The cases cited by defendants may be distinguished under the facts and circumstances of each case and offer no support for why the corporation should not be entitled to enforce the lease provisions. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Yacktman (1976), 36 Ill. App.3d 255, 343 N.E.2d 544. • 2 In the case at bar, plaintiff and defendant Waxler freely and openly entered into a second 10-year lease, part consideration for which was the rider provision for the right to purchase the premises conditioned upon defendant's desire to sell.
Under such circumstances, any pleadings filed by the defendants can be considered for the limited purpose of determining what issues are raised by the controversy. ( Ohio Oil Co. v. Yacktman (1976), 36 Ill. App.3d 255, 343 N.E.2d 544.) Where well alleged facts in an affidavit are not contradicted by a counteraffidavit, they must be taken as true notwithstanding contrary averments in an adverse party's pleadings. ( Fooden v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities (1971), 48 Ill.2d 580, 272 N.E.2d 497.)
Oftentimes, a right of first refusal is a right to elect to take specified property at the same price and on the same terms and conditions as are contained in a good-faith offer to purchase made by a third party. See Vincent v. Doebert, 183 Ill.App.3d 1081, 1083 (1989); Turner v. Shirk (1977), 49 Ill.App.3d 764, 765, 7 Ill.Dec. 461, 462, 364 N.E.2d 622, 623; Ohio Oil Co. v. Yacktman (1976), 36 Ill.App.3d 255, 257, (1976).
Parents United for Responsible Education v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 2011 IL App (1st) 1029001, ¶ 39; Carruthers v. B.C. Christopher & Co., 57 Ill. 2d 376, 380 (1974). If the party moving for summary judgment supplies facts that, if not contradicted, would warrant judgment in its favor as a matter of law, it "becomes incumbent upon the respondent to allege 'evidentiary facts through affidavits or such.' " Ohio Oil Co. v. Yacktman, 36 Ill. App. 3d 255, 261 (1976), citing Carruthers, 57 Ill. 2d 380.¶ 22 Here, American Chartered's motion for summary judgment and affidavit contained well-pleaded, uncontradicted facts that were properly accepted by the trial court as true for the purpose of ruling on the motion.
Oftentimes a right of first refusal is a right to elect to take specified property at the same price and on the same terms and conditions as are contained in a good-faith offer to purchase made by a third party. See Vincent v. Doebert (1989), 183 Ill. App.3d 1081, 1083, 539 N.E.2d 856, 858; Turner v. Shirk (1977), 49 Ill. App.3d 764, 765, 364 N.E.2d 622, 623; Ohio Oil Co. v. Yacktman (1976), 36 Ill. App.3d 255, 257, 343 N.E.2d 544, 546. The right of first refusal need not specify the price and terms, as long as it provides a method whereby the price and terms may be ascertained.
Summary judgment is the proper remedy where only the construction and legal effect of a lease are at issue. Ohio Oil Co. v. Yacktman (1976), 36 Ill. App.3d 255, 261, 343 N.E.2d 544, 549. In the case at bar, plaintiff conceded that it did not strictly follow the lease.
Summary judgment is the proper remedy where, as in the case at bar, only the construction and legal effect of a lease are at issue. Ohio Oil Co. v. Yacktman (1976), 36 Ill. App.3d 255, 261, 343 N.E.2d 544, 549. • 2 It is well settled that the law does not favor forfeitures.
All well-pleaded uncontradicted facts contained in a movant's affidavit will be taken as true for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Heller v. Goss (1980), 80 Ill. App.3d 716, 719, 400 N.E.2d 70; Ohio Oil Co. v. Yacktman (1976), 36 Ill. App.3d 255, 261, 343 N.E.2d 544. Defendant argues that section 1989(a) requires a finding of an actual intent to defraud and therefore a genuine issue of fact remains.
Although there were negotiations between the union and ATT, defendants have not shown that the company made any offers upon which a vote could be taken. We must take statements in affidavits supporting summary judgment as true, unless the nonmoving party presents evidence to contradict them. ( Zannis v. Lake Shore Radiologists, Ltd. (1982), 104 Ill. App.3d 484, 487, 432 N.E.2d 1108, 1110; Ohio Oil Co. v. Yacktman (1976), 36 Ill. App.3d 255, 261, 343 N.E.2d 544, 548-49.) Whether ATT or Illinois Bell made any offers at all is simply not shown by the record, and therefore we have no means of weighing the plausibility of defendants' proposed construction of "final offer."
• 1 Summary judgment should be granted only if the pleadings, affidavits and depositions on file reveal that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( In re Estate of Whittington (1985), 107 Ill.2d 169, 176-77; Kroll v. Sugar Supply Corp. (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 969, 975, appeal denied (1983), 96 Ill.2d 560.) All well-pleaded, uncontradicted facts contained in a movant's affidavit will be taken as true for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Heller v. Goss (1980), 80 Ill. App.3d 716, 719; Ohio Oil Co. v. Yacktman (1976), 36 Ill. App.3d 255, 261. It is uncontradicted that (1) defendant signed the installment judgment note for $20,989.13 and plaintiff agreed that no action to recover for the account would be filed until the note came due; (2) plaintiff did file suit against defendant on the account before the note matured; and (3) defendant paid the $20,989.