Odegard v. Finne

24 Citing cases

  1. Neppl v. Signature Flight Support Corp.

    234 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (D. Minn. 2002)   Cited 8 times
    Concluding that "the court does not agree with plaintiff's suggestion that `incomplete' and non-existent are synonymous. An employer cannot `find a certification incomplete' if the employer cannot find it at all because the employee has not produced it."

    In addition to Bohdan, plaintiff relies on three other Minnesota cases and four federal court cases applying Minnesota law in his opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss the claim, However, those cases are distinguishable from the matter now before the court. See Soucek v. Banham, 503 N.W.2d 153, 164 (Minn.Ct.App. 1993); Odegard v. Finne, 500 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn.Ct.App. 1993); Lee v. Metropolitan Airport Com'n, 428 N.W.2d 815, 824 (Minn.Ct.App. 1988); Willner v. Godfather's Pizza, Inc., Case No. Civ.-4-94683 [Doc. No. 21] (Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Franklin L. Noel of December 12, 1994); Schiele v. Charles Vogel Mfg. Co., 787 F. Supp. 1541, 1555 (Minn. 1992); Meleen v. Hazelden Foundation, 740 F. Supp. 687 (Minn.

  2. Neppl v. Signature Flight Support Corporation

    No. 02-232 (DSD/SRN) (D. Minn. Dec. 10, 2002)

    However, those cases are distinguishable from the matter now before the court. See Soucek v. Banham, 503 N.W.2d 153, 164 (Minn.Ct.App. 1993);Odegard v. Fenne, 500 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn.Ct.App. 1993); Lee v. Metropolitan Airport Com'n, 428 N.W.2d 815, 824 (Minn.Ct.App. 1988);Willner v. Godfather's Pizza, Inc., Case No. Civ.-4-94-683 [Doc. No. 21] (Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Franklin L. Noel of December 12, 1994); Schiele v. Charles Vogel Mfg. Co., 787 F. Supp. 1541, 1555 (D. Minn. 1992); Meleen v. Hazeldon Foundation, 740 F. Supp. 687 (D. Minn. 1990); Jones v. Lincoln Property Co., Case No. Civ.-97-240 [Doc. No. 47] (Memorandum Opinion and Order of Judge Ann D. Montgomery of September 15, 1997). First, one of those cases, Odegard v. Fenne, speaks only to intentional infliction of emotional distress, and therefore is inapplicable to the present matter.

  3. Adewale v. Whalen

    21 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (D. Minn. 1998)   Cited 25 times
    Finding that a jury could find excessive force when a police officer threw the "physically compliant" plaintiff into the squad car, breaking her arm

    The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is "sharply limited" to cases involving particularly outrageous facts. Odegard v. Finne, 500 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn.Ct.App. 1993). The conduct giving rise to distress must be "so atrocious that it passes boundaries of decency and is utterly intolerable to the civilized community."

  4. Darnaby v. Davis

    57 P.3d 100 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002)   Cited 5 times

    We note that "[t]ransference is not a recognized component in the medical treatment of physical conditions." Odegard v. Finne, 500 N.W.2d 140, 143 (Minn.Ct.App. 1993). See also Iwanski v. Gomes, 611 N.W.2d 607 (Neb. 2000).

  5. Sabal v. Robbinsdale Police Dep't

    CIVIL 22-1732 (DWF/DTS) (D. Minn. Feb. 16, 2023)

    The conduct giving rise to such a claim must be “so atrocious that it passes boundaries of decency and it utterly intolerable to the civilized community.” Odegard v. Finne, 500 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn.Ct.App. 1993) (citation omitted).

  6. Edison v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.

    Case No. 20-CV-0614 (PJS/LIB) (D. Minn. Jun. 18, 2021)   Cited 3 times

    But similar types of emotional distress have been held to be insufficiently severe to support an IIED claim. See Njema v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 124 F. Supp. 3d 852, 877 (D. Minn. 2015) ("dread, anxiety, and fear" inadequate), aff'd, 673 F. App'x 609 (8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam); Besett v. Wadena County, No. 10-CV-0934 (JRT/LIB), 2010 WL 5439720, at *17 (D. Minn. Dec. 7, 2010) ("'reoccurring headaches, night sweats, insomnia, illness and physical pain'" inadequate), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 5441937 (D. Minn. Dec. 28, 2010); Langeslag, 664 N.W.2d at 869-70 (stomach pain, hair loss, weight loss, eczema, and aggravation to diabetes inadequate when the plaintiff failed to introduce "medical testimony" that defendant's conduct was the cause); Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 440 (depression, vomiting, stomach problems, rash, and high blood pressure inadequate); Odegard v. Finne, 500 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (depression, impaired ability to trust, and damaged relationship with children inadequate).

  7. Doe v. Chesapeake Med. Sols., LLC

    Civil Case No. SAG-19-2670 (D. Md. Feb. 26, 2020)   Cited 10 times
    In Doe v. Chesapeake Medical Solutions, Judge Gallagher further found that the plaintiff failed to meet any of the grounds for reconsideration used by this Court in considering Rule 54(b), 59(e), and 60(b) motions.

    The court found it persuasive that courts from other jurisdictions had held almost unanimously that, other than a mental health professional or a doctor who essentially takes on the role of a mental health professional, a doctor who does not induce his patient to have sexual relations with him as necessary for medical treatment does not commit medical malpractice simply by engaging in sexual relations with his patient. See Gunter v. Huddle, 724 So.2d 544, 546 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998); Korper v. Weinstein, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 433, 783 N.E.2d 877, 879-80 (2003); Odegard v. Finne, 500 N.W.2d 140, 143 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Iwanski v. Gomes, 259 Neb. 632, 611 N.W.2d 607, 614 (2000); Darnaby v. Davis, 57 P.3d 100, 104 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002).

  8. Doe v. Chesapeake Med. Sols., LLC

    Civil Case No. SAG-19-2670 (D. Md. Dec. 2, 2019)   Cited 3 times

    The court found it persuasive that courts from other jurisdictions had held almost unanimously that, other than a mental health professional or a doctor who essentially takes on the role of a mental health professional, a doctor who does not induce his patient to have sexual relations with him as necessary for medical treatment does not commit medical malpractice simply by engaging in sexual relations with his patient. See Gunter v. Huddle, 724 So.2d 544, 546 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998); Korper v. Weinstein, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 433, 783 N.E.2d 877, 879-80 (2003); Odegard v. Finne, 500 N.W.2d 140, 143 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Iwanski v. Gomes, 259 Neb. 632, 611 N.W.2d 607, 614 (2000); Darnaby v. Davis, 57 P.3d 100, 104 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002).

  9. Olson v. International Business Machines

    Civil File No. 05-118 (MJD/AJB) (D. Minn. Mar. 2, 2006)   Cited 2 times

    Furthermore, even if the Court did find IBM's conduct outrageous, Olson has not proven that his emotional distress was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. The courts have repeatedly stated that injuries such as Olson's do not meet this standard. See Peterson v. City of Plymouth, 945 F.2d 1416, 1421 (8th Cir. 1991) (damages insufficient to make out IIED claim when conduct caused illness, sleeplessness, anxiety, mental anguish, loss of reputation, and marital problems); Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 440 (damages insufficient to make out IIED claim when conduct caused depression, stomach disorders, rash, and high blood pressure);Elstom v. ISD No. 270, 533 N.W.2d 51, 57 (Minn.Ct.App. 1995) (damages insufficient to make out IIED claim when conduct caused insomnia, crying spells, fear of answering door and phone, and depression requiring treatment); Odegard v. Finne, 500 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn.Ct.App. 1993) (damages insufficient to make out IIED claim when conduct caused depression requiring medication, impairment of ability to trust, and damaged relationships with children). Olson's injuries are not any more severe than the injuries cited in the above cases, and Olson's claim for IIED fails. This part of IBM's motion is granted.

  10. Ncmic Insurance Company v. Sammon

    Civ. No. 05-456 (RHK/JSM) (D. Minn. Oct. 17, 2005)   Cited 3 times
    Concluding that an insurance policy with a $1,000,000 payoff was the pecuniary risk the plaintiff faced from an adverse judgment

    In Odegard v. Finne, after the successful conclusion of a patient's treatment for a physical condition, the doctor and the patient engaged in an sexual relationship. 500 N.W.2d 140, 141 (Minn.Ct.App. 1993). The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for medical malpractice on grounds that the intimate relationship was a consensual decision made subsequent to conclusion of the treatment and therefore not part of the treatment.