In conclusion, a policy is the law between the parties, and a court is not ordinarily at liberty to depart from the terms of the policy. Oil Well Supply Co. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 38 So.2d 777, 782 (La. 1949). Under Louisiana law, an insurance policy is an agreement between the parties and is interpreted using ordinary contract principles.

Being in accord with the ruling of the trial court, we must adhere to the contract of insurance between the parties. Oil Well Supply Co. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 214 La. 772, 38 So.2d 777 and Shuff v. Life Casualty Ins. Co., 164 La. 741, 114 So. 637. The application sets forth the subject of the agreement between the parties and the consideration paid therefor, namely, the coverage and the premium.

The applicant may or may not pay his first premium at the time of making the application. If he does so, under the agreement, if he meets all other requirements, then should he die before delivery of the policy and acceptance by him, the beneficiaries would nevertheless receive the full amount of the policy. Oil Well Supply Co. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 1949, 214 La. 772, 38 So.2d 777. Appellants seriously contend that the conduct of the company's agent, acting within the apparent scope of his authority, misled the applicant to cause him to believe he was covered by an interim contract of insurance from the date of the application, and as a result he did nothing to procure other insurance.

Moreover, such contracts must be enforced as written so long as the terms are clear and unambiguous and do not lead to absurd consequences. La.Civ. Code Ann. art. 2046 (West 1992); Pareti v. Sentry Indem. Co., 536 So.2d 417, 420 (La. 1988); Oil Well Supply Co. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 214 La. 772, 38 So.2d 777, 780 (1949). Under the express terms of the D O policy, notice of actual or potential claims was a condition precedent to the insurer's obligation under the contract.

(4) An insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and the insured, and the courts are bound to give legal effect to it according to the intent of the parties, the intent to be determined by the words of the contract when these are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences. Art. 1945, LSA-Civil Code; Oil Well Supply Co. v. New York Life Insurance Co., 214 La. 772, 38 So.2d 777. (5) A description (in feet) as to the location of a house with reference to its position relative to an adjacent structure, admittedly not material to the risk or premium rate in any way, is not such an essential feature of the risk under the facts of this case to void the policies.

This Court is bound to give legal effect to the insurance policy according to the intent of Lexington and Tulane, which is determined by the words of the policy that are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences. Oil Well Supply Co. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 38 So.2d 777, 214 La. 772 (1949). The insurance policy clearly and explicitly provided hospital professional liability coverage in excess of $1,000,000.00.

In construing an insurance contract, courts are not authorized to add or detract from its language. Muse v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 193 La. 605, 192 So. 72, 125 A.L.R. 1075; Edwards v. Life Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee, 210 La. 1024, 29 So.2d 50; Hemel v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company, 211 La. 95, 29 So.2d 483; Oil Well Supply Co. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 214 La. 772, 38 So.2d 777; Albritton v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 224 La. 522, 70 So.2d 111; Monteleone v. American Employers' Insurance Co., 239 La. 773, 120 So.2d 70. In the Muse case, cited supra, this Court declined to add or delete words in the insurance policy to reach a conclusion favorable to the insured and stated [ 193 La. 605, 192 So. 75]:

Article 1957, LSA-Civil Code. Our law, therefore, conformable with the universal rule applicable to contracts of insurance, is that all ambiguities must be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer. See Muse v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 193 La. 605, 192 So. 72, 125 A.L.R. 1075; Hemel v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 211 La. 95, 29 So.2d 483; Stanley v. Cryer Drilling Co., 213 La. 980, 36 So.2d 9 and Oil Well Supply Co. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 214 La. 772, 38 So.2d 777."

Our law, therefore, conformable with the universal rule applicable to contracts of insurance, is that all ambiguities must be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer. See Muse v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 193 La. 605, 192 So. 72, 125 A.L.R. 1075; Hemel v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 211 La. 95, 29 So.2d 483; Stanley v. Cryer Drilling Co., 213 La. 980, 36 So.2d 9 and Oil Well Supply Co. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 214 La. 772, 38 So.2d 777. Applying these rules of construction to the case at bar, it seems patent that, if the word "collision" be interpreted in its usual concept, its scope is such that it necessarily includes an impact of the body of the vehicle with the highway on which the vehicle with the highway on which the vehicle was travelling as we entertain little doubt that the ground or anything visible or tangible is another object.

The rule is well established that since an insurance policy is a contract between the insured and the insurer, it is to be given effect according to the intent of the parties. Oil Well Supply Company v. New York Life Insurance Company, 214 La. 772, 38 So.2d 777 (1949). Therefore, resolution of the issue of coverage in the instant case depends first upon whether the parties intended the exclusion clause at issue would be included in the policy or endorsements. Then, if the parties did intend the exclusion be included, there must be a determination as to whether LRA's potential liability in connection with the Hackberry casualty falls within the exclusion.