ger v. Industrial Accident Comm. (Cal.), 24 P.2d 796; Conoher v. American Wire Steel Co. (N.J.), 64 A.2d 622; C. Rose Plumbing Co. v. Gordon (Okla.), 317 P.2d 197; Frank v. Anderson Bros. (Minn.), 51 N.W.2d 805; Frank v. Industrial Comm., 43 P.2d 158; Gugler v. Industrial Accident Fund (Mont.), 157 P.2d 89; Haggerty's Case (Mass.), 11 N.E.2d 583; Hale v. General Box Mfg. Co., 228 Miss. 394, 87 So.2d 679; Hanson v. Hays (Minn.), 29 N.W.2d 473; Industrial Comm. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 74 Colo. 52, 218 P. 910; Industrial Comm. v. Lockard, 89 Colo. 428, 3 P.2d 416; Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. Cahela, 251 Ala. 163, 36 So.2d 513; Irvine v. Perry (Idaho), 299 P.2d 97; J.F. Imbs Mill Co. v. Industrial Comm., 324 Ill. 416, 155 N.E. 380; Ketchell v. Wilson Co., 138 Kan. 97, 23 P.2d 488; Lutman v. American Shoe Machinery Co. (Mo.), 151 S.W.2d 701; Marshall v. Pletz, 317 U.S. 383, 87 L.Ed. 348; Martenson v. Shutte Lbr. Co. (Mo.), 162 S.W.2d 312; Moss v. Stainbridge, 215 Ala. 237, 110 So. 17; Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Nolen, 164 Okla. 213, 23 P.2d 381; Reynolds Metals Co. v. Brumley (Ark.), 290 S.W.2d 211; Richardson v. National Refining Co., 136 Kan. 724, 18 P.2d 131; Rogers v. Solem, 103 Colo. 52, 83 P.2d 154; Royal Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Comm., 293 P. 342; Rupp. v. Jacobs, 149 Kan. 712, 88 P.2d 112; Shank v. Consolidation Coal Corp., 161 Pa. Sup. 304, 54 A.2d 289; Slauson v. Standard Oil Co., 29 F. Supp. 497; Sprague v. Spencer (N.Y.), 14 N.Y.S.2d 673; Thomas v. Lockwood Mfg. Co., 236 Mo. App. 1248, 163 S.W.2d 117; Townsley v. Miami Roofing Sheet Metal Co. (Fla.), 79 So.2d 785; Trehern v. Grafe Auto Co., 232 Miss. 854, 100 So.2d 786; United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 195 Cal. 577, 234 P. 369; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Smith, 50 Ga. App. 585, 178 S.E. 472; Wolgamott v. Vinegar Hill Zinc Co. (Kan.), 99 P.2d 755; Yellow Cab Co. v. Industrial Comm., 315 Ill. 235, 146 N.E. 160; Secs. 6998-02(10), 6998-18, 6998-19(g), 6998-27, Code 1942; 2 Larson's Workmen's Comp. Law, Sec. 78.43(b) p. 270. HAL

Respondent first contends that the filing of this report by the physician should be treated as the filing of a claim for compensation within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and therefore sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the commission to hear and determine the claim. In support of this contention he relies upon the following cases: Oklahoma Natural Gas Corp. v. Craig, 193 Okla. 56, 139 P.2d 181; 141 P.2d 99; International Supply Co. v. Morrell, 187 Okla. 346, 102 P.2d 846; Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Nolen, 164 Okla. 213, 23 P.2d 381, and other similar cases. These cases do not go to the extent claimed by respondent.

Tolling has been in the mainstream of workers' compensation jurisprudence since the 1930's. It has been allowed where the employer's actions evince a "conscious recognition of liability" for the injury sustained: (a) by [its] provision of medical treatment — Smedley v. State Industrial Court, 1977 OK 55, ¶ 6, 562 P.2d 847; Hobart Sales and Service v. Harmon, 1962 OK 54, 369 P.2d 628; Oklahoma City v. Hardy, 1958 OK 264, 332 P.2d 13; Bethlehem Supply Co. v. Armbrister, 1957 OK 228, 316 P.2d 588; Wilcox Oil Co. v. Fuqua, 1950 OK 164, 224 P.2d 255, 203 Okl. 391; Domestic Laundry Dry Cleaning Co. v. Weston, 1947 OK 384, 190 P.2d 460, 200 Okl. 13; Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Nolen, 1933 OK 305, 23 P.2d 381, 164 Okl. 213; Atlas Coal Co. v. Corrigan, 1931 OK 31, 296 P. 963, 148 Okl. 36; (b) by payment for medical treatment — California Co. v. State Industrial Court, 1960 OK 80, 350 P.2d 957; Continental Oil Co. v. Wilkerson, 1933 OK 356, 22 P.2d 1004, 164 Okl. 62; and (c) by other acts In conscious recognition of liability " Indian Drilling Mud Co. v. McGrew, 1957 OK 115, 311 P.2d 247.Thompson v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., supra note 6, at ¶ 10 n. 16, 73 P.3d at 838 (emphasis added).

See, Nantz v. Nantz, 1988 OK 9, 749 P.2d 1137. The present form of § 43(A) reveals that the legislature intended that the statute of limitations be tolled by treatment authorized by either the employer or the insurance company. ¶ 14 In Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Nolen, 1933 OK 305, 23 P.2d 381, the Court construed the originally enacted statute, which the Court quotes: "The right to claim compensation under this Act shall be forever barred unless within one year after the injury, a claim for compensation thereunder shall be filed with the Commission." Nolen, 1933 OK 305, ¶ 4, 23 P.2d at 382.

The general rule in the majority of the states is that the furnishing of hospital and medical services is equivalent to or is the payment of compensation to the employee. So, in the case of Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Nolen, 164 Okla. 213, 23 P.2d 381, a case where the claimant was not paid monetary compensation but was furnished medical treatment, the Court said that "* * * the furnishing of medical treatment recognizes liability and constitutes the equivalent of the payment of compensation and is sufficient to toll the statute. We are unable to draw a legal distinction between the voluntary payment of compensation and the furnishing of medical treatment.

We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals' decision and affirm the order of the Workers' Compensation Court en banc. In Atlas Coal Co. v. Corrigan, 296 P. 963 (1931), Oklahoma Furniture Manufacturing Co. v. Nolen, 23 P.2d 381 (1933), Indian Drilling Mud Co. v. McGrew, 311 P.2d 247 (1957), and Smedley v. State Industrial Court, 562 P.2d 847 (1977), we said that in order for payments by the employer to be denominated as "remuneration in lieu of compensation", such payments must be made with intent and a "conscious recognition of liability by the employer". If an employer has intended to pay remuneration in lieu of compensation, or even to provide medical treatment after the one-year period has lapsed, his conduct waives the limitation period because of the "conscious recognition of liability". Inherent in the "conscious recognition of liability" is the conduct of the employer, either in intending to pay "remuneration", or "providing medical treatment". See Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Newport, 159 P.2d 726 (1945); Cupit v. Dancu Chemical Co., 316 P.2d 593 (1957).

Clark v. Keith, 103 Okla. 20, 229 P. 613 (1924); Gaier Stroh Millinery Co. v. Hilliker, 52 Okla. 74, 152 P. 410 (1915) and Munsingwear, Inc. v. Tullis, 557 P.2d 899, 901 (Okla. 1976). Munsingwear cites in support of the operation of the statute of limitations on the remedy only, the following cases: Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Nolen, 164 Okla. 213, 23 P.2d 381 (1933); Pine v. Indus. Comm'n., 148 Okla. 200, 298 P. 276 (1931); Atlas Coal Co. v. Corrigan, 148 Okla. 36, 296 P. 963 (1931); Skelly Oil Co. v. Harrell, 187 Okla. 412, 103 P.2d 88 (1940) and National Zinc Company v. Van Gunda, 402 P.2d 264 (Okla. 1965). Likewise, Haggard v. Calhoun, 294 P.2d 836 (Okla. 1956) which is twice cited by the majority as being supportive is doubtful in its application.

There, both payment of compensation and furnishing of medical treatment form the basis for the waiver. With the decision of Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Nolen, 164 Okla. 213, 23 P.2d 381 (1933), the furnishing of medical treatment was found sufficient to toll the limitation statute. That holding was based on determining the furnishing of medical treatment recognizes liability the same as payment of compensation.

Logan County v. York, Okla., 270 P.2d 968 (1954).Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Nolen, 164 Okla. 213, 23 P.2d 381 (1933); Pine v. The Indus. Comm'n., 148 Okla. 200, 298 P. 276 (1931); Atlas Coal Co. v. Corrigan, 148 Okla. 36, 296 P. 963 (1931); Steffens Ice Cream Co. v. Jarvis, 132 Okla. 300, 270 P. 1103 (1928); W.R. Pickering Lumber Co. v. Tincup, 132 Okla. 241, 269 P. 262 (1928); Skelly Oil Co. v. Harrell, 187 Okla. 412, 103 P.2d 88 (1940); Shank v. Oklahoma Office Bank Supply Co., Okla., 387 P.2d 626 (1963); and National Zinc Company v. Van Gunda, Okla., 402 P.2d 264 (1965). See n. 1, supra.

This Court has long held that for the purpose of the above-quoted proviso, "there is no legal distinction" between an employer's voluntary furnishing his employee medical treatment to which he is entitled under the Workmen's Compensation Law, and its payment to him of the compensation to which he is entitled under said law. See Shank v. Oklahoma Office Bank Supply Co., Okla., 387 P.2d 626, 629, citing Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Nolen, 164 Okla. 213, 23 P.2d 381, and other cases. In Sooner Rock and Sand Co. v. Donaho, Okla., 421 P.2d 844, we held that said section's one-year limitation period is tolled "during the time when" such medical attention is furnished.