Opinion
3:23-cv-00232-YY
05-01-2023
RYAN EUGENE OGAN, Plaintiff, v. AMAZON INC., AMAZON PDX9, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
YOULEE YIM YOU UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
FINDINGS
On March 3, 2023, this court granted pro se plaintiff Ryan Eugene Ogan's application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and ordered him to file an amended complaint because his Complaint failed to state a claim for relief. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on April 17, 2023, but it still fails to state a claim for relief. Therefore, this case should be dismissed without prejudice.
The IFP statute provides that “[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction; . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and . . . a demand for the relief sought, which may include in the alternative or different types of relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). “Rule 8 does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2006) (citations omitted). “A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
Federal courts hold a pro se litigant's pleadings to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987); see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (per curiam) (holding a document filed pro se “is to be liberally construed”; a plaintiff need only give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds on which it rests) (citation omitted). “Although . . . pro se litigant[s] . . . may be entitled to great leeway when the court construes [their] pleadings, those pleadings nonetheless must meet some minimum threshold in providing a defendant with notice of what it is that it allegedly did wrong.” Brazil v. U.S. Dep't of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995).
In his original Complaint, plaintiff, who alleges he has traumatic brain injury, asserted a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Plaintiff claimed that, when he was employed by defendants, he suffered from “verbal abuse,” “tolerated many innuendos for two years,” and made “repeated verbal complaints to managers for months.” Compl. 4, ECF 1. He alleged that in April 2022, he was wrongfully “dismissed from employment after writing an email complaining about verbal harassment” in which he stated he “would be ‘forced to use physical threats,' in an attempt to get urgency for the verbal abuse to stop.” Id.
“To prevail on an ADA claim of unlawful discharge, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing that: (1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of the statute; (2) he is a qualified individual with a disability; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability.” Mayo v. PCC Structurals, Inc., 795 F.3d 941, 944 (9th Cir. 2015) quoting Hutton v. Elf Atochem North America, Inc., 273 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 2001)). The ADA defines a “qualified individual” as an individual “with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
In its order issued on March 3, 2023, the court explained that plaintiff had failed to allege “sufficient details regarding the ‘verbal abuse' plaintiff claims he suffered and how it relates to his disability.” Order 3, ECF 7. The court explained that vague allegations, such as those alleged by plaintiff in the original Complaint, are insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 8. Id. (citing Sepulveda v. Woodford, No. 1:05-CV-01143-AWIDLB, 2008 WL 5219455, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2008), report and recommendation adopted, 2009 WL 3565664 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2009) (dismissing claims against defendants because “vague allegations of hostility, harassment or abuse does not provide fair notice to the defendants”); see also Meirhofer v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers Inc., 415 Fed.Appx. 806, 807 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that, to the extent a hostile work environment claim is even actionable under the ADA, a “derogatory nickname and occasional insulting comments constitute[] ‘simple teasing' and ‘isolated incidents'” and are “not sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of . . . employment and create an abusive work environment”)).
The court also explained that, in alleging he had warned managers he would be “forced to use physical threats,” plaintiff failed to allege was “qualified” at the time of his discharge. Order 3, ECF 7; see Compl. 4, ECF 1. “An essential function of almost every job is the ability to appropriately handle stress and interact with others.” Mayo, 795 F.3d at 944. A “disproportionate reaction,” such as physical threats, demonstrates that plaintiff “could not perform an ‘essential function' of his job, and was not a ‘qualified individual.'” Mayo, 795 F.3d at 944 (finding the plaintiff was not qualified when he threatened to kill co-workers in chilling detail and on multiple occasions). “This is true regardless of whether [the employee's] threats stemmed from his [disability].” Id. “A contrary rule would place employers in an impossible position.” Id. The ADA “does not require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee.” Id. (quoting Palmer v. Circuit Court, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir. 1997)). “Such a requirement would place the employer on a razor's edge-in jeopardy of violating the Act if it fired such an employee, yet in jeopardy of being deemed negligent if it retained him and he hurt someone.” Id. (quoting Palmer, 117 F.3d at 352). “The Act protects only ‘qualified' employees, that is, employees qualified to do the job for which they were hired; and threatening other employees disqualifies one.” Id. (quoting Palmer, 117 F.3d at 325).
Plaintiff has filed an Amended Complaint, in which he again alleges a claim under the ADA; however, the Amended Complaint contains even less details than the original Complaint and merely alleges:
I was terminated after writing an email complaining of verbal harassment, rescinding the email after realizing the language I used in frustrating and then resolving the issue with HR.Am. Compl. 4, ECF 10.
Such “threadbare” allegations are insufficient to state a claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Despite having been advised why his original Complaint was deficient, plaintiff fails to allege any details regarding the “verbal harassment” he suffered and how it relates to his disability. Accordingly, this case should be dismissed without prejudice.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Because plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief, this case should be dismissed without prejudice.
SCHEDULING ORDER
These Findings and Recommendations will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due Monday, May 22, 2023. If no objections are filed, then the Findings and Recommendations will go under advisement on that date.
If objections are filed, then a response is due within 14 days after being served with a copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendations will go under advisement.
NOTICE
These Findings and Recommendations are not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of a judgment.