[T]hough not recognizing strict liability, North Carolina's product liability law “expresses no interest in regulating the conduct of the defendant, but rather limits the liability exposure to which his conduct subjects him.” O'Connor, 201 Conn. at 654, 519 A.2d 13. As comment e to Restatement § 146 (relating to personal injury) advises, an important factor in the “most significant relationship” analysis is to look at the purpose sought by the particular tort rule:

Connecticut courts have noted that these auxiliary factors should not be overemphasized, as they are ancillary to the goal of providing rational and fair choice of law rules. See W. Dermatology, 153 A.3d at 586; O'Connor v. O'Connor, 519 A.2d 13, 22-23 (Conn. 1986). The parties dispute whether Hungerford owed a duty to Wiener regarding his allegations and whether Hungerford breached that duty.

The relevant factors that are considered are: (1) the place where the injury occurred; (2) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (3) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and business of the parties, and (4) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is based. Id. at 558-59 (quoting O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 652 (1986)). "Under both federal and Connecticut choice-of-law rules, a claim for malicious prosecution is governed by the laws of the state in which the legal proceedings took place, unless a more significant relationship exists in another state."

In Connecticut, "[a] principled search for the local law of the state with the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties will often cause foreign law to be recognized as the law that should govern the controversy." O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 648, 519 A.2d 13 (1986). Thus, we see no reason why a Connecticut court could not properly apply our statute, where (1) the injury and the conduct alleged to have caused the injury occurred in Massachusetts, (2) Empire is a Massachusetts company, (3) Stanley maintains an office in Massachusetts, and (4) the parties' relationship is centered in Massachusetts.

The plaintiffs argue that Connecticut law should apply under the more modern "significant relationship test," which calls for the application of the law of the jurisdiction that has the most significant relationship to the controversy in accordance with the principles of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. See O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 636 (1986). Federal courts apply the choice of law rules of the state in which they sit, and therefore Connecticut choice of law rules govern the dispute in the present case.

(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the [protection] of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.Id. at 574 (quoting O'Connor v. O'Connor, 519 A.2d 13, 22 (Conn. 1986)).

By not recognizing strict liability and recognizing contributory negligence, "North Carolina's product liability law 'expresses no interest in regulating the conduct of the defendant, but rather limits the liability exposure to which his conduct subjects him.'" Rosenthal, 462 F. Supp. 2d at 305 (quoting O'Connor v. O'Connor, 519 A.2d 13, 24 (Conn. 1986)). Defendants are Texas companies that have allegedly designed and manufactured an allegedly defective product in Texas that caused injury to a North Carolina resident.

The parties agree, as does this court, that these principles compel application of Connecticut law. Connecticut typically follows the lex loci deliciti doctrine, which states "that the substantive rights and obligations arising out of a tort controversy are determined by the law of the place of injury." O'Connor v. O'Connor, 519 A.2d 13, 15 (Conn. 1986). Connecticut courts have held that in situations where the lex loci deliciti doctrine would produce irrational results, courts should also consider the choice-of-law principles found in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.

The term " false conflict" has been used " to describe cases where application of the laws of two or more jurisdictions with contacts to the litigation reach identical results, thus eliminating any potential conflict of laws." O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 657 n.18, 519 A.2d 13 (1986). Plaintiffs' argument in this regard can be distilled as follows: Florida's seat belt defense requires a statutory violation; neither DeSalle nor Videira violated Florida's seat belt statute; therefore, there is no conflict between Connecticut and Florida law on this issue.

Id., at 214, 78 A.3d 167. In conducting the choice of law analysis in the present case, both the trial court and the Appellate Court, citing O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 519 A.2d 13 (1986), first applied the doctrine of lex loci delicti—the place of injury—before proceeding to the most significant relationship test set forth in §§ 6 (2) and 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. See Western Dermatology Consultants, P.C. v. VitalWorks, Inc., supra, 146 Conn.App. at 203–206, 78 A.3d 167. As we stated in Jaiguay, however, "we have moved away from the place of the injury rule for tort actions and adopted the most significant relationship test found in §§ 6 and 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws." Jaiguay v. Vasquez, supra, 287 Conn. at 349, 948 A.2d 955.