Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-11884-IT
2024-02-06
Michael OKOSI, Plaintiff, v. Scott ROBY, Defendant.
Alycia M. Kennedy, Max D. Stem, Todd & Weld LLP, Boston, MA, Daniel L. McFadden, Jessie J. Rossman, Medha Swaminathan, ACLU of Massachusetts, Boston, MA, for Plaintiff. Sarah McAteer, Elizabeth L. Bostwick, Randall F. Maas, City of Boston Law Department, Boston, MA, for Defendant.
Alycia M. Kennedy, Max D. Stem, Todd & Weld LLP, Boston, MA, Daniel L. McFadden, Jessie J. Rossman, Medha Swaminathan, ACLU of Massachusetts, Boston, MA, for Plaintiff.
Sarah McAteer, Elizabeth L. Bostwick, Randall F. Maas, City of Boston Law Department, Boston, MA, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
TALWANI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Following a four-day trial, a jury awarded Plaintiff Michael Okosi $17,500 in compensatory damages and $75,000 in punitive damages on some of his claims against Defendant Scott Roby. Now pending before the court are Defendant's Motion for a New Trial [Doc. No. 130] and Motion for Remittitur [Doc. No. 125], and Plaintiff's Motion to Modify the Judgment [Doc. No. 122]. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED and Defendant's motions are DENIED.
I. Background
Michael Okosi, a resident of Boston, brought this action against Boston Police Officer Scott Roby alleging Fourth Amendment violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful seizure (Count I) and excessive force (Count II), and state law claims for battery (Count III), false arrest (Count IV), malicious prosecution (Count V), abuse of process (Count VI), and false imprisonment (Count VII).
The weight of the evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to Okosi (the non-moving party), see Cambridge Plating Co., Inc. v. Napco, Inc., 85 F.3d 752, 764 (1st Cir. 1996), and consistent with the split verdict, was as follows:
On November 23, 2018, Boston Police responded to a 911 call made from Okosi's home. The female caller (later identified as Okosi's fiancée) reported that an unknown woman with a knife was in the house. 911 Call Tr., Trial Ex. 1.1. When police arrived, they met with the caller in the living area of the house and determined that the woman who reportedly had a knife had left the home. Trial Day 3 Tr. 69:20-25 [Doc. No. 113].
Hearing the commotion from the third floor, Okosi went downstairs and asked the police "why are you in my house," "did I authorize you to be in my house?" and loudly told the officers several times to "get the fuck out of my house." Nest Camera Footage, Trial Ex. 6.
Okosi then entered the living area on the first floor, and within a few minutes had calmed down. Trial Day 2 Tr. 51:1-7 [Doc. No. 112]. While he was in the living area, Roby and another officer entered the house and stood in the entryway. Nest Camera Footage, Trial Ex. 2. The front door was open and Okosi could feel cold air coming in. Okosi asked the officers to close the door, saying "can you close my front door, bro? I pay for heat. Can you close my front door please?" Nest Camera Footage, Trial Ex. 2. Roby gestured at the officer next to him to close the door, and the officer complied but the door did not
shut completely. Id. Okosi, who could not see the door closing from where he stood, "decided to just close it [him]self." Trial Day 2 Tr. 53:1-6 [Doc. No. 112]. Okosi walked to the door and reached past Roby with his right arm to tap the door shut, leaving his left arm at his side. Id. at 53:7-19; see also Nest Camera Footage, Trial Ex. 2 (showing Okosi closing the door with his right hand). Okosi did not touch Roby. Trial Day 2 Tr. 139:18-21 [Doc. No. 112].
As Okosi reached past Roby, Roby roughly grabbed Okosi and threw him against the door, which Okosi described as "very painful." Id. at 54:24. Roby also began screaming at Okosi, who yelled "What did I do? I didn't do anything." Nest Camera Footage, Trial Ex. 2; Trial Day 2 Tr. at 55:21-23, 55:24-55:2 [Doc. No. 112]. At trial, Okosi explained: "I was scared. I was frantic. I didn't know what to expect...." Id. at 56:1-2. Concerned that Roby "was going to beat [him] up," Okosi alerted the officers that he had a security camera above the staircase that covered the entryway. Id. at 54:11-14, 55:21-23, 57:9-13, 64:12-19.
Roby handcuffed Okosi, who was shirtless and barefoot, and forced him out of his house into a police cruiser. Nest Camera Footage, Trial Ex. 2; Trial Day 2 Tr. 58:1-10 [Doc. No. 112]. While other officers drove Okosi to the police station, Roby returned inside the house and peered towards the area where Okosi had reported the security camera was located. Nest Camera Footage, Trial Ex. 4.
Back at the police station, Officer Lockwood, who had only seven months on the job, was assigned to write an incident report on what transpired at Okosi's home. Trial Day 2 Tr. 145:1-17 [Doc. No. 112]. When Roby returned to the police station, he falsely told Lockwood that he had been assaulted at the scene, and that Okosi "attempted to push [him] to the side with his right hand and then hit [him] in the chest with a closed fist." Id. at 150:1-4; 152:3-24. Lockwood included Roby's description of the event in the incident report. Incident Report, Trial Ex. 8. Following the incident, Roby filed charges against Okosi for assault and battery on a police officer and disorderly conduct. Trial Day 2 Tr. 151:13-25. [Doc. No. 112].
Okosi spent the night in a cell at the police station. Trial Day 2 Tr. 59:3-5 [Doc. No. 112]. He was extremely cold and was not provided a shirt or shoes, and had "severe panic attacks." Id. at 59:6-21. The next morning, his fiancée posted his bail, and he was released. Id. at 29:6-7.
Following his release, Okosi promptly filed a formal complaint with the Boston Police Department and provided the video footage from the incident. Id. at 71:3-18. He also submitted to a recorded interview regarding the incident. On March 7, 2019, almost four months after the arrest, the charges were dropped. Joint Stipulation of Facts, Trial Ex. 3. [Doc. No. 85].
At trial, Roby conceded that portions of the incident report were inaccurate but asserted instead that Okosi had assaulted him with his left hand. Trial Day 3 Tr. 146:4-9 [Doc. No. 113]. No officer corroborated Roby's account of the alleged assault at trial, although there were several officers in the entryway at the time of the incident.
In summary, the evidence at trial supported Okosi's claim that Roby falsely accused Okosi of pushing him, that Roby made the decision to charge Okosi with assault and battery on a police officer and disorderly conduct, that Roby did so knowing that those charges were false, and that his contrary testimony at trial was also false.
After receiving the evidence, the jury found for Okosi on his § 1983 unlawful
seizure, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment claims, and awarded him $17,500 in compensatory damages and $75,000 in punitive damages. The jury did not find for Okosi on the excessive force and other remaining claims.
II. Motion for New Trial
Roby seeks a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. "A district court may set aside the jury's verdict and order a new trial only if the verdict is against the law, against the weight of the credible evidence, or tantamount to a miscarriage of justice." Casillas-Diaz v. Palau, 463 F.3d 77, 81 (1st Cir. 2006). Defendant does not argue that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the credible evidence. Instead, he challenges two pretrial evidentiary rulings and the court's instruction on punitive damages.
A. The Evidentiary Rulings
Roby contends that the court erred in pretrial rulings precluding evidence of [Redacted] his alleged intoxication during the incident. A district court evaluates post-verdict challenges to pretrial evidentiary rulings under the harmless error standard. Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. Though "evidentiary rulings in the admissions or exclusion of evidence provide a basis for a new trial," such "errors in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence ... are not 'ground for a new trial unless the refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.'" McKeown v. Woods Hole, 9 F. Supp. 2d 32, 38 (D. Mass. 1998).
Rule 61 provides: "Unless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting or excluding evidence—or any other error by the court or a party—is ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order. At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights."
[Redacted]
1. Intoxication
Roby also contends that the court erred in precluding witnesses from testifying to their opinions that Okosi was intoxicated at the time of the incident and that jurors should have been allowed to consider whether Okosi's alleged intoxication influenced his memory of events. Def.'s Post-Trial Mem. 5-6 [Doc. No. 129].
Prior to trial, Okosi sought to exclude any evidence, testimony, or argument regarding Okosi's alleged intoxication. Mot. in Limine to Exclude Evidence Relating to Alleged Intoxication [Doc. No. 61]. Okosi noted that no contemporaneous evidence of alcohol consumption—like a breathalyzer, field sobriety test, blood test, or witness testimony that Okosi consumed alcohol— would be offered to show he was intoxicated on the day of the arrest. Id. at 1. Consequently, Okosi sought to have any testimony as to intoxication excluded because (1) there was no rational basis to believe Okosi was intoxicated; and (2) the probative value of that evidence, if any, was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Id. at 3-4.
Roby opposed exclusion. Roby's Opp. to Pl.'s Mot. in Limine to Exclude Evidence Relating to Alleged Intoxication 2-3 [Doc. No. 66]. Roby argued that (1) lay evidence of intoxication based on personal observations is admissible, and (2) the probative value of Okosi's alleged intoxication outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice.
In resolving the issue, the court differentiated between personal observations from which the jury could infer intoxication and lay opinion testimony. The court placed no limits on fact witnesses testifying "to their direct observations (what they
saw, heard, or smelled)." Elec. Order [Doc. No. 79]. The court limited lay witness testimony, however, precluding "their opinions about whether Okosi was intoxicated." Id.
Roby contends that "[j]urors should have been permitted to consider how, if at all, Plaintiff's intoxication affected not only his behavior ... but also his recollection" of events. Def.'s Post-Trial Mem. 6 [Doc. No. 129]. But Roby was permitted to offer any observations for the jurors' consideration as to whether Okosi was intoxicated. And at trial, Roby and his counsel had the following colloquy on direct examination:
Q: What — was there anything else that you observed about Mr. Okosi physically when you were arresting him?
A: Just a strong odor of alcohol emanating from his — when he was speaking.
Trial Day 3 Tr. 102:11-15 [Doc. No. 113].
Under Rule 701, lay opinion evidence must be "helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony or determining a fact in issue." Fed. R. Evid. 701(b). "The nub of that requirement is to exclude testimony where 'the witness is no better suited than the jury' to make the judgment at issue." United States v. Meises, 645 F.3d 5, 16 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Kornegay, 410 F.3d 89, 95 (1st Cir. 2005)). Here, while Roby was precluded from offering his opinion that Okosi was intoxicated, he was allowed to provide the jury with all facts on which his lay opinion would have been based.
As Plaintiff summarizes, (1) there was no evidence offered that Okosi consumed alcohol that day; (2) there was no evidence that the police tested Okosi for alcohol; (3) the police report made no mention of alcohol or intoxication; and (4) the video footage of the incident did not show Okosi stumbling or slurring words. Pl.'s Post-Trial Mem. 11-12 [Doc. No. 135]. The jury heard testimony from Roby that he smelled alcohol, "and was as well-equipped as Officer Roby to draw lay conclusions from that information, if they chose to credit it." Id. at 13.
Had the court allowed Roby's lay opinion that Okosi was intoxicated, there would have been a risk both of undue prejudice to Okosi and of usurpation of the jury's role as fact-finder. See Meises, 645 F.3d at 16-17 (A "usurpation problem [] arises when a witness testifies to opinions based on evidence that was also available to the jurors"); see also United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 214 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that jurors are not "'helped' within the meaning of Rule 701 by opinion testimony that, in addition to telling them 'what was in the evidence,' also told them 'what inferences to draw from it.'") (quoting United States v. Grinage, 390 F.3d 746, 750 (2d Cir. 2004)). In the context of this trial, where the jury was shown video of Okosi's arrest, it would have been especially inappropriate to allow Roby or other witnesses to testify to their interpretations of Okosi's behavior when the jury was able to view that behavior and independently assess its meaning. In sum, it was not error to exclude Roby's or any other person's lay opinion testimony that Okosi was intoxicated during the incident.
And, if exclusion of that evidence was error, it did not deprive Roby of any substantial rights. Even if the jury heard testimony from officers that Okosi was intoxicated despite no mention of that allegation in the police report, the central question at trial was whether Okosi physically assaulted Roby as Roby claimed that was the basis for the arrest. The video of the incident demonstrated that Okosi did not hit Roby with his right fist as Roby claimed, so the jury's determination that Roby falsely accused Okosi of assaulting him would likely not have been altered. Accordingly, the court finds that if it was somehow error to exclude lay
opinion testimony regarding Okosi's alleged intoxication, that error did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict.
B. The Punitive Damages Instruction
Roby also contends that the court erred by instructing the jury on punitive damages because "the record evidence did not support" such an instruction. Def.'s Post-Trial Mem. 6 [Doc. No. 129]. He argues that, to receive punitive damages on a false arrest claim, Okosi was required to show that Roby "determined to effectuate the arrest knowing that he lacked probable cause to do so, or, at least, with conscious indifference to the possibility that he lacked probable cause," and that Okosi made no such showing. Id. at 7 (quoting Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 26 (1st Cir. 1999)).
Okosi counters that the court's instruction on punitive damages was justified and that, in similar cases, courts have found a failure to instruct on punitive damages to be reversible error. Pl.'s Post-Trial Mem. 14 [Doc. No. 135] (citing Cameron v. City of New York, 598 F.3d 50, 69 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding trial court erred in not instructing jury on punitive damages where officers were accused of arresting plaintiff knowing they did not have probable cause); Chavez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 525 F.2d 827, 831 (10th Cir. 1975) (holding instruction on punitive damages should have been given where same evidence supported instruction on the definition of malice)). Okosi argues that the jury was presented ample evidence that Roby knew he was unjustified in arresting Okosi and that Roby's actions were improper. Pl.'s Post-Trial Mem. 15 [Doc. No. 135]. Okosi also argues that Roby's reliance on Iacobucci is misplaced. Id.
"A court must grant a new trial when jury instructions contain a prejudicial error." Perry v. Roy, 2016 WL 1948823, at *1 (D. Mass. May 3, 2016) (citing Sullivan v. Nat'l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1107 (1st Cir. 1994)). "A jury instruction is erroneous if it does not adequately explain the law, or if it confuses or misleads the jury as to a material issue in the case." Id.
Here, the jury was presented ample evidence that Okosi did not strike Roby, that Roby had personal knowledge that Okosi did not strike him, and that Roby therefore knowingly arrested Okosi without probable cause. Further, even if Roby was mistaken as to what exactly occurred as Okosi reached for the door, the jury was presented evidence that Roby took duplicitous steps to secure Okosi's arrest and overnight detention, including directing a police report to be filed against Okosi with false allegations, and falsely testifying to the contrary at trial. Because the evidence could support a jury finding that Roby knowingly arrested Okosi without probable cause in violation of his federal rights, the punitive damage instruction was proper. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983) (Punitive damages are available in a § 1983 action "when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others").
The court further agrees that Iacobucci does not direct a new trial here. In that case, the plaintiff was a town citizen who continued to videotape a town meeting despite protestations from city commissioners and police officers. 193 F.3d at 17-18. After repeated requests that he turn the camera off, the officers' supervisor, the defendant in the case, insisted that Iacobucci stop filming or be arrested. Id. at 18. Iacobucci declined to stop, so defendant grabbed the camera and Iacobucci's elbow, and led him into a nearby room where
defendant handcuffed and arrested him. Id. Iacobucci sued for, among other things, false arrest. Id. The jury found for Iacobucci on false arrest, and awarded him $75,000 in compensatory and $135,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 18. The district court struck the punitive damage portion of the award. Id. at 25.
On appeal, the First Circuit noted that "[p]unitive damages become a discretionary matter for the jury in a section 1983 action only if the plaintiff makes an adequate threshold showing." Id. The operative question, the First Circuit wrote, is whether a defendant had "knowledge that [he] may be acting in violation of federal law." Id. at 26 (citing Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 535, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999)). In upholding the district court's decision to strike the punitive damages, the First Circuit held that "the evidence show[ed] no more than an exasperated police officer, acting in the heat of the moment, [who] made an objectively unreasonable mistake." Id.
Roby argues that he, like the defendant in Iacobucci, was at most an exasperated police officer who acted in the heat of the moment. But as noted, the jury was presented evidence that Roby knew that Okosi had not assaulted him, and therefore knew that he had no grounds to arrest Okosi. Additionally, evidence was adduced showing that Roby attempted to cover up his wrongdoing with further wrongdoing. Unlike in Iacobucci, the evidence at trial in this case supports a finding that Roby acted with knowledge that he not only lacked probable cause, but also made false accusations, and the jury credited that evidence.
In sum, the court finds that the jury verdict was not against the law, against the weight of the credible evidence, or tantamount to a miscarriage of justice, and, accordingly, DENIES Roby's Motion for a New Trial [Doc. No. 130].
III. Motion for Remittitur
Defendant's Motion for Remittitur contends that the jury's punitive damage award of $75,000 for Unlawful Seizure under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "is grossly excessive and runs afoul of the Due Process clause" and should therefore be vacated or reduced. Memorandum of Law in Supp. of [Def.'s] Mot. for Remittitur ("Def.'s Remittitur Mem.") 1 [Doc. No. 126].
"Where properly imposed, punitive damages further legitimate state interests in the punishment and deterrence of unlawful conduct. An award 'grossly excessive' with respect to those interests violates the Due Process Clause, which requires that an individual have fair notice of the penalty to which his conduct could expose him." Méndez-Matos v. Mun. of Guaynabo, 557 F.3d 36, 52 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996)).
The Supreme Court has articulated three guideposts for considering whether punitive damages are excessive under the Due Process clause: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damage award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages award by the jury and civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. BMW, 517 U.S. at 575, 116 S.Ct. 1589. However, "[t]hese guideposts should neither be treated as an analytical straitjacket nor deployed in the expectation that they will 'draw a bright line marking the limits of a constitutionally acceptable punitive damages award.' Other pertinent factors may from time to time enter into the equation." Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 81 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 585, 116 S.Ct. 1589). The court has discretion to order remittitur if warranted based on the evidence at trial. Sebastino v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 530 F. Supp. 3d 81, 86 (D. Mass. 2021) (denying motion for remittitur for compensatory damages) (quoting Climent-Garcia v. Autoridad de Transporte Maritimo, 754 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2014)). "In reviewing an award of damages, a district court Is obliged to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and to grant remittitur or a new trial on damages only when the award "exceeds any rational appraisal or estimate of the damages that could be based upon the evidence before it."'" Porter v. Cabral, 2007 WL 602605, at *7 (D. Mass. Feb. 21, 2007) (declining to remit compensatory or punitive damages) (quoting E. Mountain Platform Tennis v. Sherwin-Williams, 40 F.3d 492, 502 (1st Cir. 1994)). In a § 1983 action specifically, punitive damages are available under limited circumstances; first, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant intentionally violated his federally protected rights or acted with reckless indifference toward those rights. Méndez-Matos, 557 F.3d at 47. Second, the amount of punitive damages available is limited under the Due Process clause. Id.
Here, Roby does not argue that the punitive damage award was unsupported by the evidence, but rather that the amount was excessive and thus unconstitutional. Okosi counters that the jury's punitive damage award was consistent with Due Process requirements and that the First Circuit has approved far greater punitive damages awards in cases where compensatory damage awards were much less than the $17,500 awarded in this case. Plaintiff's Opp. to Def.'s Mot. for Remittitur ("Pl.'s Remittitur Opp.") [Doc. No. 134]. The court considers the three BMW factors to determine if the punitive damage award here violates the Due Process Clause. In undertaking this evaluation, the court considers the specific conduct at issue here.
A. Reprehensibility
First, the court considers the degree of reprehensibility of Defendant's conduct, the "most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award...." BMW, 517 U.S. at 575, 116 S.Ct. 1589. "We have instructed courts to determine the reprehensibility of a defendant by considering whether: the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003) (citing BMW, 517 U.S. at 576-77, 116 S.Ct. 1589). "Conduct involving Violence or threat of violence' is generally regarded as being more serious than nonviolent conduct," but "[a]ctual physical injury is not essential." Méndez-Matos, 557 F.3d at 53 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 575-76, 116 S.Ct. 1589).
Further, punitive damage awards may be justified not only by defendant's actions on the date in question but also by their subsequent behavior. Davis v. Rennie, 264 F.3d 86, 115 (1st Cir. 2001) (affirming punitive damages where defendants physically assaulted plaintiff or did nothing while it was happening, and later tried to cover up the source of plaintiff's injury); see also Romano v. U-Haul Int'l, 233 F.3d 655, 673 (1st Cir. 2000) (upholding punitive damages where defendant said he would deny making comment to plaintiff about terminating her on the basis of sex in the event of a discrimination suit). Roby contends that his conduct "did not reach a high degree of reprehensibility" because he was not violent, Plaintiff was not physically harmed, and the jury had the opportunity to considered whether Roby used excessive force and concluded he did not. Def.'s Remittitur Mem. 4-5 [Doc. No. 126]. While Roby is correct that, based on the verdict here, punitive damages may not be based on violence or physical harm, he ignores the remainder of the jury's verdict. As Okosi counters, there was ample evidence at trial that Roby arrested and maliciously prosecuted Okosi based on Roby's false assertion that Okosi struck him, that Roby then lied about his actions to cover up any wrongdoing, and that this conduct was intentional and malicious. Pl.'s Remittitur Mem. 7-8 [Doc. No. 134].
In Romano, the First Circuit upheld a $285,000 punitive damages award in a Title VII case that did not involve violence or physical harm where there was "testimony that appellants knowingly violated appellee's federally protected rights and then attempted to conceal this violation." 233 F.3d at 673. Viewing the evidence here in the light most favorable to the non-moving party yields a similar conclusion. The jury was presented evidence that Roby violated Okosi's federal rights, gave inaccurate information in a police report that Okosi assaulted Roby, and then gave false testimony about the incident. It was not necessary for the jury to return a positive verdict on the excessive force claim, or there to have been violence or physical injury, to have found Roby's conduct to be sufficiently reprehensible to support a punitive damages award. See Méndez-Matos, 557 F.3d at 56 (The First Circuit ha[s] approved large awards in the absence of violence" where the conduct at issue was "intentional or malicious"). The court finds that the degree of reprehensibility of Roby's conduct supports the punitive damage award here.
B. Ratio
The second BMW factor considers whether the jury's punitive damages assessed were reasonable when compared to the awarded compensatory damages. There is no bright line rule governing the appropriate ratio between compensatory and punitive awards, though the Supreme Court has noted that "in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process." State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425, 123 S.Ct. 1513. And "where the compensatory award is substantial, a ratio of punitive-to-compensatory damages larger than one-to-one may be unreasonable." Méndez-Matos, 557 F.3d at 54 (citing State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425, 123 S.Ct. 1513). The animating question is whether "the measure of punishment is both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the general damages recovered." State Farm, 538 U.S. at 426, 123 S.Ct. 1513. "'Particularly egregious' conduct that results in relatively low actual damages can support a higher ratio than conduct that is less reprehensible." Romano, 233 F.3d at 673 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 582, 116 S.Ct. 1589).
Roby contends that the $75,000 punitive damages award was unreasonable where "the amount of compensatory damages was significant for the harm suffered by the Plaintiff." Def.'s Remittitur Mem. 5 [Doc. No. 126]. Roby also suggests that the court should consider the compensatory damages "split among the four counts" making the ratio of punitive damages to the compensatory damages on the unlawful seizure claim $75,000 to $4,375, or 17:1. Id. at 5-6.
Okosi responds that (1) Roby provides no authority for the idea that a damages award should be "split" among the four counts on which liability was found; and (2)
that the 4.3:1 ratio of compensatory to punitive damages in this case was well within constitutional bounds. Pl.'s Remittitur Mem. 12-13 [Doc. No. 134].
As a preliminary matter, the court will not second-guess the jury's unchallenged assessment of $17,500 in compensatory damages. The court also rejects Roby's argument that the damage award should be split between four counts, making the relevant compensatory award comparator $4,475, rather than $17,500. Roby cites no authority for this proposition, nor does First Circuit precedent support it. See Rodriguez-Torres v. Caribbean Forms Mfr., Inc., 399 F.3d 52, 66 (1st Cir. 2005) ("the most plausible reading of the jury's verdict" when it makes an unapportioned award "is that the jury wanted the specified sum awarded to the plaintiff no matter the count to which the award was eventually assigned."). Moreover, Roby agreed to a verdict form that assessed one damages figure for all compensatory damages. This court's assessment of the relationship between compensatory and punitive damages uses $17,500 as the relevant compensatory award.
Turning to whether the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages— $75,000 to $17,500—was reasonable, the court concludes that it was. The Supreme Court and First Circuit have upheld compensatory to punitive ratios similar to or larger than the 4.3:1 ratio here. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-4, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991) (upholding 4:1 punitive to compensatory damages ratio); Romano, 233 F.3d at 673 (upholding 19:1 ratio in Title VII case involving intentional discrimination); Davis, 264 F.3d at 117 (upholding 10:1 ratio on excessive force Fourth Amendment claim).
Roby argues that a 1:1 ratio would be appropriate here, but cites no cases holding that 1:1 is the only allowable relationship between compensatory and punitive damages in cases such as this, nor does he cite any case law holding that 4.3:1 is outside of the bounds of constitutionality. Accordingly, the court finds that the 4.3:1 ratio between compensatory and punitive damages awarded by the jury did not offend Due Process.
C. Sanctions for Comparable Misconduct
The final step in assessing a punitive damages award under BMW is "comparing the punitive damages award and the civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct." 517 U.S. at 583, 116 S.Ct. 1589. "[A] reviewing court engaged in determining whether an award of punitive damages is excessive should 'accord "substantial deference" to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue.'" Id. Congress, in drafting § 1983, "did not make any reference to the quantum of damages," so a reviewing court may "consider awards in similar cases to help determine if particular punitive damages in a given case appear excessive." Casillas-Diaz, 463 F.3d at 86. The First Circuit looks first to cases within this circuit, then to authorities outside the circuit for comparators. Méndez-Matos, 557 F.3d at 55. The central inquiry is "whether a particular defendant was given fair notice" of the potential liability for particular misconduct. Zimmerman, 262 F.3d at 83.
In reviewing potentially comparable cases, Méndez-Matos noted that the First Circuit has upheld large punitive damage awards "where the plaintiff suffered significant injury." 557 F.3d at 55 (explaining that in Davis, 264 F.3d at 94, a punitive damages award of over $1,000,000 was affirmed where "the plaintiff was thrown to the ground and repeatedly punched in the head"); see also Nydam v. Lennerton, 948 F.2d 808, 811 (1st Cir. 1991) (affirming two punitive damages awards of $100,000 each for excessive force claim); Gutierrez-Rodriguez
v. Soto, 882 F.2d 553, 580-81 (1st Cir. 1989) ("affirming total award of $600,000 in punitive damages for police shooting"); and Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d 920, 927 (1st Cir. 1987) (affirming total award of $200,000 in punitive damages for battery, false arrest, and imprisonment claims).
Méndez-Matos explained further that the First Circuit has also approved large punitive damages awards in the absence of violence where "the conduct at issue was typically intentional or malicious, such as discrimination." 557 F.3d at 56 (citing Rivera-Torres v. Ortiz Velez, 341 F.3d 86, 102 (1st Cir. 2003) (affirming a punitive award of $250,000 for politically motivated discrimination); Zimmerman, 262 F.3d at 83-84 (affirming an award of $400,000 for violations of state discrimination law); and Romano, 233 F.3d at 673 (affirming an award of $285,000 for violations of Title VII and state law)). Méndez-Matos also noted an out-of-circuit decision allowing a large punitive damages award for a nonviolent violation of Fourth Amendment rights that also involved malicious conduct. 557 F.3d at 56 (citing Romanski v. Detroit Ent., L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629, 650 (6th Cir. 2005)). In Romanski, a § 1983 false arrest case, the Sixth Circuit gave plaintiff the option of either remitting the punitive damage from $875,000 to $600,000 or proceeding with a new trial on damages. 428 F.3d at 650.
Méndez-Matos noted finally that First Circuit case law "provides no guidance for determining what penalty is appropriate for engaging in a non-violent violation of the Fourth Amendment," but that cases not involving malicious conduct "have resulted in punitive awards under $100,000." 557 F.3d at 56 (citing Dean v. Olibas, 129 F.3d 1001, 1007 (8th Cir. 1997) (affirming an award of $70,000 for malicious prosecution); and Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 810 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding $200,000 award excessive for malicious prosecution and giving Plaintiff option of remitting punitive damage award to $75,000 or proceeding with a new trial)). Concluding that the case before it similarly did not involve violence or malicious conduct, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's reduction in punitive damages on a § 1983 claim against a municipality of unlawful detention and a state law claim for emotional distress from $350,000 to $35,000, concluding that $350,000 exceeded the limits of due process. Id. at 40.
Here, the punitive damages award was not based on violent conduct, but did include malicious conduct, where, as noted above, the evidence supported the conclusion that Roby arrested Okosi based on a false assertion that Okosi struck him, and that Roby then lied about his actions to cover up any wrongdoing. Pl.'s Remittitur Mem. 7-8 [Doc. No. 134]. The jury's award of $75,000 was similar to that in non-violent Fourth Amendment cases not involving malicious conduct from courts of appeals from other circuits from more than twenty-five years ago, and considerably less than awards in other cases involving malicious conduct. Accordingly, the award does not violate Defendant's due process rights.
Defendant cites Milfort v. Prevete, 3 F. Supp. 3d 14 (E.D.N.Y. 2014), where there was no probable cause for an arrest for disorderly conduct, and the district court reduced a punitive damages award from $40,000 to $5,000. In Milfort, however, the district court found that "some mitigating circumstances existed," and, while there was malice, there was no evidence that the defendant had engaged in repeated acts of similar misconduct, the plaintiff was not damaged in a way that necessitated compensatory damages, and he was held in custody for only one and a half hours. The court finds Milfort distinguishable for each of these reasons.
In sum, after applying the BMW guideposts, the court finds that the $75,000 punitive
damage award assessed here is constitutionally sound, and Roby's Motion for Remittitur [Doc. No. 125] is DENIED.
IV. Motion to Modify the Judgment
Okosi's unopposed Motion to Modify the Judgment ("Mot. to Mod.") [Doc. No. 122] asks the court to modify its judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to include pre-judgment interest under Massachusetts law, at an annual rate of 12%, on the jury's compensatory damage award, commencing when the act was filed on November 19, 2021, until the court entered judgment on April 27, 2023. Okosi also asks that the judgment reflect that he is entitled to post-judgment interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) on the entire damages award under federal law, inclusive of pre-judgment interest and any attorney's fees award. Mot. to Mod. 1 [Doc. No. 122].
A. Prejudgment Interest under Massachusetts Law
A Rule 59(e) motion is the proper vehicle for seeking prejudgment interest once a judgment has issued. Crowe v. Bolduc, 365 F.3d 86, 92-93 (1st Cir. 2004). Where a party has brought and prevailed on mixed federal and state law claims "and the damages recovered are duplicative, i.e., not segregated into separate federal and state components, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to select the body of law under which the damages will be paid." Foley v. City of Lowell, 948 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1991). "Under Massachusetts law, the 'fruits of [a] state-law victory' generally 'include[] prejudgment interest, to be added ministerially after the verdict, not factored into the jury calculus.'" Primarque Prods. Co., Inc. v. Williams West & Witts Prods. Co., 988 F.3d 26, 44 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Foley, 948 F.2d at 17).
Okosi brought and prevailed on both federal and state claims, and the jury's $17,500 compensatory damage award was "for injuries or damages cause[d] by Defendant Scott Roby's actions," without differentiating between state and federal claims. See Jury Verdict 3 [Doc. No. 102]. Accordingly, Okosi is entitled to his selection of Massachusetts law as the governing precedent for any prejudgment interest award. Mot. to Mod. 3 [Doc. No. 122]; Foley, 948 F.2d at 17.
Massachusetts General Law ch. 231 § 6B provides:
In any action in which a verdict is rendered or a finding made or an order for judgment made for pecuniary damages for personal injuries to the plaintiff or for consequential damages, or for damage to property, there shall be added by the clerk of court to the amount of damages interest thereon at the rate of twelve per cent per annum from the date of commencement of the action even though such interest brings the amount of the verdict or finding beyond the maximum liability imposed by law.
Courts have interpreted this provision to require a 12% annual interest rate on a compensatory damage award dating from the date of a complaint's filing to the entry of final judgment. See Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 553 F.3d 121, 146 (1st Cir. 2009). Accordingly, the court will grant Plaintiff's request to amend the judgment to reflect that prejudgment interest should accrue on the $17,500 compensatory damage award from November 19, 2021, to April 27, 2023, for a total of $3,020.55. B. Post-Judgment Interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961
Okosi asserts that pre-judgment interest should run until April 27, 2023, the date of the court's original judgment, and post-judgment interest should run thereafter. Under Massachusetts law, the presumptive date for prejudgment interest is the date an amended final judgment enters, see Tobin, 553 F.3d at 147 (citing Foley, 948 F.2d at 17), while under federal law, post-judgment interest ordinarily begins to accrue on the date of the original entry of judgment, see id. at 146 (citing Cordero v. De Jesus-Mendez, 922 F.2d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) and Marshall v. Perez-Arzuaga, 866 F.2d 521, 524 (1st Cir. 1989)). Where Okosi does not seek prejudgment interest through an amended judgment date, and Defendant does not object to the choice of April 27, 2023, for the date that prejudgment ends and post judgment interest begins, the court adopts Okosi's proposed date.
28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) provides that "[i]nterest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court" and "[s]uch interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment." The First Circuit has held that § 1961 interest is "exclusive and mandatory" even where prejudgment interest has been awarded under state law. In re Redondo Constr. Corp., 820 F.3d 460, 467-8 (1st Cir. 2016). Postjudgment interest is awarded on the entire judgment, including any punitive damages and attorneys' fees, see Foley, 948 F.2d at 22, and any pre-judgment interest up to the date judgment was entered, see In re Redondo, 820 F.3d at 467-8.
Accordingly, the court will modify its judgment to reflect that Okosi is entitled post-judgment interest on the entire damages award, plus prejudgment interest and any attorneys' fees and costs awarded.
The court has granted Plaintiff an extension until April 10, 2024, to file his petition for attorneys' fees and costs. Elec. Order [Doc. No. 142].
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to Modify the Judgment [Doc. No. 122] is GRANTED, and Defendant's Motion for Remittitur [Doc. No. 125] and Motion for a New Trial [Doc. No. 130] are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.