{¶ 14} In addition to this court and the Eighth Appellate District, the Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Districts have concluded that a voluntary dismissal of all defendants renders a prior interlocutory summary judgment ruling a nullity. See Fairchilds v. Miami Valley Hosp., Inc., 160 Ohio App.3d 363, 2005-Ohio-1712; Toledo Heart Surgeons v. The Toledo Hosp., 6th Dist. No. L-02-1059, 2002-Ohio-3577; Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Modine Mfg. (Sept. 5, 2001), 9th Dist. Nos. 3114-M and 3116-M, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3921; State ex rel. Mogavero v. Belskis, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-164, 2002-Ohio-6497. {¶ 15} In Fairchilds at ¶ 38, the appellants filed a notice of voluntary dismissal informing the trial court that they were "`voluntarily dismissing this case without prejudice, and subject to refiling pursuant to Civ. R. 41(A) against all party Defendants, Angela Landis and Miami Valley Hospital, Inc.'" The notice clearly included the voluntary dismissal of all defendants, and thus, the Second District concluded that the appellants' voluntary dismissal of all defendants prevented the prior interlocutory summary judgment decision from becoming a final adjudication of the claims with which it was concerned.
{¶ 9} In addition to the Eighth Appellate District, the Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Districts have concluded that a voluntary dismissal of all defendants renders a prior interlocutory summary judgment ruling a nullity. See Fairchilds v. Miami Valley Hosp., Inc., 160 Ohio App.3d 363; Toledo Heart Surgeons v. The Toledo Heart Hosp., 6th App. No. L-02-1059, 2002-Ohio-3577; Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Modine Mfg. (Sept. 1, 2001), 9th App. Nos. 3114-M and 3116-M, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3921; State ex rel. Mogavero v. Belskis, 10th App. No. 02AP-164, 2002-Ohio-6497. As stated in Fairchilds, which cites to Toledo Heart Surgeons, supra, at ¶ 35, an order that grants a summary judgment motion or a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted to a party while claims against other parties are pending, and which does not contain the requisite Civ.R. 54(B) language that there is no just reason for delay, is not appealable when the entire action is later dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A). "Rather, such order is dissolved and has no res judicata effect."
{¶ 9} In addition to the Eighth Appellate District, the Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Districts have concluded that a voluntary dismissal of all defendants renders a prior interlocutory summary judgment ruling a nullity. See Fairchilds v. Miami Valley Hosp., Inc., 160 Ohio App.3d 363; Toledo Heart Surgeons v. The Toledo Heart Hosp., 6th App. No. L-02-1059, 2002-Ohio-3577; Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Modine Mfg. (Sept. 1, 2001), 9th App. Nos. 3114-M and 3116-M, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3921; State ex rel. Mogavero v. Belskis, 10th App. No. 02AP-164, 2002-Ohio-6497. As stated in Fairchilds, which cites to Toledo Heart Surgeons, supra, at ¶ 35, an order that grants a summary judgment motion or a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted to a party while claims against other parties are pending, and which does not contain the requisite Civ.R. 54(B) language that there is no just reason for delay, is not appealable when the entire action is later dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A). "Rather, such order is dissolved and has no res judicata effect."
Albright v. Univ. of Toledo (Sept. 18, 2001), 10th Dist. No. 01AP-130, citing Wireman v. Keneco Distributors, Inc. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 103, 108. "One having neither possession nor control of premises is ordinarily not liable for damages resulting from the condition of the premises." Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Modine Mfg. (Sept. 5, 2001), 9th Dist. Nos. 3114-M and 3116-M, at 7, quoting Hendrix v. Eighth and Walnut Corp. (1982), {¶ 14} 1 Ohio St.3d 205, 207. Control implies the power and right to admit people to the premises and to exclude people from it.
Therefore, in this case, when Mousset dismissed his entire action without prejudice, the effect was "as if no suit had ever been filed against" any of the defendants. It follows that the orders of November 8, 2000 and February 21, 2001 are void and there is nothing from which to appeal. Additionally, since those summary judgment orders have been dissolved they have no res judicata effect. See, Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Modine Mfg. (Sept. 5, 2001), Medina App. Nos. 3114-M, 3116-M; appeal not allowed (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 1430, where the trial court granted summary judgment to two of several defendants. In that case, the plaintiffs then voluntarily dismissed all their claims, without prejudice, pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A). Plaintiffs filed their action again and the two defendants who had been granted summary judgment moved to dismiss the claims against them because they were barred by res judicata.