Opinion
1:20-CV-00136
07-22-2020
KELLEY O'DONNELL, Plaintiff v. JOHN WETZEL, et al., Defendants
() REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction.
The plaintiff Kelley O'Donnell complains about her conditions of confinement. After conducting a screening review of O'Donnell's complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c), we concluded that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We also concluded that the complaint violates Fed.R.Civ.P. 20. We granted O'Donnell leave to amend her complaint, but she failed to do so. Because the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and because it violates Fed.R.Civ.P. 20, we recommend that it be dismissed.
II. Background.
O'Donnell, a prisoner at the State Correctional Institution at Muncy, commenced this action pro se on January 27, 2020, by filing a complaint. She subsequently paid the filing fee for this action.
The complaint names 84 defendants. O'Donnell's complaint consists of a complaint form and an attachment. In the attachment is where O'Donnell makes factual allegations. The attachment is divided into two sections—the first labeled "Unecessary [sic] Use of Force," and the second labeled "Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Need." Doc. 1 at 12-33. Within each section, however, O'Donnell includes allegations regarding a vast array of events, many of which have no discernable connection with each other. And the events span a period of years (how many, also not clearly discernable), with the allegations bouncing from one year to another and back, with no apparent logic. It is also impossible to discern which allegations are meant as background to other allegations or how many (and what) claims O'Donnell is attempting to raise.
For the reasons discussed below, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the complaint violates Fed.R.Civ.P. 20. By an Order dated March 17, 2020, we explained to O'Donnell that her complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and that it violates Fed.R.Civ.P. 20. We granted O'Donnell leave to file an amended complaint. We later extended the time for O'Donnell to file an amended complaint until June 18, 2020. But O'Donnell has not filed an amended complaint. III. Screening of Prisoner Complaints—Standard of Review.
The court may sua sponte dismiss an action brought by a prisoner under federal law complaining about prison conditions if, among other reasons, the action "fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). This statutory text mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
When determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, "[w]e must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, construe the complaint in the light favorable to the plaintiff, and ultimately determine whether plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint." Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). In making that determination, we "consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the [plaintiff's] claims are based upon these documents." Id. at 230.
"Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a 'short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The statement required by Rule 8(a)(2) must give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and of the grounds upon which it rests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but more is required than labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). "A complaint has to 'show' such an entitlement with its facts." Id.
In considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court "'must accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'" Krieger v. Bank of Am., N.A., 890 F.3d 429, 437 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Flora v. Cty. of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2015)). But a court "need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). A court also need not "assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief."Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679).
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and "'however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
IV. The complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the complaint violates Fed.R.Civ.P. 20.
O'Donnell's claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). "It is well settled that § 1983 does not confer any substantive rights, but merely 'provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Williams v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 870 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2014)). To state a claim under §1983, the plaintiff must allege a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005).
"Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). "This already liberal standard is 'even more pronounced' where a plaintiff files the complaint without the assistance of counsel." Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). "[A] court must make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants from the inadvertent forfeiture of important rights due merely to their lack of legal training." Id. Thus, "[c]ourts are more forgiving of pro se litigants for filing relatively unorganized or somewhat lengthy complaints." Id.
Liberally construing O'Donnell's complaint, we nevertheless conclude that the complaint fails to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, which requires, among other things, that a claim for relief must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," and that "[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), 8(d)(1). O'Donnell's complaint does not contain a short and plain statement of her claims, and her allegations are not simple, concise, or direct. "Fundamentally, Rule 8 requires that a complaint provide fair notice of 'what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Garrett, 938 F.3d at 92 (quoting Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93). Here, the complaint does not provide fair notice of what O'Donnell's claims are. Accordingly, we conclude that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The complaint also violates Fed.R.Civ.P. 20, which governs permissive joinder of parties. "For courts applying Rule 20 and related rules, 'the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.'" Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966)). Still, the liberal policy of joinder under Rule 20 does not mean that unrelated claims and defendants can be joined in one action. Rather, the requirements of Rule 20(a)(2) regarding joinder of defendants must be satisfied, and that Rule provides that persons may be joined in one action as defendants if "any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and . . . any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action." Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(2).
Here, O'Donnell's complaint is based on a series of events, many of which do not appear to be connected to each other. And O'Donnell names 84 defendants, including correctional officers (ranging from the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Correction to corrections officers), medical defendants, and entities that O'Donnell labels "PA DOC CONTRACTORS." See doc. 1 at 27-33. But O'Donnell fails to plausibly allege that the claims against these numerous defendants arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences or that there is a question of law or fact common to all the defendants. Thus, O'Donnell's complaint fails to comply with Rule 20.
Before dismissing a complaint under a screening provision, the court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend her complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, in light of the liberal-amendment standard, we granted O'Donnell an opportunity to correct the deficiencies noted above by filing an amended complaint. Although O'Donnell was granted this opportunity, she has not filed an amended complaint. Thus, further leave to amend would be futile.
VI. Recommendation.
Based on the foregoing, we recommend that the complaint be dismissed in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and because it fails to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 20.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 22 day of July, 2020.
S/Susan E . Schwab
Susan E. Schwab
Chief United States Magistrate Judge