O'Kane v. Coleman

12 Citing cases

  1. FLST, Ltd. v. Explorer Pipeline Co.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:16-CV-00017-KPJ (E.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2017)

    The doctrine states that a person that remains on property, after demand for their removal by the lawful possessor, becomes a trespasser ab initio. See Hillman, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 804 (citing O'Kane v. Coleman, 2008 WL 2579832, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 1, 2008, no pet.)). However, the doctrine of trespasser ab initio operates simply as a mechanism for retrospectively making a person a trespasser from the moment of entry, not as a means to create a new trespass every time a demand is made.

  2. Hillman v. City of Mckinney

    70 F. Supp. 3d 790 (E.D. Tex. 2014)   Cited 6 times

    One who remains on property, after demand for their removal by the lawful possessor, becomes a trespasser ab initio. O'Kane v. Coleman, No. 14–06–00657–CV, 2008 WL 2579832, at *5 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 1, 2008, no pet.). In their motion, Defendants argue that McCrorey cannot be found liable for trespass because McCrorey never physically, intentionally, and voluntarily entered onto the property of Plaintiffs.

  3. Lincoln General Insurance Company v. US Auto Ins. SVC

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:07-CV-1985-B (N.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2009)   Cited 7 times
    Finding that detailed allegations satisfied pleading requirements

    Although the Court recognizes the case cited by the movants indicating that "aiding and abetting tortious interference" is not a cause of action separate from a conspiracy claim, this case does not persuade the Court that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim by alleging Defendants "encouraged, aided and/or abetted" U.S. Auto's breach of contract." See O'Kane v. Coleman, 2008 WL 2579832, at *5 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] July 1, 2008, no pet. h.) (mem.op.). The Court concludes that Plaintiff has stated a claim for tortious interference with contract and DENIES Defendants Gamma, CSI, Alpha, and Santa Fe's Motion for Summary Judgment on that claim.

  4. Leach v. Baylor College of Medicine

    CIVIL ACTION NO. H-07-0921 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2009)   Cited 17 times
    Providing that the FPA only pertains to discriminatory compensation actions, and that the rules set forth by the Supreme Court in Morgan and Ricks still apply to other discrete acts

    n seeking to prevent Dr. Leach from supervising Baylor residents at the VA were justified. Generally, justification is established as a matter of law when the acts alleged as tortious interference are the defendant's exercise of its own contractual rights. See Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Financial Review Service, Inc., 29 S.W.3d 74, 81 (Tex. 2000) (concluding that a health insurer was legally justified in communicating with the insureds about claims against their policies, which a hospital's collections company alleged was tortious interference with contract, because the insurer was only obligated to pay for reasonable charges and had a contractual right to challenge the hospital's bills); Calvillo v. Gonzalez, 922 S.W.2d 928, 929 (Tex. 1996) (holding that the defendant's attempt to prevent hospital from contracting with an anesthesiologist that defendant did not approve was legally justified by defendant's exclusive contract to operate and staff the anesthesiology department); O'Kane v. Coleman, 2008 WL 2579832, at *10 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (finding, in case involving successive leases, that defendants' alleged interference with plaintiff's lease was justified because it was "based on their own contractual right to occupy the premise"); Baty v. ProTech Ins. Agency, 63 S.W.3d 841, 857 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (finding actions of an insurance company who gave agency appointments to former officers of independent agency were legally justified because "the insurance companies were not only exercising contractual rights but were endeavoring to discharge their own contractual obligations to third parties"). Under the Affiliation Agreement, Baylor and the VA share responsibilities for the academic enterprise.

  5. Highland Crusader Offshore Part. v. Lifecare Holdings

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:08-CV-0102-B (N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2008)   Cited 9 times

    However, a Texas court of appeals court recently stated that no Texas cases support the idea that aiding and abetting fraud is a tort separate from conspiracy. O'Kane v. Coleman, 2008 WL 2579832, at *5 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008); see also Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative "ERISA" Litig), 2006 WL 3716669, at *8 n. 7 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (agreeing that Texas has not clearly recognized a cause of action for aiding and abetting common law fraud and stating that because the plaintiffs also pled conspiracy to commit fraud, the aiding and abetting claim was redundant and unnecessary). Since Texas does not recognize such a cause of action, the Plaintiffs' claim for aiding and abetting fraud is DISMISSED.5. Economic Loss The Defendants' final argument has been partially addressed above in Part II.D.2. They argue that the tort claims are the contract claims repled as torts and that they cannot receive exemplary damages for breach of contract claims.

  6. PODS Enters. v. World Trade Distribution, Inc.

    NO. 14-19-00036-CV (Tex. App. Jan. 12, 2021)

    PODS has not established on this record that World Trade Distribution unlawfully appropriated PODS' property with the intent of depriving PODS of its property. See O'Kane v. Coleman, No. 14-06-00657-CV, 2008 WL 2579832, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 1, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). PODS accordingly did not present evidence raising a fact question or conclusively establishing this element of theft.

  7. Thomas Muller & La Paz Golf Villas, LLC v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co.

    525 S.W.3d 859 (Tex. App. 2017)   Cited 30 times
    Holding failure to file motion to compel discovery demonstrates lack of diligence

    In addition, Muller did not point to any place in the record showing his diligent efforts to obtain, nor did he aver that he filed a motion to compel, any of this discovery. SeeBottenstein v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston , No. 14-07-00747-CV, 2009 WL 3003256, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 10, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.); O'Kane v. Coleman , No. 14-06-00657-CV, 2008 WL 2579832, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jul. 1, 2008) (mem. op.); see alsoState v. Wood Oil Distrib., Inc. , 751 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. 1988) ("[T]he failure of a litigant to diligently utilize the rules of civil procedure for discovery purposes will not authorize the granting of a continuance."). Even assuming without deciding that Muller preserved error as to his request for continuance in his summary-judgment response and attached affidavit, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in refusing Muller's request.

  8. Shelton v. Kalbow

    489 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. App. 2016)   Cited 26 times
    Holding it was proper for trial court to render declaratory judgment that deed granted easement for public use of road

    We review a trial court's decision to admit summary judgment proof for an abuse of discretion. O'Kane v. Coleman, No. 14–06–00657–CV, 2008 WL 2579832, at *7 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 1, 2008, no pet.) (mem.op.). 1. Supplemental affidavits by Larson and Lampe

  9. Tran v. Nguyen

    480 S.W.3d 119 (Tex. App. 2015)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that, notwithstanding the terms of Family Code section 153.193, the trial court did not err by failing to allow father supervised visitation in prison with his biological daughters and in denying father possession and access to these daughters based on father's conviction for the aggravated sexual assault of his stepdaughter

    See Fritsch v. J.M. English Truck Line, 151 Tex. 168, 246 S.W.2d 856, 858 (1952) ( "There is nothing in the rules on continuance requiring the granting of a first motion merely because it is in statutory form and is not controverted by affidavit of the opposite party."); O'Kane v. Coleman, No. 14–06–00657–CV, 2008 WL 2579832, at *6–7 & n. 5 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] July 1, 2008, no pet.) (mem.op.) (citing Fritsch and rejecting argument that uncontroverted facts meant trial court had no discretion to deny motion). Possession and Access

  10. In re Lipsky

    411 S.W.3d 530 (Tex. App. 2013)   Cited 83 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the TCPA "dictates that we should review evidence concerning whether [the defendants'] statements were defamatory and thus actionable in the second part of our review, in which [the plaintiff] has the burden of establishing 'by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question.'"

    There is some uncertainty about whether Texas recognizes a cause of action of “aiding and abetting” separately from a civil conspiracy claim. See Ernst & Young, L.L.P. v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 573, 583 n. 7 (Tex.2001); O'Kane v. Coleman, No. 14–06–00657–CV, 2008 WL 2579832, at *5 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] July 1, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). The Adequacy of Relators' Remedy by Appeal