Opinion
No. 3D19-1524
04-29-2020
DeSouza Law, P.A., and Daniel DeSouza (Coral Springs), for petitioner. Joseph E. Altschul, LLC., and Alexandria L. Beaton (Pembroke Pines), for respondents.
DeSouza Law, P.A., and Daniel DeSouza (Coral Springs), for petitioner.
Joseph E. Altschul, LLC., and Alexandria L. Beaton (Pembroke Pines), for respondents.
Before EMAS, C.J., and MILLER and LOBREE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Denied. See Pino v. Bank of New York, 121 So. 3d 23, 39 (Fla. 2013) (recognizing that "[w]hile the language of rule 1.420(b) clearly affords a plaintiff the absolute right to voluntarily dismiss a case once without prejudice," Florida law has "recognized specific situations in which the trial court will not be divested of jurisdiction by virtue of the plaintiff's notice of voluntary dismissal," foremost among them those described in Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540 ); U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Rivera, 193 So. 3d 954, 956 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (recognizing that "a litigant may secure relief from a voluntary dismissal under rule 1.540(b) where the litigant has been subjected to some adverse impact from which the litigant needs to be relieved").