Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO.: CV514-098
12-01-2014
JERRY ROLLINS OGLESBY, Petitioner, v. Sheriff GREG NOBELS, Long County; Sheriff STEVE C. SIKES, Liberty County; and Sheriff RANDY F. ROYAL, Ware County, Respondents.
ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Jerry Oglesby ("Oglesby"), who is currently housed at the Ware County Jail in Waycross, Georgia, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was filed as being brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Oglesby also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons which follow, Oglesby's motion is DENIED and his petition should be DISMISSED.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Oglesby asserts that he was arrested for making terroristic threats and acts and has been imprisoned falsely. Oglesby also asserts that his arrest was achieved through several violations of his constitutional rights. Oglesby contends that he was without proper medications while he was housed at the Liberty County Jail. Oglesby alleges that he has been forced to live in inhumane conditions since he was released from the medical unit at Ware County Jail. As relief, Oglesby seeks an investigation of the named Defendants.
DISCUSSION AND CITATION TO AUTHORITY
I. Section 2254
Though Oglesby does not seek his immediate release from custody, per se, he he does challenge the fact of his confinement. "A state prisoner seeking post-conviction relief from a federal court has but one remedy: an application for a writ of habeas corpus." Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1062 (11th Cir. 2003). Two different statutes govern the single post-conviction remedy of the writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. "The difference between the statutes lies in the breadth of the situations to which they apply." Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Medberry, 351 F.3d at 1059). A writ of habeas corpus may issue to a prisoner pursuant to section 2241 if the prisoner "is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Section 2254 "applies to a subset of those to whom" section 2241(c)(3) applies. Thomas, 371 F.3d at 786. This section applies to "'a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court' who is 'in custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States." Id. (quoting section 2254(a)) (emphasis in original). While "the habeas corpus remedy is authorized by § 2241," it is "also subject to § 2254 and all of its attendant restrictions." Peoples v. Chatman, 393 F.3d 1352, 1353 (11th Cir. 2004). "A state prisoner cannot evade the procedural requirements of § 2254 by filing something purporting to be a § 2241 petition." Thomas, 371 F.3d at 787. When a state prisoner challenges the "'fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.'" Harden v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 1289, 1294 n.6 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)). However, Plaintiff must exhaust his available state remedies before a federal court can address these claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c).
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that-28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). "An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). The United States Supreme Court has held that "a state prisoner must present his claims to a state supreme court in a petition for discretionary review in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement" when discretionary review "is part of the ordinary appellate review process in the State." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839-40, 847 (1999). Therefore, in order to exhaust state remedies, "state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." Id. at 845. This exhaustion requirement also extends to a state's collateral review process. Gary v. Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 686 F.3d 1261, 1274 (11th Cir. 2012); Pope v. Rich, 358 F.3d 852, 854 (11th Cir. 2004). Failure to exhaust all claims or to demonstrate that exhaustion is futile prior to bringing a section 2254 petition requires that the petition be dismissed. See Nelson v. Schofeld, 371 F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2004), superseded by rule on other grounds as recognized in Hills v. Washington, 441 F.3d 1374 (11th Cir. 2006).
(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or
(B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or
(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.
While a state prisoner's failure to exhaust his remedies in state court ordinarily will result in the automatic dismissal of his federal habeas petition, this is not always true. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b) & (c). First, a court may deny a petition on the merits without requiring exhaustion "if it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise a colorable federal claim." Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 135 (1987); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). The State may also explicitly waive the exhaustion requirement. Hills, 441 F.3d at 1376. Finally, a court should not require exhaustion if it has been shown that "there is an absence of available State corrective process," or that "circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B). The exhaustion requirement should not be applied "if the state court has unreasonably or without explanation failed to address petitions for relief." Hollis v. Davis, 941 F.2d 1471, 1475 (11th Cir. 1991).
Oglesby has not shown an absence of available State corrective process or that the State has waived the exhaustion requirement. To the extent Oglesby's pleading can be construed as a section 2254 petition, any such petition should be dismissed based on his failure to exhaust his available state court remedies. It is clear that Oglesby has not exhausted his available state court remedies.
II. 42 U.S.C. §1983
The Supreme Court has held:
that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). According to the Heck Court, "when a state prisoner seeks damages in a [civil rights] suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence." Id. at 487. If this is the case, the plaintiff's complaint "must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." Id. A district court must determine whether "plaintiffs action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit." Id. (emphasis in original). To have success on his false imprisonment claim, Oglesby would have to show that the charges against him have been dismissed or that any conviction on these charges has been overturned, neither of which has occurred. Oglesby's section 1983 false imprisonment claim should be dismissed, as he has not met the prerequisites to proceed pursuant to § 1983.
The undersigned notes that Oglesby's success on the merits of his conditions of confinement claims would not invalidate any outstanding criminal charges or judgment against Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff cannot proceed with his conditions of confinement claims in this case. Plaintiff names as Defendant Ware County Sheriff Randy Royal.
A plaintiff must set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). In order to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must satisfy two elements. First, a plaintiff must allege that an act or omission deprived him "of some right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). Second, a plaintiff must allege that the act or omission was committed by "a person acting under color of state law." Id. Plaintiff fails to make any factual allegations against Defendant Royal, and his conditions of confinement claims should be dismissed for this reason.
Additionally, in section 1983 actions, liability must be based on something more than a theory of respondeat superior. Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1299 (11th Cir. 2009); Braddy v. Fla. Dep't of Labor & Employment Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 801 (11th Cir. 1998). A supervisor may be liable only through personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between the supervisor's conduct and the alleged violations, Id. at 802. "To state a claim against a supervisory defendant, the plaintiff must allege (1) the supervisor's personal involvement in the violation of his constitutional rights, (2) the existence of a custom or policy that resulted in deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs constitutional rights, (3) facts supporting an inference that the supervisor directed the unlawful action or knowingly failed to prevent it, or (4) a history of widespread abuse that put the supervisor on notice of an alleged deprivation that he then failed to correct." Barr v. Gee, 437 F. App'x 865, 875 (11th Cir. 2011). It is clear Oglesby seeks to hold Defendant Royal liable based on his supervisory position as Sheriff of Ware County. Plaintiff's section 1983 claims against Defendant Royal should be dismissed for this reason, as well.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is my RECOMMENDATION that Oglesby's pleading, docketed as being brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, be DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this 1st day of December, 2014.
/s/_________
JAMES E. GRAHAM
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE