Opinion
No. 52 DB 2018
03-25-2020
OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL Petitioner v. CANDACE MARIE STAMOS FORD Respondent
OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, Petitioner v. CANDACE MARIE STAMOS FORD, Respondent No. 2487 Disciplinary Docket No. 3 ORDER
PER CURIAM
AND NOW this 18 day of June, 2020, upon consideration of the Report and Recommendations of the Disciplinary Board, Candace Marie Stamos Ford is disbarred from the Bar of this Commonwealth and she shall comply with the provisions of Pa.R.D.E. 217. Respondent shall pay costs to the Disciplinary Board pursuant to Pa.R.D.E. 208(g). A True Copy Patricia Nicola
As Of 06/18/2020 Attest: /s/_________
Chief Clerk
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Attorney Registration No. 89574 (Allegheny County)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA:
Pursuant to Rule 208(d)(2)(iii) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ("Board") herewith submits its findings and recommendations to your Honorable Court with respect to the above-captioned Petition for Discipline.
I. HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS
By Order dated June 21, 2018, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania placed Respondent, Candace Marie Stamos Ford, on temporary suspension from the practice of law until further action by the Court, pursuant to Rule 208(f)(5), Pa.R.D.E. By Petition for Discipline filed on February 11, 2019, Petitioner, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, charged Respondent with violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement arising from Respondent's conduct in her representation of one client while on administrative suspension. Respondent was personally served with the Petition on February 18, 2019, but failed to file an answer.
By Reference for Disciplinary Hearing dated March 27, 2019, the Board assigned a District IV Hearing Committee (the "Committee") to conduct a disciplinary hearing. A prehearing conference was held on May 3, 2019. Respondent was personally served with notice of the prehearing conference but failed to appear. The Committee conducted a disciplinary hearing on June 28, 2019. Despite personal service of notice of the proceedings, Respondent failed to appear. At the hearing, Petitioner's exhibits PE 1 through PE 8 were admitted into evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the record in this matter was closed.
On August 2, 2019, Petitioner filed a brief to the Committee and recommended that Respondent be disbarred from the practice of law. Respondent did not file a brief.
By Report filed on October 17, 2019, the Committee concluded that Respondent violated the rules as charged in the Petition for Discipline and recommended that she be disbarred.
The parties did not file exceptions to the Committee's Report and recommendation.
The Board adjudicated this matter at the meeting on January 16, 2020.
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
The Board makes the following findings:
1. Petitioner, whose principal office is located at Pennsylvania Judicial Center, Suite 2700, 601 Commonwealth Avenue, P.O. Box 62485, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, is invested, pursuant to Pa.R.D.E. 207, with the power and duty to investigate all matters involving alleged misconduct of an attorney admitted to practice law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and to prosecute all disciplinary proceedings brought in accordance with the various provisions of said Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement.
2. Respondent is Candace Marie Stamos Ford, born in 1969 and admitted to practice law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in 2002. Her attorney registration address is 4539 Friendship Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15224.
3. Respondent is subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
4. Respondent has a prior history of discipline.
a. By Order of the Court dated April 7, 2015, Respondent was suspended for one year and one day on consent, with the suspension stayed in its entirety, and probation imposed for a period of two years subject to conditions, which required her to repay $2,000 in unearned client fees, to comply with all Continuing Legal Education requirements, and to provide quarterly letters to the Board related to her continued participation in counseling.
b. The underlying misconduct involved Respondent's unauthorized practice of law while administratively suspended for failing to comply with continuing legal education.
c. Respondent failed to comply with the terms of her probation by failing to refund the unearned client fees.
d. The Pennsylvania Lawyers Fund for Client Security paid the funds owed to Respondent's clients.
e. Respondent has not repaid the Fund for the monies paid to her client.
N.T. 16-19; PE-5; PE 7.
5. By letter dated September 26, 2017, sent to Respondent by certified mail, return receipt requested, the Attorney Registration Office notified Respondent that she would be administratively suspended for failure to comply with Rule 219, Pa.R.D.E., such action to be effective October 26, 2017.
6. The certified mail was returned to the Attorney Registration Office as unclaimed. However, Respondent was sent by regular mail a copy of the letter dated October 31, 2017 sent by Petitioner to the President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County advising him of Respondent's administrative suspension. The letter sent to Respondent was not returned to Petitioner.
7. Respondent failed to file the certified Statement of Compliance with the Board and serve a copy on Petitioner within ten days after the effective date of the administrative suspension, as required by Rule 217, Pa.R.D.E.
8. On or about December 11, 2017, Tahesha Butcher contacted Respondent about representing her in a contempt hearing in Blair County, Pennsylvania, that was scheduled for January 17, 2018.
9. At that time, even though Respondent was administratively suspended, Respondent informed Ms. Butcher that she would consider the representation and let Ms. Butcher know if Respondent would be interested.
10. By text message dated December 11, 2017:
a. Respondent informed Ms. Butcher that Respondent agreed to represent her for the contempt hearing;
b. Respondent informed Ms. Butcher that the fee for the hearing was $1,500.00; and
c. Respondent asked Ms. Butcher if that was acceptable to her.
11. On that same day, Ms. Butcher texted Respondent back and informed Respondent that the fee was fine with her and that she hoped to hear back from Respondent.
12. Respondent then texted Ms. Butcher and informed Ms. Butcher that Ms. Butcher:
a. Could send Respondent's fee via Western Union or Money Gram and that Respondent would get started as soon as she received the fee; and
b. Did not have to pay Respondent the entire $1,500.00 at one time.
13. On December 12, 2017:
a. Respondent texted Ms. Butcher and asked her to let Respondent know how much she was sending so that Respondent could draft a correct fee agreement; and
b. Ms. Butcher texted Respondent back and informed Respondent that she would send $500.00 that Friday and the other $1,000.00 on January 1, 2018.
14. On December 15, 2017, Ms. Butcher transferred $500.00 to Respondent via Western Union.
15. Respondent did not deposit any of the funds that Ms. Butcher paid to her into an IOLTA or escrow account, or any other account for the deposit of entrusted funds.
16. Respondent had never before represented Ms. Butcher.
17. Respondent did not provide Ms. Butcher with any writing setting forth the basis or rate of Respondent's fee, either before or within a reasonable period of time after representation commenced.
18. On December 15, 2017, Ms. Butcher requested that Respondent email her a copy of Respondent's fee agreement.
19. Respondent did not provide Ms. Butcher with a written fee agreement.
20. Thereafter, Respondent requested that Ms. Butcher email Respondent a copy of the contempt paperwork, which Ms. Butcher did.
21. On or about January 2, 2018, Respondent texted Ms. Butcher and asked her about the $1,000.00 that she was to have paid to Respondent by January 1, 2018.
22. On January 2, 2018, Ms. Butcher texted Respondent and informed Respondent that she had obtained a lawyer through her church and that she wanted Respondent to refund the $500.00 as soon as possible.
23. Respondent did not respond to Ms. Butcher's text message.
24. On January 2, 2018, Ms. Butcher called Respondent and left a voice mail message for Respondent in which she asked Respondent to call her about a refund.
25. Respondent did not respond to Ms. Butcher's call.
26. By text message dated January 3, 2018, Ms. Butcher informed Respondent that:
a. She had found out that Respondent was on administrative suspension and not able to practice law;
b. Respondent took her $500.00 and Ms. Butcher wanted it back that day by 1:00 p.m.; and
c. If Respondent did not refund Ms. Butcher's money to her, she would file a complaint against Respondent with the Supreme Court.
27. Respondent did not respond to Ms. Butcher's text message dated January 3, 2018 or refund to Ms. Butcher the $500.00.
28. From December 11, 2017, when Ms. Butcher contacted Respondent about representing her in the contempt matter, until January 3, 2018 when Ms. Butcher terminated Respondent's representation, Respondent was on administrative suspension and was prohibited from representing Ms. Butcher or any clients.
29. Respondent made misrepresentations to Ms. Butcher when Respondent advised Ms. Butcher that Respondent could represent her in the contempt matter.
30. On January 24, 2018, Respondent filed her 2017-2018 PA Administrative Change in Status Form with the Attorney Registration Office, along with payment in the amount of $925.00 and a Statement of Compliance pursuant to Rule 217, Pa.R.D.E.
31. On January 24, 2018, the Attorney Registration Office returned Respondent to active status.
32. By DB-7 Request for a Statement of Respondent's Position dated February 27, 2018, Petitioner placed Respondent on notice of the allegations of possible violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
33. In the DB-7 Request, Respondent was informed that failure to respond within thirty days from the date of the letter without good cause constituted an independent basis for discipline pursuant to Rule 203(b)(7), Pa.R.D.E.
34. By letter dated February 27, 2018, sent pursuant to Rule 221(g)(1), Pa.R.D.E., Petitioner advised Respondent of the allegations of misconduct and requested that Respondent provide Petitioner with the following information:
a. The identification of what bank and account number the Western Union transfer was deposited into, and the identification of the account as an IOLTA or Operating account;
b. If the $500.00 was not deposited, any and all documentation which would evidence the disposition of the funds;
c. Bank statements, checks, and deposit items for any such account for the period of October 1, 2017 through the present into which Respondent may have deposited the $500.00;
d. Bank ledgers for any account into which the $500.00 was deposited in regard to Respondent's representation of Tahesha Butcher;
e. Client account ledger(s) for all funds Respondent received from Ms. Butcher; and
f. Monthly reconciliations for any account into which Respondent deposited the $500.00 for the time period of October 1, 2017 through the date of the letter.
35. The letter sent to Respondent pursuant to Rule 221(g)(1), Pa.R.D.E., notified Respondent that the failure to produce the requested records to Petitioner within ten business days after personal service of the letter might result in the initiation of proceedings relating to emergency temporary suspension.
36. The DB-7 Request dated February 27, 2018 and the Rule 221(g)(1) letter dated February 27, 2018 were personally served on Respondent on March 1, 2018.
37. Respondent did not respond to the DB-7 Request dated February 27, 2018.
38. Respondent did not provide the records requested by Petitioner's Rule 221(g)(1) letter dated February 27, 2018.
39. On April 5, 2018, Petitioner filed with the Board a Petition for Issuance of a Rule to Show Cause Why Respondent Should Not Be Suspended for Failure to Produce Pa.R.P.C. 1.15 Records Pursuant to Pa.R.D.E. 208(f)(5), 221(g)(1) and 221(g)(3).
40. On April 6, 2018, the Board issued an Order and Rule to Show Cause why Respondent should not be placed on temporary suspension, pursuant to Rule 208(f)(5), Pa.R.D.E.
41. The Rule to Show Cause was personally served on Respondent on April 9, 2018, and was returnable within ten days after service.
42. Respondent did not respond to the Board's Rule to Show Cause.
43. On May 21, 2018, Petitioner filed with the Board a Petition to Make Rule Absolute.
44. On May 23, 2018, the Board issued its recommendation to the Court, in which it recommended that Respondent be temporarily suspended.
45. By Order of the Court dated June 21, 2018, Respondent was placed on temporary suspension until further action by the Court and was directed to comply with the provisions of Rule 217, Pa.R.D.E.
46. The Board sent Respondent letters on June 21, 2018 and September 14, 2018, in which she was reminded of her obligation to comply with Rule 217, Pa.R.D.E.
47. Respondent failed to comply with the provisions of Rule 217(e) and did not provide the required verified statement with the Board.
48. Respondent remains on temporary suspension.
49. On February 18, 2019, Respondent was personally served with the Petition for Discipline in this matter and failed to respond.
50. Respondent was personally served with notice of the prehearing conference and disciplinary hearing in this matter.
51. Respondent failed to appear at the prehearing conference on May 3, 2019, or the disciplinary hearing on June 28, 2019.
52. Respondent has not communicated with disciplinary authorities during the entirety of these proceedings.
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
By her conduct as set forth above, Respondent violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct ("RPC") and Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement ("Pa.R.D.E."):
1. RPC 1.5(a) - A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee.
2. RPC 1.5(b) - When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation.
3. RPC 1.15(b) - A lawyer shall hold all Rule 1.15 Funds and property separate from the lawyer's own property. Such property shall be identified and appropriately safeguarded.
4. RPC 1.15(e) - Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client or third person, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any property, including but not limited to Rule 1.15 Funds, that the client or third person is entitled to receive
and, upon request by the client or third person shall promptly render a full accounting regarding the property; Provided, however, that the delivery, accounting, and disclosure of Fiduciary Funds or property shall continue to be governed by the law, procedure and rules governing the requirements of Fiduciary administration, confidentiality, notice and accounting applicable to the Fiduciary entrustment.
5. RPC 1.16(d) - Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law.
6. RPC 8.1(b) - An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
7. RPC 8.4(c) - It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
8. Pa.R.D.E. 203(b)(7) - Failure by a respondent-attorney without good cause to respond to Disciplinary Counsel's request or supplement
request under Disciplinary Board Rules, § 87.7(b) for a statement of the respondent-attorney's position, is grounds for discipline.
9. Pa.R.D.E. 217(d)(1) - Orders imposing suspension, disbarment, administrative suspension or transfer to inactive status shall be effective 30 days after entry. The formerly admitted attorney, after entry of the ... administrative suspension...order, shall not accept any new retainer or engage as attorney for another in any new case or legal matter of any nature.
10. Pa.R.D.E. 217(e)(1) - Within ten days after the effective date of the disbarment, suspension, administrative suspension or transfer to inactive status order, the formerly admitted attorney shall file with the Board a verified statement and serve a copy on Disciplinary Counsel.
11. Pa.R.D.E. 217(J)(2) - A formerly admitted attorney may only engaged in specific law-related activities.
IV. DISCUSSION
Herein, the Board considers the recommendation to disbar Respondent from the practice of law. Respondent failed to provide a response to the Petition for Discipline in this matter, which Petition charged Respondent with multiple violations of the rules in connection with her practice of law while on administrative suspension for failure to file her annual fee form and pay the annual fee. Consequently, all of the factual allegations in the Petition for Discipline are deemed admitted, pursuant to Rule 208(b)(3), Pa.R.D.E., and support the conclusion that Respondent violated the rules. Petitioner proved by clear and satisfactory evidence that Respondent engaged in ethical misconduct by virtue of the facts plead in the Petition for Discipline and related exhibits. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. John Grigsby , 425 A.2d 730, 732 (Pa. 1981). Upon this record, we recommend that Respondent be disbarred.
Respondent, who has been admitted to practice law in the Commonwealth since 2002, has a checkered history of practice that has led to this nadir in her legal career. By Order of April 7, 2015, the Court suspended Respondent for one year and one day on consent, with the suspension stayed in its entirety, and probation for a period of two years with conditions, which included reimbursing unearned fees to clients. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Candace Marie Stamos Ford , No. 187 DB 2014 (S. Ct Order 4/7/2015).
The underlying conduct in the prior matter at No. 187 DB 2014 began in 2013, approximately eleven years after Respondent's admission to practice. Therein, by Order of the Court dated April 4, 2013, Respondent was placed on administrative suspension for failure to comply with Continuing Legal Education requirements. Thereafter, Respondent continued to practice law in violation of the Court's Order and failed to return unearned fees to her client. For a time, Respondent ignored Petitioner's attempts to inquire about her actions, but eventually met in person with Petitioner for a candid discussion of her disciplinary problems and her personal issues. As a result of those discussions, the parties entered into a joint petition for discipline on consent, which the Court granted. Inexplicably, given the opportunity Respondent was granted by the Court to continue practicing law, she did not abide by the conditions of the probation and still owes $2,000.00 to the Pennsylvania Lawyers Fund for Client Security for the funds repaid to her client.
The conduct at issue herein began very similarly to Respondent's prior discipline, with Respondent's administrative suspension by Order of the Court dated September 26, 2017, effective October 26, 2017. This time, the basis for the administrative suspension was Respondent's failure to file her 2017-2018 annual attorney registration form and pay the annual fee. Despite the prohibition against practicing law, approximately two months after the effective date of the administrative suspension, Respondent took on a new client's matter and received $500.00 from that client for the representation. When Ms. Butcher terminated the representation, Respondent failed to refund to her client the unearned fees. There is no evidence of record that Respondent has ever refunded Ms. Butcher's fees. Approximately three months after the effective date of the administrative suspension, Respondent paid her attorney registration fees, filed her compliance statement, and was returned to active status on January 24, 2018.
Respondent's activities during her three month period of administrative suspension caused Petitioner to send her a letter of inquiry, which she failed to answer. Respondent's failure to respond escalated her entanglement with the disciplinary authorities, as she failed to provide to Petitioner information and records relating to her bank accounts and management of entrusted funds, and failed to respond to the Board's rule to show cause. Ultimately, Respondent's uncooperative actions resulted in the Board's recommendation to the Court that she be placed on temporary suspension pursuant to Rule 208(f)(5), Pa.R.D.E. The Court temporarily suspended Respondent by Order dated June 21, 2018, and she remains on that status.
Respondent's misconduct in the instant matter is very similar to her misconduct in the previous matter that resulted in the stayed suspension and probation. In both matters, she was administratively suspended for failing to comply with requirements necessary to maintain her license, practiced law while suspended, took a fee from an unsuspecting client who had no knowledge of her suspended status, and failed to return the unearned fees to her client. While Respondent cooperated with Petitioner in the previous matter, she has utterly failed to participate in the instant matter, thereby squandering an opportunity to demonstrate that she values her privilege to practice law. It is abundantly clear from the within record that the probation imposed in the prior disciplinary matter did not have the intended effect to curb Respondent's misconduct. In fact, Respondent's misconduct continued without great pause and she engaged in nearly identical prohibited activities. To address this egregious conduct and protect the public, severe discipline is warranted.
It is well-established that in evaluating professional discipline, each case must be decided individually on its own unique facts and circumstances. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Robert Lucarini , 472 A.2d 186, 190 (Pa. 1983). In order to "strive for consistency so that similar misconduct is not punished in radically different ways," Office of Disciplinary Counsel v Anthony Cappuccio , 48 A.3d 1231, 1238 (Pa. 2012) (quoting Lucarini , 472 A.2d at 190), the Board is guided by precedent for the purpose of measuring "the respondent's conduct against other similar transgressions." In re Anonymous No. 56 DB 94 (Linda Gertrude Roback) , 28 Pa. D. & C. 4 398 (1995).
Generally, "[t]he Supreme Court does not tolerate lawyers who take a lax approach to the administrative rules governing the practice of law. Even in situations where lawyers lack disciplinary records and have otherwise good reputations, the court finds their conduct contemptuous..." Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Harry Curtis Forrest , Jr., 134 DB 2003 (D. Bd. Rpt. 12/30/2004) (S. Ct. Order 3/24/2005).
In the matter of Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Jason Michael Purcell , No. 142 DB 2018 (D. Bd. Rpt. 9/4/2019) (S. Ct. Order 10/31/2019), Purcell was placed on administrative suspension and thereafter, held himself out to the public as an active lawyer and represented clients in at least five matters. In one of those matters, Purcell appeared in court and made a false statement to the judge. The Board found factors that aggravated Purcell's matter, including Purcell's prior criminal history and outstanding bench warrant and his failure to appear at the disciplinary hearing or otherwise participate in the proceeding. Upon the Board's recommendation, the Court disbarred Purcell. In comparing these two matters, Respondent's misconduct is not as egregious as Purcell's; however, Respondent has a history of prior discipline involving similar misconduct, which constitutes a serious aggravating factor.
In Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Joseph A. Rizzo , 85 DB 2014 (D. Bd. Rpt. 7/20/2015) (S. Ct. Order 9/21/2015), Rizzo, who had no prior record of discipline, failed to comply with the Court's order placing him on administrative suspension, neglected one client matter, failed to appear for an informal admonition, failed to comply with a condition requiring the refund of $1,500.00 of client monies, failed to answer the petition for discipline, failed to appear at the disciplinary hearing, and generally failed to participate in disciplinary proceedings. The Board recommended disbarment after noting that Rizzo had absconded with his client's funds and had made himself unavailable to the disciplinary system by failing to provide a current address to the Disciplinary Board. The Court imposed disbarment.
Like Rizzo, Respondent practiced law while on administrative suspension, failed to refund client monies, and failed to participate in the disciplinary proceedings. Even though Rizzo had no prior discipline, the Court determined that disbarment was appropriate. Here, Respondent's matter is aggravated by her prior discipline.
In the matter of Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. John Michael Biondi , No. 196 DB 2012 (D. Bd. 3/31/2014) (S. Ct. Order 6/24/2014), the Court disbarred Biondi for his pattern of ignoring the court system and the disciplinary system. Biondi failed to communicate with the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County to address certain matters where Biondi represented clients. This pattern of non-communication continued after Office of Disciplinary Counsel's involvement. Biondi failed to appear for an informal admonition, which precipitated formal charges being filed against him. Thereafter, Biondi failed to answer the Petition for Discipline and failed to appear at the disciplinary hearing. Separately, Biondi was administratively suspended for failing to file his annual attorney registration form and pay the annual fee. The Board recommended that Biondi be suspended for a period of four years; however, the Court declined to adopt this recommendation and disbarred Biondi. Similar to Biondi, the instant Respondent has evidenced a pattern of non-communication with the disciplinary system that warrants severe discipline.
"The primary purpose of our system of lawyer discipline is to protect the public from unfit attorneys and to maintain the integrity of the legal system." Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. John Keller , 506 A.2d 872, 875 (Pa. 1986). It is uncontroverted that Respondent's misconduct and failure to participate in the disciplinary proceedings, aggravated by her prior similar discipline and her failure to fulfill the conditions of the earlier discipline, show that she is unfit to practice law. In order to protect the public and maintain the integrity of the courts and the legal profession, we recommend that Respondent be disbarred.
V. RECOMMENDATION
The Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania unanimously recommends that the Respondent, Candace Marie Stamos Ford, be Disbarred from the practice of law in this Commonwealth, retroactive to the date of the temporary suspension imposed by the Court in this matter on June 21, 2018.
It is further recommended that the expenses incurred in the investigation and prosecution of this matter are to be paid by the Respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
By: /s/_________
John C. Rafferty, Jr., Member Date: 03/25/2020