Opinion
Oct. 30, 1974.
Editorial Note:
This case has been marked 'not for publication' by the court.
Harry E. Carleno, Englewood, for plaintiff-appellee.
Harry H. Haddock, Denver, for defendants-appellants.
COYTE, Judge.
Offices, Ltd., brought suit against Calvin W. Hagen and Ramada Estates, Inc., seeking a judgment of $10,000 which they claimed was owed on a promissory note executed by the defendants as part consideration for a receipt and option contract. Defendants, in their answer, pled lack of consideration and, in their amended counterclaim, alleged that plaintiff fraudulently induced them to enter into the contract and sought damages for breach of contract and also specific performance of the contract. Plaintiff moved for a summary judgment and filed an affidavit in support of its complaint and defendants filed affidavits in opposition. The trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff on its complaint and dismissed defendants' counterclaims. Defendants appeal. We affirm.
The record before the court on the motion for summary judgment consisted of the pleadings, the affidavits of the plaintiff and the defendants, and the deposition of Calvin W. Hagen. None of these documents indicate that defendants did not receive the bargained for option on the property. Hence, summary judgment on the promissory note was proper.
As to defendants' counterclaim premised on fraudulent inducement, the record fails to indicate that plaintiff made any intentional misrepresentation of fact to defendants. The most that could be implied from the documents before the trial court is that the plans, appraisal, and survey furnished by plaintiff were, in plaintiff's opinion, sufficient for defendants to obtain adequate financing. Such a representation is insufficient to support a claim premised on fraud. See Morrison v. Goodspeed, 100 Colo. 470, 68 P.2d 458. Thus, since there was no genuine issue presented as to any material fact, plaintiff was entitled to judgment on its complaint and on defendants' counterclaim. Durnford v. Thornton, 29 Colo.App. 349, 483 P.2d 977.
As stated in Norton v. Dartmouth Skis, Inc., 147 Colo. 436, 364 P.2d 866:
"The function of the rule authorizing summary judgments is to avoid the expense and delay of trails when all facts are admitted or when a party is unable to support by any competent evidence a contention of fact."
Judgment affirmed.
VANCise and KELLY, JJ., concur.