Opinion
2005-815 S C.
Decided March 27, 2006.
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, First District (James P. Flanagan, J.), entered March 28, 2005. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, dismissed plaintiff's action and awarded defendant the principal sum of $3,058.10 on its counterclaim.
Judgment modified by dismissing defendant's counterclaim; as so modified affirmed without costs.
PRESENT: RUDOLPH, P.J., TANENBAUM and LIPPMAN, JJ
In this small claims action seeking to recover a $100 deposit on a fireplace and other ancillary damages arising from the sale of the fireplace, we find that the trial court, in finding against plaintiff on his claim, properly rendered its judgment providing the parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles of substantive law (UDCA 1804, 1807; see Ross v. Friedman, 269 AD2d 584; Williams v. Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126). The decision of the fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence ( see Claridge Gardens v. Menotti, 160 AD2d 544). This standard applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court ( see Williams v. Roper, 269 AD2d at 126). Furthermore, the determination of issues of credibility are given substantial deference as the court has the opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses, thereby affording the trial court a better perspective from which to evaluate credibility ( McGuirk v. Mugs Pub, 250 AD2d 824; Richard's Home Ctr. Lbr. v. Kraft, 199 AD2d 254; Vizzari v. State of New York, 184 AD2d 564; Kincade v. Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511). We note that, under the circumstances presented, plaintiff failed to establish a proper revocation of acceptance of the fireplace ( see UCC 2-608).
However, in light of the dismissal with prejudice of a prior action commenced by defendant against plaintiff, in which defendant sought the same relief as it seeks on its counterclaim herein, i.e., to recover the balance due on the purchase price of the fireplace sold to plaintiff, the counterclaim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata ( see Smith v. Russell Sage Coll., 54 NY2d 185; Couri v. Westchester Country Club, 186 AD2d 715). Accordingly, the judgment is modified by dismissing the counterclaim.
Rudolph, P.J., Tanenbaum and Lippman, JJ., concur.