See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959 (ALJ properly considered claimant's "self-limiting behaviors" and "efforts to impede accurate testing" during two physical-capacity evaluations); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001) (ALJ properly considered claimant's poor effort during consultative examinations). Plaintiff argues that Dr. Hudler's statements concerning Plaintiff's minimal effort should not have been relied on by the ALJ as detracting from Plaintiff's credibility because "Dr. Hudler took specific awareness of that finding into account and rendered her opinions with full knowledge" of it, citing as support for this proposition Ogin v. Colvin, 608 F. App'x 519 (9th Cir. 2015). (J. Stip. at 23.)

This, however, is itself a conclusory statement that fails to meet the ALJ's burden of "setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating h[er] interpretation thereof, and making findings." Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 675 (internal citations omitted); see also Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988) (requiring the ALJ to identify the evidence supporting the alleged conflict to permit the court to meaningfully review the ALJ's finding); Ogin v. Colvin, 608 Fed. App'x 519, 520 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the ALJ did not offer "specific and legitimate" reasons to discount physician's opinion because the ALJ "never specified which findings in which treating records she was relying on"). Here, it is unclear to this Court what the ALJ means by "referenced evidence" or which "referenced evidence" she relied on to make her findings. Is the "referenced evidence" the evidence cited by Dr. Tsujimoto-Ryzewski in the questionnaire or treatment notes, Dr. Tsujimoto-Ryzewski's (or another medical provider's) objective findings (e.g., mental status examinations), Plaintiff's subjective complaints to Dr. Tsujimoto-Ryzewski (or another medical provider), or something else?

Both cases he cites are unpublished memoranda dispositions with limited analysis. See Ogin v. Colvin, 608 Fed. App'x 519 (9th Cir. 2015); Om v. Colvin, 545 Fed. App'x 665 (9th Cir. 2013). Ogin is also inapposite because in that case, the Ninth Circuit determined that the ALJ improperly discounted a medical opinion when the doctor "expressly took into account" the factors underlying the adverse credibility finding.

The Court cannot be expected to find the ALJ properly rejected or discounted these opinions based on an improvement the ALJ has not identified. See Ogin v. Colvin, 608 F. App'x 519, 520 (9th Cir. 2015)(Finding that the ALJ failed to provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting a treating physician's opinions when she said that the physician's findings did not match the contemporary findings found in the claimant's treating records, but failed to specify which findings in which treating records she was relying on); see also Jones v. Astrue, 503 Fed. Appx. 516, 517 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 830) (An ALJ's unsupported assertion that opinions contrary to the treating physicians are supported by the "great weight of evidence" does not constitute specific and legitimate reasons for discrediting the treating physicians' reports.) Looking elsewhere in the decision, the ALJ identified improvements but in the context of discrediting Plaintiff's allegations of near total loss of functioning.

However, absent further explanation, it is not a legitimate basis for discounting a physician's opinion. See Ogin v. Colvin, 608 F. App'x 519, 520 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding the ALJ erred in discounting a physician's opinion based on "lackluster effort" where the physician took a lack of cooperation into account when formulating a conclusion). Therefore, without more explanation demonstrating that Dr. Orr failed to take Plaintiff's poor effort into account when forming her opinion, this fails to meet the specific and legitimate standard.

See, e.g., Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1996) ("ALJ [] permissibly rejected [medical evaluations] because they were check-off reports that did not contain any explanation of the bases of their conclusions."); De Guzman v. Astrue, 343 Fed. Appx. 201, 209 (9th Cir. 2009) (ALJ "is free to reject 'check-off reports that d[o] not contain any explanation of the bases of their conclusions.'") (citing id.); see also Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he regulations give more weight to opinions that are explained than to those that are not. . . .") (citation omitted); Ogin v. Colvin, 608 Fed. Appx. 519, 519-20 (9th Cir. 2015) (ALJ offered specific and legitimate reasons for discounting treating physician's opinions that "were expressed as 'standardized, check-the-box form[s]' [and] that provided no 'supporting reasoning or clinical findings.'") (quoting Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111).

See, e.g., Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1996) ("ALJ [] permissibly rejected [psychological / medical evaluations] because they were check-off reports that did not contain any explanation of the bases of their conclusions."); De Guzman v. Astrue, 343 Fed. Appx. 201, 209 (9th Cir. 2009) (ALJ "is free to reject 'check-off reports that d[o] not contain any explanation of the bases of their conclusions.'") (citing id.); Ogin v. Colvin, 608 Fed. Appx. 519, 519-20 (9th Cir. 2015) (ALJ properly discounted treating physician's opinions that "were expressed as 'standardized, check-the-box form[s]' . . . that provided no 'supporting reasoning or clinical findings.'") (quoting Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111); see also Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he regulations give more weight to opinions that are explained than to those that are not. . . .") (citation omitted).