Before the Carson decision, our circuit courts appointed special masters to assist them when the circumstances of the cases so justified. See, e.g., O'Connor v Vander Veen, 253 Mich. 77; 234 N.W. 101 (1931), Skinner v Lucas, 68 Mich. 424; 36 N.W. 203 (1888), Chittenden v Witbeck, 50 Mich. 401; 15 N.W. 526 (1883), FMB-First Michigan Bank v Bailey, 232 Mich. App. 711; 591 N.W.2d 676 (1998), O'Dess v Grand Trunk W R Co, 218 Mich. App. 694; 555 N.W.2d 261 (1996), Union Bank Trust Co, NA v Farmwald Development Corp, 181 Mich. App. 538; 450 N.W.2d 274 (1989), Eyde v Eyde, 172 Mich. App. 49; 431 N.W.2d 459 (1988), and Harper Creek School Dist v LeRoy Twp Supervisor, 146 Mich. App. 515; 382 N.W.2d 172 (1985). While at the present time the Michigan Court Rules of 1985 do not contain an express provision either authorizing or forbidding the appointment of a special master by the circuit court, in our view, the court possesses such inherent authority.
Evans v. Bank, (Ariz.) 19 P.2d 1062; Sneider v. Company, (Wyo.) 200 P. 1011; Lawer v. Kline, (Wyo.) 270 P. 1077; Rue v. Merrill, (Wyo.) 297 P. 375; O'Connor v. VanderVeen, 234 N.W. 101; Claughton v. Johnson, 38 P.2d 612; Walter v. Kressman, (Wyo.) 169 P. 3; Richards v. Richards, (Wyo.) 186 P. 1107; Fisher v. Power Company, (Colo.) 29 P.2d 641; 20 R.C.L. 823. Questions as to the admission or exclusion of evidence are not argued in appellant's brief, and are therefore waived.