A party who has the last chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the previous negligence of a plaintiff, is solely responsible. ( Townsend v. Butterfield, 168 Cal. 564 [ 143 P. 760]; Harrington v. LosAngeles Ry. Co., 140 Cal. 514, 526 [98 Am. St. Rep. 85, 63 L.R.A. 238, 74 P. 15]; Palmer v. Tschudy, 191 Cal. 696 [ 218 P. 36]; Berguin v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 203 Cal. 116 [ 263 P. 220]; Darling v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 197 Cal. 702 [ 242 P. 703]; Atkins v. Bouchet, 86 Cal.App. 294 [ 260 P. 828]; O'Farrell v. Andrus, 86 Cal.App. 474 [ 260 P. 957]; Smith v. Los Angeles Ry., 105 Cal.App. 657 [ 288 P. 690].) [4] The element of continual negligence is present in all last-chance cases.

Unawareness of peril may bring the last clear chance doctrine into play, and this rule has been applied to negligently inattentive pedestrians crossing the path of vehicles over and over again. ( Center v. Yellow Cab Co., 216 Cal. 205 [ 13 P.2d 918]; Meincke v. Oakland Garage, Inc., 11 Cal.2d 255, 257-258 [ 79 P.2d 91]; Cooper v. Smith, 209 Cal. 562, 565-566 [ 289 P. 614]; Darling v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 197 Cal. 702, 707 et seq. [ 242 P. 703]; Lee v. Market Street Ry. Co., 135 Cal. 293 [ 67 P. 765]; Ladas v. Johnson's B. W. Taxicab Co., supra, 43 Cal.App.2d 223, 229; Bailey v. Wilson, 16 Cal.App.2d 645 [ 61 P.2d 68]; Olson v. Combs, 1 Cal.App.2d 260 [ 36 P.2d 708]; Baldock v. Western Union Tel. Co., 127 Cal.App. 141 [ 15 P.2d 199]; Moore v. Bishop, 113 Cal.App. 25 [ 297 P. 580]; Bence v. Teddy's Taxi, 112 Cal.App. 636, 642 [ 297 P. 128]; Atkins v. Bouchet, 86 Cal.App. 294 [ 260 P. 828]; O'Farrell v. Andrus, 86 Cal.App. 474, 482 [ 260 P. 957].) [4] The fact that plaintiff's negligence, if the jury found him negligent, was continuous to the time of the injury does not prevent the application of the last clear chance doctrine.

Before the judgment could be appropriately and fairly upset we must be able to say as a matter of law that the plaintiff was negligent and that her negligence contributed to cause her injuries. Such is the holding of a long line of decisions. ( Smith v. Southern Pacific etc., 201 Cal. 57, 64 [ 255 P. 500]; Zibbell v. So. Pac. Co., 160 Cal. 237 [ 116 P. 513]; O'Farrell v. Andrus, 86 Cal.App. 474, 481 [ 260 P. 957]; Barlow v. Crome, 44 Cal.App. (2d) 356 [ 112 P.2d 303], and authorities there cited.) That there was a question for the jury as to whether plaintiff was negligent is clear to any one not a partisan.

Matteson v. Southern P. Co., 1906, 6 Cal.App. 318, 326, 92 P. 101, 105, holds that the last clear chance rule can never apply where the negligence of the injured party continued up to the very moment of the injury and was a contributing and efficient cause thereof. In O'Farrell v. Andrus, 1927, 86 Cal.App. 474, 260 P. 957, at page 961, it is said: "If defendant alone was guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause of the injury, plaintiff is entitled to the verdict; but if plaintiff was also guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to his injury, defendant is entitled to the verdict." In Young v. Carlson, Cal.App. 1954, 276 P.2d 23, at pages 27-28, it is said: "No doubt the doctrine of last clear chance has been greatly expanded, and properly so, in recent years.

What is important to note is that expressions such as "too fast" standing alone are too uncertain. Such testimony is properly admitted in evidence when coupled with testimony that an automobile was going at a certain rate of speed or going faster than the law allows, Bennett v. Central of California Traction Co., 115 Cal.App. 1, 1 P.2d 47 (1931), or due to facts surrounding the collision that indicates excessive speed, Hoffman v. Southern Pac. Co., 279 P. 474 (Cal.App. 1929), such as weather conditions that affected the condition of the street, O'Farrell v. Andrus, 86 Cal.App. 474, 260 P. 957 (1927). The evidence presented was sufficient to establish: (1) that Skelton failed to exercise due care in the operation of the vehicle; (2) that the vehicle was unsafe if the reach broke as a result of hitting a "chunk of cement" or a cement curb; and (3) that Skelton did not have his speed under control.