The impairment was only temporary, and there is no evidence that Goodyear anticipated the duration of the impairment to be beyond its actual scope. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii) and (iii); Ogburn v. Gas Water Dept, City of Clarksville, No. 01-A-01-9702-CH-00056, 1997 Tenn. App. Lexis 585, at *6 n. 1 (Tenn.App. Aug. 27, 1997) ("[T]emporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities."); Roush v. Weastec, Inc., 96 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 1996) ("Generally, short-term, temporary restrictions are not substantially limiting."). Moreover, there is no evidence that Goodyear regarded Barnes as physically unable to perform his specific job as a PC Operator, much less perform a broad range of jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.