Okin v. Isaac Goldman Co.

17 Citing cases

  1. Law Research Serv. v. Martin Lutz App. Print

    498 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1974)   Cited 20 times
    Holding that under New York law the assignment of an "existing judgment" for a sum of money is a transfer of a present interest and that the "assignment of an existing right creates an immediate lien in favor of the assignee that is valid against later lien creditors of the assignor" (citing Stathos v. Murphy, 26 A.D.2d 500, 276 N.Y.S.2d 727 (N.Y.App.Div. 1966))

    The assignment of a future right, on the other hand, creates a lien that attaches only at such time as the right accrues. See, e.g., Okin v. Isaac Goldman Co., 79 F.2d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 1935). Concededly the courts have encountered some difficulty in defining the contours of a future right or interest for purposes of assignment law.

  2. Goldberg v. N.Y. Community Bancorp

    565 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2009)   Cited 15 times

    See N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 13-103 ("A judgment for a sum of money, or directing the payment of a sum of money, recovered upon any cause of action, may be transferred; but if it is vacated or reversed, the transfer thereof does not transfer the cause of action unless the latter was transferable before the judgment was recovered"); Law Research, 498 F.2d at 837, 838 (holding that under New York law the assignment of an "existing judgment" for a sum of money is a transfer of a present interest and that the "assignment of an existing right creates an immediate lien in favor of the assignee that is valid against later lien creditors of the assignor" (citing Stathos v. Murphy, 26 A.D.2d 500, 276 N.Y.S.2d 727 (N.Y.App.Div. 1966))); see also Id. at 838 ("The assignment of a future right . . . creates a lien that attaches only at such time as the right accrues." (citing Okin v. Isaac Goldman Co., 79 F.2d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 1935))). Thus, if we determine that the Security Agreement transferred the USPS Judgment itself, Roslyn's interest in the Fund would have been perfected as of March 12, 2002, the date the Security Agreement was executed.

  3. Law Research Service. Inc. v. Crook

    524 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1975)   Cited 13 times
    In Law Research, Inc. v. Crook, supra, the Second Circuit held that even though the order of confirmation had not provided for the retention of jurisdiction, confirmation did not leave "the bankruptcy court powerless to discharge duties it had properly assumed" with respect to a fund in its possession.

    See 498 F.2d at 836 n. 6. LRS had argued in Lutz that there was no perfectable transfer when the assignment was given since there was at that time no separate and identifiable fund and the judgment might be upset on appeal. On authority of Stathos v. Murphy, 26 A.D.2d 500, 276 N.Y.S.2d 727 (1st Dept. 1966), aff'd, 19 N.Y.2d 883, 281 N.Y.S.2d 81, 227 N.E.2d 880 (1967), Judge Mansfield held that "the assignment of an existing judgment is of a present, not future interest," 498 F.2d at 838 (emphasis added), and thus not subject to the difficulties some courts have encountered in determining when rights in the latter category accrue. If this point of alleged distinction had been raised here, it would doubtless have been a sufficient answer that the judgment was entered more than four months before the filing of LRS's Chapter XI petition. See Okin v. Isaac Goldman Co., 79 F.2d 317, 319-20 (2 Cir. 1935). In his opinion on reargument in this case, rendered six months prior to Lutz, Bankruptcy Judge Herzog had ruled to this effect.

  4. In re Hygrade Envelope Corp.

    393 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1968)   Cited 17 times

    So far as the accounts receivable are concerned, this agreement gave Gibraltar no more than an equitable lien upon the future accounts as they arose, which would have been inferior to the lien of an attaching judgment creditor. See Okin v. Isaac Goldman Co., 79 F.2d 317 (2 Cir. 1935); Rockmore v. Lehman, 128 F.2d 564 (2 Cir. 1942), rev'd on rehearing, 129 F.2d 892, cert. denied 317 U.S. 700, 63 S.Ct. 525, 87 L.Ed. 559 (1943); Matter of City of New York v. Bedford Bar Grill, 2 N.Y.2d 429, 161 N.Y.S.2d 67, 141 N.E.2d 575 (1957). It was only when the factor satisfied the further requirement imposed by § 45 of the New York Personal Property Law, McKinney's Consol.Laws, c. 41, then in effect, and either notified the account debtor "that the account is payable to the lienor," or secured an additional assignment, that the lien became "so far perfected that no subsequent lien upon such property obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract could become superior to the rights of the transferee * * *," see § 60(a)(2).

  5. Swetnam v. Edmund Wright Ginsberg Corporation

    128 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1942)   Cited 6 times

    In 1936, there was only an agreement to assign, and, as we have held, no valid lien upon the hides and leather. Hence until the accounts came into existence, no security could exist; and until actually assigned, the security interest did not exist. Okin v. Isaac Goldman Co., 2 Cir., 79 F.2d 317; In re Modell, 2 Cir., 71 F.2d 148. When the assignment was made, a preference was created.

  6. In re Barnett

    124 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1942)   Cited 62 times

    The New York cases there cited showed that certain types of equitable liens, especially those created by mortgages and pledges of after-acquired property, could not withstand the onslaught of creditors who obtained judgment before the mortgagee or pledgee took possession. Titusville Iron Co. v. New York, 207 N.Y. 203, 100 N.E. 806; Zartman v. First National Bank, 189 N.Y. 267, 82 N.E. 127, 12 L.R.A., N.S., 1083; Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N.Y. 570, 37 N.E. 632, 40 Am.St.Rep. 635; In re Friedman, 2 Cir., 72 F.2d 412, and Okin v. Isaac Goldman Co., 2 Cir., 79 F.2d 317, similarly turning on New York law, did not involve the equitable rights of assignees of expectancies. It is not our duty, of course, to explain why the New York courts distinguish between the validity of mortgages and pledges of after-acquired property, and assignments of expectancies. 3. So that the pertinent facts should more clearly appear, we have followed the unusual course of first discussing the merits.

  7. U.S. v. Kenley

    Criminal No. 1:CR-06-009 (M.D. Pa. Jul. 6, 2006)

    In addition to asserting his innocence, a defendant must "`give sufficient reasons to explain why contradictory positions were taken before the district court and why permission should be given to withdraw the guilty plea.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 79 F.2d 317, 318 (3d Cir. 1992). Defendant fails to sufficiently explain why he has now decided to take a position that contradicts his previous statements to the court.

  8. Malone v. Bolstein

    151 F. Supp. 544 (N.D.N.Y. 1957)   Cited 12 times
    Interpreting New York law

    No question is raised but what the problem here is to be solved under the provisions of New York State law as construed and applied in New York State court decisions. Manchester Nat. Bank v. Roche, 1 Cir., 186 F.2d 827; In re Barnett, 2 Cir., 124 F.2d 1005, at page 1008, Okin v. Isaac Goldman Co., 2 Cir., 79 F.2d 317. Before attempting any discussion of the law which must be applied, it seems logical to consider and interpret the agreement of July 24, 1951.

  9. In re Ideal Mercantile Corp.

    143 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)   Cited 3 times

    The Second Circuit rejected this argument holding: (1) the October, 1930, assignment was "no more than an executory agreement to transfer [the proceeds] when it shall come into existence"; and (2) the equitable lien did not relate back to the October assignment. See discussion of this decision in Okin v. Isaac Goldman Co., 2 Cir., 79 F.2d 317, and in this respect compare 31 U.S.C.A. § 203 with New York Personal Property Law, § 41, Mck.Consol. Laws, c. 41.

  10. Scarborough v. Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates

    128 F. Supp. 948 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)   Cited 6 times

    Filardo v. Foley Bros., 1948, 297 N.Y. 217, 78 N.E.2d 480, reversed on other grounds, 1949, 336 U.S. 281, 69 S.Ct. 575, 93 L.Ed. 680; Crumpler v. Hines, 1917, 174 N.C. 283, 93 S.E. 780. Archibald v. Panagoulopoulos, 1922, 233 N.Y. 478, 135 N.E. 857; See Okin v. Isaac Goldman Co., 2 Cir., 1935, 79 F.2d 317. It is clear that Berkshire, being dubious of the bankrupt's financial condition, sought to protect itself fully against the economic collapse that eventually befell the bankrupt.