Opinion
No. 1D20-462
03-04-2021
Frances OGDEN, Appellant, v. Donna MINDREBO, Appellee.
Nathan D. Clark of Coral Reef Law Offices, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellant. Lisa S. Minshew of Lisa S. Minshew, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellee.
Nathan D. Clark of Coral Reef Law Offices, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellant.
Lisa S. Minshew of Lisa S. Minshew, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellee.
M.K. Thomas, J.
Frances Ogden (Appellant) was held in contempt of a final judgment that previously imposed a stalking injunction against her for the protection of Donna Mindrebo (Appellee). The circuit court found that Appellant was in contempt of the injunction based on four specific instances of conduct; three of these instances are affirmed without further comment, as the record evidence shows Appellant initiated direct contact with Appellee. The fourth—that Appellant was in contempt of the injunction every time she travelled to her property because the action brought her within 500-feet of Appellee's property—is reversed as explained below.
Appellant and Appellee were neighbors. In addition, Appellant owned other, unimproved property in the same neighborhood. Appellee was doing construction on her home, sparking a protracted effort by Appellant to harass Appellee, leading to the injunction. The written injunction included the usual conditions prohibiting Appellant from having any contact with Appellee or from going within 500 feet of her property. That said, the written injunction noted that the parties were neighbors currently living within 500 feet of each other. Thus, the injunction permitted Appellant to "reside at her current residence" while abstaining from contact with Appellee.
In further providing for the maintenance of peaceable neighboring residences, the written order allowed Appellant to walk on the street in front of Appellee's home, but not on the side of the street closest to the residence. The written order included no other provisions, however, the trial court orally explained when ordering the injunction that its intent was to allow each party to continue to use and enjoy neighborhood functions and amenities while preventing any contact between the two. The trial judge specifically explained that the injunction did not entirely prevent Appellant from being on the neighborhood roads, and the parties discussed the implementation of the injunction given that Appellant owned the additional property and had friends she regularly visited within the neighborhood.
Appellant subsequently moved out of the neighborhood, however, she maintained ownership of the unimproved property. The record shows that Appellant continued her harassment of Appellee, leading Appellee to move for an order of contempt based on numerous allegations of direct in-person contact and indirect electronic communication. In addition, Appellee's motion alleged that Appellant was attempting to harass her by camping on the unimproved lot in view of Appellee's home and by leaving the property in disarray.
After testimony at the contempt hearing established the aforementioned instances of direct contact and that Appellant had been travelling to her lot, the trial court questioned whether Appellee needed to present any other evidence at all. The court noted that the written injunction only excepted Appellant coming within 500 feet of Appellee's residence to allow access to her previous residence at the time and did not mention other properties. The court reasoned that, because the written injunction did not address the unimproved lot, Appellant violated the 500-foot perimeter around Appellee's home every time she travelled to and remained on the unimproved property. Appellant argues that the trial court erroneously interpreted the original trial court's injunction, which she argues intended to allow the activity later deemed unlawful. We agree that the trial court erroneously interpreted the terms of the injunction and reverse the court's determination that Appellant was in contempt for violating the 500-foot perimeter when accessing her unimproved property.
Like statutory and case-law interpretation, an appellate court reviews a trial court's interpretation of the terms of a final judgment de novo . Lynne v. Landsman , 306 So. 3d 390, 392 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020). That said, the final determination whether to hold a party in contempt for violating the terms of a final judgment is an act within the discretion of the trial court, reviewed for abuse of that discretion. Id.
"A party cannot be held in contempt for noncompliance with a provision of a final judgment that ‘is not clear and definite so as to make the party aware of its command and direction.’ " Id. (quoting Keitel v. Keitel , 716 So. 2d 842, 844 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ). An injunction provision must be sufficiently clear so that it puts a party on notice as to the precise conduct required of the party to avoid a judgment of contempt. See id. Further, because an injunction provision must clearly notice a party of prohibited conduct, implied or inherent provisions of an injunction cannot serve as the basis for a contempt order. See Cancino v. Cancino , 273 So. 3d 122, 128 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2019) ; Harris v. Hampton , 70 So. 3d 747, 749 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).
Appellee argues that the terms of the final injunction do not specifically reference the unimproved property. Regardless, it is a trial court's oral pronouncement of its order which controls over any contradictory written provisions. See Glick v. Glick , 874 So. 2d 1238, 1241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Thus, even if the original trial court's written order contradicts its ore tenus explanation of the ruling, the verbal explanation controls. Appellant argues that, based on the trial court's oral explanation of the injunction, it is clear the court intended to permit her travelling throughout the community without regard to her residence at the time of the injunction.
To some extent, both parties’ arguments miss the mark; the focus is not on what conduct is specifically allowed , but rather, what conduct is clearly prohibited so that a party may be found to be in contempt at a later hearing. That said, we agree that the original trial court's ore tenus explanation of its order imposing the injunction implied that Appellant would not violate the 500-foot perimeter by merely passing Appellee's property while travelling through the neighborhood. Since the injunction implied that the conduct now found to be contemptuous would be allowed, it could not have effectively noticed Appellant that said conduct would be prohibited. Accordingly, the trial court erroneously interpreted the injunction and abused its discretion when it ruled that Appellant was in contempt based on the perimeter violations incurred in travelling to her unimproved property.
The foregoing considered, the trial court's order of contempt is REVERSED in part and AFFIRMED in part.
Jay and Nordby, JJ., concur.