Opinion
14-P-815
04-14-2015
PRECIOUS OKEREKE v. ADAM G. COHEN & others.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff Precious Okereke appeals from the dismissal, by a judge of the Superior Court, pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), of her lawsuit, which was filed against the defendants who had represented two parties in a separate action Okereke had previously brought.
The plaintiff's underlying claims were brought against the defendants, who are attorneys, for their alleged conduct in connection with their defense in Okereke v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Company, et al., Docket No. SUCV2011-03349. That action was dismissed for failure by Okereke to comply with an order to pay a reduced filing fee.
On review of a dismissal under rule 12(b)(6), allegations in Okereke's complaint must be taken as true and construed in favor of the plaintiff, but the complaint must nevertheless be found to comply with the standard announced in the case of Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). In Iannacchino, our Supreme Judicial Court adopted the formulation articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp.: "While a complaint attacked by a . . . motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions . . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . [based] on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) . . . ." Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., supra, quoting from Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, supra at 555. "What is required at the pleading stage are factual 'allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)' an entitlement to relief, in order to 'reflect[ ] the threshold requirement of [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 8(a)(2) that the "plain statement" possess enough heft to "sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief."'" Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., supra, quoting from Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, supra at 557.
Upon our consideration of the arguments and authorities of the parties, we conclude that the order of dismissal by the judge was correct. The plaintiff has not met the standards appropriate for consideration under the present rules of pleading a cause of action, as she has not alleged facts plausibly suggesting that she had an attorney-client relationship with any of the defendant attorneys or that they otherwise owed her any duty. For this reason, among others, the motion judge properly concluded that the plaintiff had failed to state any potential claim for relief.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Kantrowitz, Trainor & Fecteau, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
Clerk Entered: April 14, 2015.