"One who is required to act in an emergency is not held by the law to the wisest choice of conduct, but only to such choice as a person of ordinary care and prudence, similarly situated, would have made." Ingle v. Cassady, 208 N.C. 497, 181 S.E. 562. Citing Poplin v. Adickes, 203 N.C. 726, 166 S.E. 908; Pridgen v. Produce Co., 199 N.C. 560, 155 S.E. 247; Odom v. R. R., 193 N.C. 442, 137 S.E. 313; Parker v. R. R., 181 N.C. 95, 106 S.E. 755; Norris v. R. R., 152 N.C. 505, 67 S.E. 1017. The standard of conduct required is that of an ordinarily prudent man. Jernigan v. Jernigan, 207 N.C. 831, 178 S.E. 587; Small v. Utilities Co. 200 N.C. 719, 158 S.E. 385. "`If the peril seemed imminent, more hasty and violent action was to be expected than would be natural at quieter moments, and such conduct is to be judged with reference to the stress of appearances at the time, and not by the cool estimate of the actual danger formed by outsiders after the event' — Holmes, J., in Gannon v. R. R., 173 Mass. 40." Ingle v. Cassady, supra.
Some allowance must be made for the excitement of the moment and the strain of nerves. One who is required to act in an emergency is not held by the law to the wisest choice of conduct, but only to such choice as a person of ordinary care and prudence, similarly situated, would have made. Poplin v. Adickes, 203 N.C. 726, 166 S.E. 908; Pridgen v. Produce Co., 199 N.C. 560, 155 S.E. 247; Odom v. R. R., 193 N.C. 442, 137 S.E. 313; Parker v. R. R., 181 N.C. 95, 106 S.E. 755; Norris v. R. R., 152 N.C. 505, 67 S.E. 1017. In Hinton v. R. R., 172 N.C. 587, 90 S.E. 756, it is said: "It is well understood that a person in the presence of an emergency is not usually held to the same deliberation or circumspect care as in ordinary conditions."
This act, however, does not bar recovery. Discussing a similar situation in Odom v. R. R., 193, N.C. 442, 137 S.E. 313, the Court said: "The mere fact that a person jumps from a vehicle in which he is travelling, where there is imminent danger of its coming in collision with an approaching train at a crossing, does not bar recovery against the railroad corporation, although it appears that he made a mistake and would have escaped injury had he remained quite." Hence the determining question of law is whether there is evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant.
We do not think this can be sustained. Parker v. R. R., 181 N.C. at p. 103; Odom v. R. R., 193 N.C. 442. The other assignments of error as to admissibility of testimony and other exceptions to the charge, we do not think, if error, are reversible or prejudicial.
Dreher v. Devine, 192 N.C. 325, is not controlling under the facts in the present case. As to proximate cause, see DeLaney v. Henderson, 192 N.C. at p. 651; Radford v. Young, 194 N.C. 747. As to sudden danger or emergency, see Riggs v. Mfg. Co., 190 N.C. at p. 260; Fowler v. Underwood, 193 N.C. 402; Odom v. R. R., 193 N.C. 442. Plaintiff's cause of action arose prior to Motor Vehicle Uniform Act, Public Laws of N.C. 1927, ch. 148, where the "Rules of the Road" are set forth.
In cases of sudden peril, imminent danger and emergency not brought about by the negligence of the traveler. McLellan v. R. R., 155 N.C. 1; Hinton v. R. R., 172 N.C. 587; Odom v. R. R., 193 N.C. 442. 4. The existence of unusual and extraordinary conditions created by the railroad company, which tend to distract and divert the attention of a man of ordinary prudence and self-possession from the duty of looking and listening effectively for an approaching train.
No error. Cited: Tyree v. Tudor, 183 N.C. 349; Graham v. Charlotte, 186 N.C. 665; Williams v. R. R., 187 N.C. 355; Hanes v. Utilities, 188 N.C. 468; Mangum v. R. R., 188 N.C. 696; Williams v. R. R., 190 N.C. 368; Albritton v. Hill, 190 N.C. 431; Hanes v. Utilities, 191 N.C. 19; Earwood v. R. R., 192 N.C. 30; Clinard v. Electric Co., 192 N.C. 743; Gillis v. Transit Corp., 193 N.C. 349; Odom v. R. R., 193 N.C. 443; Evans v. Construction Co, 194 N.C. 33; Ballinger v. Thomas, 195 N.C. 520; Ralsey v. Power Co., 195 N.C. 793; Dickey v. R. R., 196 N.C. 728; Jordan v. Hatch, 198 N.C. 540; Moss v. Brown, 199 N.C. 192; Campbell v. R. R., 201 N.C. 107; Godfrey v. Coach Co., 201 N.C. 266; Sanders v. R. R., 201 N.C. 676; Eller v. Dent, 203 N.C. 439; Keller v. R. R., 205 N.C. 278; Bullard v. Ross, 205 N.C. 496; Gaffney v. Phelps, 207 N.C. 558; Brown v. R. R., 208 N.C. 59; Myers v. Utilities Co., 208 N.C. 295; West v. Baking Co., 208 N.C. 529; Smith v. Sink, 210 N.C. 817; Harper v. R. R., 211 N.C. 402; Lewis v. Hunter, 212 N.C. 508; York v. York, 212 N.C. 703; Cunningham v. Haynes, 214 N.C. 458; Mason v. Johnston, 215 N.C. 97; Daniel v. Packing Co., 215 N.C. 765; Bechtler v. Bracken, 217 N.C. 522; Rattley v. Powell, 223 N.C. 136; Barber v. Wooten, 234 N.C. 109; Tillman v. Bellamy, 242 N.C. 204; Faircloth v. Bennett, 258 N.C. 518; Pearsall v. Power Co., 258 N.C. 642.