The petition sufficiently identified the date, time and place of this incident and that it involved harassment that led to police involvement. To the extent it is argued that the pleadings were insufficient, Family Court had authority to conform petitioner's pleadings to the proof, sua sponte, and there is no contention that he was unfairly surprised or prejudiced (see Oksoon K. v Young K., 115 A.D.3d 486, 487 [1st Dept 2014], lv denied, 24 N.Y.3d 902 [2014]).

[2, 3] The mother’s contention that the court abused its discretion in conforming the pleading to the proofs is improperly raised for the first time in her reply brief (see Erdey v. City of New York, 129 A.D.3d 546, 546-47, 11 N.Y.S.3d 592 [1st Dept. 2015]). In any event, the mother had a full and fair opportunity to address allegations concerning unsubstantiated accusations of sexual abuse of one or both of the children in 2020 that she, herself, testified to at both the Family Court Act § 1028 and fact-finding hearings (seeMatter of Oksoon K. v. Young K., 115 A.D.3d 486, 487, 981 N.Y.S.2d 423 [1st Dept. 2014], lv. denied 24 N.Y.3d 902, 2014 WL 4454914 [2014]). We have considered the mother’s remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

The father's contention that he had no notice or opportunity to defend against these charges because they were not alleged in the petition is unpreserved, as he did not object or respond when petitioner requested the derivative neglect findings (see Matter of Michelle S. , 195 A.D.2d 721, 722, 600 N.Y.S.2d 303 [3d Dept. 1993] ). Further, the court properly sua sponte conformed the petition to the proof adduced at the hearing, as no surprise or prejudice could result, given the father's admissions (see Family Court Act § 1051[b] ; Matter of Jose M.R. v. Arian S. , 209 A.D.3d 549, 176 N.Y.S.3d 50 [1st Dept. 2022] ; Matter of Oksoon K. v. Young K. , 115 A.D.3d 486, 487, 981 N.Y.S.2d 423 [1st Dept. 2014] ).

Contrary to Arian S.’s contention, he was not denied due process when the Family Court sua sponte conformed the petition to the proof adduced during the fact-finding hearing, as Arian S. could not have been surprised or prejudiced by his own admissions (see Matter of Oksoon K. v. Young K., 115 A.D.3d 486, 487, 981 N.Y.S.2d 423 [1st Dept. 2014], lv denied, 24 N.Y.3d 902, 2014 WL 4454914 [2014] ). As to Arian S.’s petition, we find no basis to disturb the Family Court's determination that Jose R. was more credible than Arian S. (see Matter of Lisa S. v. William V., 95 A.D.3d 666, 666, 943 N.Y.S.2d 886 [1st Dept. 2012] ).

Contrary to respondent's contentions, Family Court did not violate his due process rights by including in its order events to which respondent testified but which were not contained in the original family offense petition. Family Court had the authority to conform petitioner's pleadings to the proof, sua sponte ( Oksoon K. v. Young K. , 115 A.D.3d 486, 981 N.Y.S.2d 423 [1st Dept. 2014], citing O'Neill v. New York Univ. , 97 A.D.3d 199, 209, 944 N.Y.S.2d 503 [1st Dept. 2012], lv denied 24 N.Y.3d 902, 2014 WL 4454914 [2014] ; see alsoCave v. Kollar , 2 A.D.3d 386, 388, 767 N.Y.S.2d 856 [2d Dept. 2003] ). Given that Family Court's determination rested squarely on respondent's admissions, and that respondent was neither hindered in preparation of his case nor suffered any prejudice due to surprise, the court properly conformed the pleadings to the proof.

Contrary to respondent's contention, reversal is not mandated on the ground that Family Court based its determination, in part, on incidents not alleged in the petition. Inasmuch as respondent has failed to make any showing of prejudice, we exercise our discretion pursuant to CPLR 3025 (c) to deem the petition amended to conform to the proof presented at the hearing (seeKimso Apts., LLC v. Gandhi , 24 N.Y.3d 403, 411, 998 N.Y.S.2d 740, 23 N.E.3d 1008 [2014] ; Matter of Pittsford Gravel Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Town of Perinton , 43 A.D.2d 811, 812, 350 N.Y.S.2d 480 [4th Dept. 1973], lv denied 34 N.Y.2d 618, 355 N.Y.S.2d 365, 311 N.E.2d 501 [1974] ; Harbor Assoc. v. Asheroff , 35 A.D.2d 667, 668, 317 N.Y.S.2d 897 [2d Dept. 1970], lv denied 27 N.Y.2d 490, 318 N.Y.S.2d 1026, 267 N.E.2d 281 [1970] ; see also Matter of Oksoon K. v. Young K. , 115 A.D.3d 486, 487, 981 N.Y.S.2d 423 [1st Dept. 2014], lv denied 24 N.Y.3d 902, 2014 WL 4454914 [2014], rearg denied 24 N.Y.3d 1029, 997 N.Y.S.2d 680, 22 N.E.3d 188 [2014] ).

Petitioner's testimony that on January 30, 2017, respondent summoned the police to the apartment and attempted to have her arrested about three times that day was sufficient to support a finding that respondent's actions constituted the family offense of harassment in the second degree because they served no legitimate purpose and only alarmed or seriously annoyed petitioner (see Penal Law § 240.26[3] ). The issuance of the one-year order of protection in petitioner's favor directing respondent to stay away from petitioner, her home and employment was appropriate, because it will likely be helpful in eradicating the root of the family disturbance and fully protect petitioner (see Matter of Oksoon K. v. Young K., 115 A.D.3d 486, 487, 981 N.Y.S.2d 423 [1st Dept. 2014], lv denied 24 N.Y.3d 902, 2014 WL 4454914 [2014] ). Respondent's contention that the Referee should have imposed less drastic remedies at disposition ignores petitioner's dispositional testimony that she was afraid in her own home, because respondent continued leaving the stove on unattended in violation of the May 8, 2017 and June 1, 2017 temporary orders of protection.

The Referee's credibility determinations are supported by the record, and there is no basis to disturb them (see Matter of Lisa S. v. William V., 95 A.D.3d 666, 943 N.Y.S.2d 886 [1st Dept.2012] ). The issuance of a two-year order of protection was appropriate "because it will likely be helpful in eradicating the root of the family disturbance" (Matter of Oksoon K. v. Young K., 115 A.D.3d 486, 487, 981 N.Y.S.2d 423 [1st Dept.2014], lv. denied 24 N.Y.3d 902, 2014 WL 4454914 [2014] ). Respondent has not preserved his contention that the Referee should have dismissed the petition because it violated his right to due process by failing to delineate a sufficiently narrow time frame for the alleged offenses (see Matter of Erica D. [Maria D.], 80 A.D.3d 423, 424, 915 N.Y.S.2d 46 [1st Dept.2011], lv. denied 16 N.Y.3d 708, 2011 WL 1160593 [2011] ; Matter of Tiffany A., 295 A.D.2d 288, 289, 744 N.Y.S.2d 669 [1st Dept.2002] ).