Hawthorne v. Edis Co., 2003 WL 23009254, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct. July, 14, 2003) (As a general rule, "[i]t is well settled that neither the owner nor general contractor has a duty to protect an independent contractor's employee from hazards created by doing of the contract work or condition of the premises or manner in which work is performed . . .").Kilgore v. Kroener, 2002 WL 480944 at *6, 2002 Del.Super. Lexis 103, at *16 (Del.Super.Ct. Mar. 14, 2002) (citing O'Connor v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 503 A.2d 661, 663 (Del.Super. 1985)). We refer to these three exceptions as the "recognized exceptions."
The second general rule is that an owner or contractee will not be held liable for the torts of an independent contractor which are committed in the performance of the contracted work. See Schagrin v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., Del.Super., 304 A.2d 61, 63-64 (1973); see also O'Connor v. Diamond State Tel. Co., Del.Super., 503 A.2d 661, 663 (1985); Seeney v. Dover Country Club Apartments, Inc., Del.Super., 318 A.2d 619, 623-24 (1974). The second general rule has been substantially eroded by numerous exceptions.
Super. Ct. July 14, 2003); see Urena v. Capano Homes, Inc., 901 A.2d 145, 150 (Del. Super. Ct. 2006), aff'd, 930 A.2d 877 (Del. 2007); see also O'Connor v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 503 A.2d 661, 663 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985) (citing Seeney v. Dover Country Club Apartments, Inc., 318 A.2d 619 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974); Williams v. Cantera, 274 A.2d 698 (Del.
Handler Corp. v. Tlapecho, 901 A.2d 737, 743 (Del. 2006); Handler, 901 A.2d at 743 (quoting Kilgore v. Kroener, 2002 WL 480944, at *6 (Del.Super.Ct. Mar. 14, 2002)). See also Hawthorne v. Edis Co., 2003 WL 23009254, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct. July 14, 2003); O'Connor v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 503 A.2d 661, 663 (Del.Super.Ct. 1985). The general rule is based on the theory that the "contractor possesses superior knowledge of the dangers inherent in the work to be performed."
Delaware courts will not impose a duty upon the landowner in this circumstance because the relationship between landowner and contractor is such that the contractor possesses superior knowledge of the dangers inherent in the work to be performed.O'Connor v. Diamond State Tel., 503 A.2d 661 (Del.Super.Ct. 1985).Id. at 663
(citations omitted). For example, O'Connor v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 503 A.2d 661, 663 (Del.Super. 1985), Seeney v. Dover Country Club Apartments, Inc., 318 A.2d 619, 621 (Del.Super. 1974) and Williams v. Cantera, 274 A.2d 698, 700 (Del.Super. 1971) stand for the proposition that, neither an owner nor general contractor has a duty to protect an independent contractor's employee from hazards created by the doing of contract work or the condition of the premises or the manner in which the work is performed unless the owner or general contractor retains active control over the manner in which the work is carried out and the methods used.
LeVonas v. Acme Paper Board Co., Md. Ct. App., 40 A.2d 43, 45 (1944); Cutlip v. Lucky Stores, Inc., Md. Ct. Sp. App., 325 A.2d 432, 438 (1974). O'Connor v. Diamond State Telephone Co., Del. Super., 503 A.2d 661, 663 (1985); Seeney v. Dover Country Club Apts., Del. Super., 318 A.2d 619, 621 (1974). Delaware and Maryland law do not differ, however, regarding the standard of care required of a landowner for active negligence.
In a construction case, the determination of whether a particular employer owed a duty to the plaintiff is generally one of law to be determined by the Court. See O'Connor v. Diamond State Telephone Co., Del.Super., 503 A.2d 661 (1985). II. FACTS
While the issue has not been passed on by the Delaware Supreme Court, the Superior Court has consistently held that although not a direct employer or controller of workers, a landowner may nonetheless be responsible for implementing OSHA regulations where the landowner controls the work area or voluntarily or by agreement undertakes responsibility for implementation of the regulations. Rabar, 415 A.2d at 504-05; see also Troise v. Herman Miller, Inc., C.A. No. 85C-FE-132, 1989 WL 64119, LEXIS op. at 5 (Del.Super. May 18, 1989); Farrall v. A.C. S. Co., C.A. No. 85C-FE-10, 1989 WL 25881, LEXIS op. at 2 (Del.Super. March 6, 1989); Bowles v. White Oak, Inc., C.A. No. 86C-AP- 107, 1988 WL 97901, LEXIS op. at 9 (Del.Super. Sept. 15, 1988); Brozozowski v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., C.A. No. 83C-JL-110, LEXIS op. at 3 (Del.Super. Oct. 24, 1985); O'Connor v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 503 A.2d 661 664 (Del.Super. 1985); Johnson v. City of Wilmington, C.A. No. 82C-MR-67, LEXIS op. at 2 (Del.Super. June 6, 1982). On this point Plaintiffs proffer the following evidence.
503 A.2d 661 (Del. 1985).