We conclude that Supreme Court properly denied defendants' post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, to set aside the verdict on damages for past and future pain and suffering on the ground that it deviated materially from what would be reasonable compensation. Contrary to defendants' contention, we conclude that the jury verdict with respect to liability is not against the weight of the evidence inasmuch as it cannot be said that "the evidence so preponderate[d] in favor of [defendants] that [the verdict] could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence" ( Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744, 746 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Homan v Herzig [appeal No. 2], 55 AD3d 1413; Odom v Binghamton Giant Mkts., 237 AD2d 686, 687). The parties presented conflicting expert testimony with respect to whether defendants' treatment of plaintiff deviated from the applicable standard of care and the effect thereof on the progression of her condition and the ultimate loss of her colon.
Murphy's testimony alone does not persuasively establish constructive notice since no other proof clearly puts the substance in the bathroom for a considerable length of time and the disgorging that created the unsafe condition could have occurred shortly before the accident. We are unpersuaded to set aside the jury's determination ( see Hamlin v McTighe, supra at 793; Odom v Binghamton Giant Mkts., 237 AD2d 686, 687). The further arguments regarding purportedly improper comments by defense counsel during summation were not preserved for review ( see Healy v Greco, 174 AD2d 877, 879).
The only conclusion which may be drawn from the facts presented is that, but for the dangerous condition, plaintiff would not have fallen, and the jury's findings to the contrary are irreconcilably inconsistent. While a plaintiff's own conduct may be a superceding cause which severs the causal connection between defendant's negligence and the injury (see Boltax v. Joy Day Camp, 67 N.Y.2d 617, 620), "in order to be a superceding cause, a plaintiff's negligence must be more than mere contributory negligence, which would be relevant in apportioning culpable conduct" (Mesick v. State of New York, 118 A.D.2d 214, 218, lv denied 68 N.Y.2d 611). This matter is distinguishable from cases where the plaintiff recognized the danger and chose to disregard it, thus rendering the plaintiff's conduct the sole proximate cause (see Acovangelo v. Brundage, 271 A.D.2d 885; Odom v. Binghamton Giant Mkts., 237 A.D.2d 686, 687; Schermerhorn v. Warfield, 213 A.D.2d 877). Here, the icy condition of portions of the parking lot was not readily apparent, as evidenced by the testimony of defendant's manager who did not perceive an obvious danger in the parking lot.