Anderson, supra, page 529 of 279 F.; People v. Hopkins, supra. It has been the practice of equity courts to abrogate the time limit for filing claims where a reasonable explanation is offered for failing to comply and to let in claimants upon such terms as might be imposed as long as the fund is in court. Daniels Chy. Pl. Prac., supra, p. 1205; In re Howard, 9 Wall. (76 U.S.) 175, 184, 19 L.Ed. 634; Johnson v. Waters, 111 U.S. 640, 674, 4 S.Ct. 619, 28 L.Ed. 547; Olcott v. Headrick, 141 U.S. 543, 548, 12 S.Ct. 81, 35 L.Ed. 851; Grinnell v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 16 N.J. Eq. 283, 284; Brooks v. Gibbons, 4 Paige (N.Y.) 374; Burchard v. Phillips, 11 Paige (N.Y.) 66; see, also, Wechsler v. U.S., 27 F.2d 850, 851 (C.C.A. 3); U.S. v. Birmingham Trust Savings Co., 258 F. 562, 564 (C.C.A.5). We do not think that the government in seeking to collect taxes should be treated with less favor than general creditors.

  5. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Williamsport Wire Rope Co.

    19 F. Supp. 482 (M.D. Pa. 1937)   Cited 1 times

    The requirement that the purchaser pay, in addition to the amount of his bid, certain undetermined amounts is not unreasonable and will not discourage bidders, but on the other hand such requirement may be necessary in the sale of a large going business and is frequently done. See Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93, 24 S.Ct. 399, 48 L.Ed. 629; Olcott v. Headrick, 141 U.S. 543, 12 S.Ct. 81, 35 L. Ed. 851; Hanlon v. Smith (C.C.) 175 F. 192, 193; Bound v. South Carolina Ry. Co. (C.C.A.) 58 F. 473; Sheffield Birmingham Coal, Iron Ry. Co. v. Newman (C.C. A.) 77 F. 787; Central Trust Co. v. Denver Rio Grande R. R. Co. (C.C.A.) 97 F. 239; Atchison, Topeka Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Osborn (C.C.A.) 148 F. 606. The largest part of the alleged undetermined amount, the unpaid indebtedness of the receivers, has been made certain by the statements filed by the receivers pursuant to the foreclosure decree. The remaining amounts are capable of being ascertained with reasonable certainty.

  6. Fallon v. Commerce Com

    402 Ill. 516 (Ill. 1948)   Cited 21 times

    The legal position of a trustee under the Bankruptcy Act is quite similar to that of a receiver. It is settled that the order of the court authorizing a sale of property in its custody controls the rights of the purchaser. If it is sold free and clear the purchaser obtains all the title free of liens. It is clear of common claims and subject only to the liens or deeds fixed in the order of sale. (45 Am. Jur. 313; Houston Texas Central Railway Co. v. Crawford, 88 Tex. 277, 53 A.S.R. 752; Olcott v. Headrick, 141 U.S. 543, 35 L. ed. 851.) In the instant case the conveyance by the trustee was free of all mortgages and liens, with exceptions as to taxes and certain other enumerated claims, of which only "easements" or "rights of way" are relied upon by appellees, which, as pointed out above, is insufficient. Second, it is also to be observed that when property is in the control and custody of a court, it will allow an interested party to intervene and will take measures to prevent any abuse of the court's process and powers.

  7. Gully v. First Nat. Bank

    184 So. 615 (Miss. 1938)   Cited 4 times

    The failure of the state or any of the political subdivisions to file their claim for taxes in a receivership would not constitute a bar. Sec. 104, Mississippi Constitution; U.S. v. Kendall, 263 Fed. 126; Sec. 193, Title 12, U.S.C.A., sec. 5235 R.S.; People of New York v. Hopkins, 18 F.2d 731; State of Mississippi v. Joiner, 23 Miss. 500; Adams v. I.C.R.R., 15 So. 640, 71 Miss. 752; Josselyn v. Stone, 28 Miss. 753; Parmilee v. McNutt, 1 S. M. 179; Trust Co. v. Norfolk, 183 Fed. 803, 197 Fed. 737; Texas Pac. v. Manton, 164 U.S. 636, 41 L.Ed. 580; Olcott v. Headrick, 141 U.S. 543, 35 L.Ed. 85; Anderson v. Condict, 93 Fed. 349; Houston v. Crawford, 28 L.R.A. 761; Texas Pacific Ry. v. Johnson, 151 U.S. 81, 38 L.Ed. 81; Texas v. Blum, 184 U.S. 641, 41 L.Ed. 582; Texas v. Gay, 167 U.S. 745, 42 L.Ed. 1209; Central Coal Co. v. Southern National Bank, 34 S.W. 385. It certainly cannot be said in this case that the State of Mississippi or any of its political subdivisions was a party to the proceedings for the liquidation of the old bank.

  8. McCloskey v. Shortle

    64 P.2d 1294 (N.M. 1937)   Cited 4 times

    The sale made by the court could have been provided for in the original order. It was indefinite as to certain items, particularly the receiver's fees, and costs of court, but these are not jurisdictional defects, even if irregular. In Olcott et al. v. Headrick, 141 U.S. 543, 12 S.Ct. 81, 82, 35 L.Ed. 851, a much more indefinite order of sale was approved. An order was entered by the trial court, providing that the purchaser at a sale of real estate decreed to be sold in a mortgage foreclosure, and as part of the consideration of the purchase (in addition to his cash bid) would pay and satisfy any and all claims then pending against the receiver, which might be thereafter allowed by the court.

  9. Webb v. J. G. White Engineering Corp.

    204 Ala. 429 (Ala. 1920)   Cited 23 times

    The defendant was not a servant of the government. 96 U.S. 421, 24 L.Ed. 847; 39 Stat. at Large, 747; (D.C.) 256 Fed. 552; 141 U.S. 543, 12 Sup. Ct. 81, 35 L.Ed. 851; 162 N.Y. 638, 57 N.E. 1116; 91 Kan. 450, 138 P. 632, 50 L.R.A. (N.S.) 574; 220 N.Y. 184, 115 N.E. 470; 125 Tenn. 98, 140 S.W. 747, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 586; 246 U.S. 28, 38 Sup. Ct. 271, 62 L.Ed. 560; 250 U.S. 46, 39 Sup. Ct. 393, 63 L.Ed. 835. Andrews Peach, of Sheffield, for appellees.

  10. H. T. C. Ry. Co. v. Strycharski

    92 Tex. 1 (Tex. 1896)   Cited 36 times

    The conditions stipulated in the decree form part of the consideration of the purchase, and define the extent of the burdens assumed by the purchaser. Railway v. Johnson, 14 Sup. Ct. Reporter, 250; Olcott v. Headrick, 141 U.S. 543; Jesup v. Railway, 44 Fed. Rep., 663; Gluck Becker on Receivers, 422. A court of equity, administering property committed to its custody pending foreclosure of mortgages thereon and sale thereof, may lawfully decree that the purchaser shall take such property free from all claims except such as shall be established in said court, and may lawfully prescribe a time within which all persons having claims against such trust fund, whether by reason of the obligations of the mortgagor, or by reason of claims against the court's receiver, or other expenses of administration, shall file their claims in said court, and that unless so filed such claims shall not be entitled to participate in the funds realized from such sale, and shall not be a charge upon such property in the hands of the purchaser or his assigns.