But, he had a legal right to do so as the appellant surety company, at that time, was not subrogated to the rights of anyone concerned with the contract and had no valid claim to the money. Kane v. First Nat. Bank of El Paso, Tex., 5 Cir., 56 F.2d 534, 85 A.L.R. 362, cert. denied sub nom., Kane v. Pottorff, 287 U.S. 603, 53 S.Ct. 8, 77 L.Ed. 524; Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Union State Bank of Minneapolis, D.C., 21 F.2d 102; Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Colorado Portland Cement Co., 97 Colo. 541, 51 P.2d 591. The rule applicable here is succinctly stated in 4 Corbin on Contracts, § 901, p. 609: "As long as the contractor has committed no vital breach, he has a right to payments as provided in the contract; and his assignee will have as good a right to these payments as did the contractor.
By assignments of error 1, 2 and 3 defendant categorically asserts that the verdict was contrary to the law, to the evidence, and to both. We have held that such general assignments do not conform to our Rule 32 and should not be considered. Wilson v. Giem, 90 Colo. 27, 5 P.2d 880; Lundquist v. Eisenmann, 87 Colo. 584, 290 Pac. 277; Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Colorado Portland Cement Co., 97 Colo. 541, 51 P.2d 591. In any event, under this record, where the plaintiff's contentions are well sustained by competent testimony — although the evidence as a whole is conflicting — and no objection whatsoever is directed to the giving or refusal of instructions, such assignments practically are impotent of effect.
" These assignments are no compliance with our Rule No. 32 and present nothing for review. Wilson v. Giem, 90 Colo. 27, 5 P.2d 880; Ohio C. I. Co. v. Colorado Portland Cement Co., 97 Colo. 541, 51 P.2d 591; Buchanan v. Burgess, 99 Colo. 307, 62 P.2d 465. We thus briefly dispose of the cause with no reluctance since our examination of the record discloses that on no theory could a contrary conclusion be reached.
These assignments are equally insufficient. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Colo. P. C. Co., 97 Colo. 541, 51 P.2d 591. 4. The sixth assignment is, "That the said court erred in overruling and denying defendants' motion for a new trial."
The motion was sustained and to review the judgment thereupon entered accordingly the city prosecutes this writ. Three errors are assigned: (1) The sustaining of the motion; (2) the discharging of the defendant; (3) entering judgment for defendant. That the last two are so clearly without our rules as to require no consideration is too apparent for discussion. Ohio Casualty Co. v. Colo. Portland Cement Co., 97 Colo. 541, 51 P.2d 591. In view of the common knowledge that notwithstanding the county court's holding that the ordinance was void the city is still attempting its enforcement, although it has virtually abandoned this cause by its failure to file a reply brief, the court has deemed it advisable of its own motion to take up the consideration out of order. It was accordingly assigned to the writer November 18.
These assignments do not even hint at the questions to be presented under them. Our rule 32 requires that "Each error shall be separately alleged and particularly specified," and we have repeatedly held that these general assignments are no compliance therewith and will not be noticed. Ohio Casualty Co. v. Colo. Portland Cement Co., 97 Colo. 541, 51 P.2d 591. The rule and authorities apply in workmen's compensation cases as in others. They are reviewed here "by writ of error as provided by law."
This is not contrary to public policy in Alabama, Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Strange, supra. See a like provision in a performance and payment bond in Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Colorado Portland Cement Co., 97 Colo. 541, 51 P.2d 591. Assignment No. 3 as to the court's oral charge is not based on an exception made before the jury retired.