Opinion
Civil Action No. 05-02879.
May 26, 2006
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Marvin O'Connor ("Plaintiff") brings this action for alleged police misconduct that occurred on 2000 Oakford Street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants City of Philadelphia (the "City") and Philadelphia Police Officers Iezzi and Coleman have filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons that follow, I will grant the motion and dismiss this case.
The following is a recitation of the undisputed facts taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party.
Plaintiff played collegiate basketball in Philadelphia for Saint Joseph's University between 1998 and 2002. After graduating in 2002, Plaintiff entered into a three year contract with Partizan, a European basketball team, to play professional basketball in eastern Europe. The terms of the contract guaranteed Plaintiff $90,000.00 in the first year of the contract, $150,000.00 in the second year, and $250,000.00 in the third year. Shortly after his arrival in eastern Europe, however, Plaintiff returned to the United States to be with his family because of his brother's poor health.
Philadelphia Police Officer Iezzi of the South Narcotics Field Unit initiated the investigation that ultimately led to Plaintiff's arrest. At the time of Plaintiff's arrest, Officer Iezzi had been a police officer for 14 years and had worked in the South Narcotics Field Unit for 12 years. Officer Iezzi met with a confidential first-time informant approximately three weeks before Plaintiff's arrest. During the hour-long meeting, the informant told Officer Iezzi that an African-American male (later identified as Stephen Williams) had been selling narcotics in Philadelphia. The informant also told Officer Iezzi that Williams worked for another person and that Williams drove an Acura automobile. This meeting precipitated a narcotics investigation of Williams for the stated purpose of determining who had employed him. Assisting Officer Iezzi in the investigation were Officers Coleman, McKnight, and Galazaka, as well as Sergeant Torpet and Corporal Peluzzo.
The informant used Williams's street name during the meeting with Officer Iezzi, and did not mention or describe Plaintiff.
At approximately 5:05 pm on June 19, 2003, Officers Coleman and McKnight observed Williams in a black Acura Legend automobile at 2000 Mercy Street in Philadelphia. The police officers initiated surveillance, and Plaintiff arrived in a Green Oldsmobile shortly thereafter. Williams approached the Oldsmobile soon after Plaintiff's arrival, and Plaintiff exited his vehicle to speak with Williams for several minutes on Mercy Street. After their conversation ended, Williams returned to the black Acura and left 2000 Mercy Street.
Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he had known Williams for a number of years.
Officers Coleman and McKnight then followed Williams to 1100 Reed Street. A license check of the black Acura performed on the way to Reed Street revealed that its registration tags actually belonged to a 1987 Cadillac. Thereafter, the police officers observed Williams engage in what appeared to be a narcotics transaction with a white male who approached the black Acura after Williams arrived at Reed Street. The police, however, were unable to apprehend the white male after Williams left the area or to determine whether a narcotics transaction had occurred.
Williams then drove the black Acura to 2400 South 10th Street, where the police resumed their surveillance. An unidentified white male approached the Acura on 10th Street and handed cash to Williams in exchange for a small blue packet. After receiving the packet, the man handed it to a white female later identified as Jacqueline Amico. As soon as Williams left the area, Corporal Peluzzo attempted to arrest the white male while Sergeant Torpet pursued Amico. The white male managed to elude Corporal Peluzzo, but Sergeant Torpet ultimately apprehended Amico. The police also recovered the blue packet, which Amico had tossed to the ground during Sergeant Torpet's pursuit. The blue packet contained alleged cocaine powder.
Williams's final stop of the evening was at 2000 Oakford Street. Officers Kidd and Galazaka followed the black Acura to Oakford Street, where they rendezvoused with Officers Iezzi and Coleman. At some point after Williams's arrival, Officer Coleman observed Plaintiff's green Oldsmobile parked at nearby 21st and Oakford Streets. Plaintiff exited his car at approximately 5:15 pm and began to approach the black Acura. At that time, Officers Iezzi, Coleman, Kidd, and Galazaka moved in on the black Acura and arrested Williams and Plaintiff.
Immediately after the arrest, the police searched the Acura and the Oldsmobile at the site of the arrest. Officer Kidd discovered the following items in the front seat of the Acura: (1) a number of zip-lock packets containing cocaine; (2) a glass jar containing marijuana; (3) multiple zip-lock packets containing marijuana; and (4) a loaded semi-automatic 9 mm handgun. Thereafter, the police obtained a search warrant for the Acura and confiscated a bag from the trunk containing, inter alia: (1) 30 glass jars of marijuana; (2) 80 packets of marijuana; (3) $70.00 cash; and (4) two cellular telephones.
The Philadelphia District Attorney's office charged Williams with a number of narcotics and firearm-related criminal violations. Williams pleaded guilty to the charge of Controlled Substance-Manufacture/Delivery/Possession with Intent. The District Attorney's office charged Plaintiff with six narcotics and firearm-related violations, and he was incarcerated for approximately 36 hours before posting bail. At a preliminary hearing held on August 22, 2003, the Philadelphia District Attorney withdrew all criminal charges brought against Plaintiff. As a direct result of the arrest and subsequent criminal charges, however, Plaintiff alleges that he was unable to report on time to his basketball team's training camp in Europe. The team terminated his contract and Plaintiff has not received any comparable offers from other basketball teams.
Plaintiff initiated this action on June 17, 2006. The complaint alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the arrest and detention prevented him from reporting on time to his basketball team's training camp. Plaintiff also seeks declaratory relief, attorneys' fees, and costs. Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 13) on March 15, 2006, and Plaintiff responded to the motion on March 22, 2006 (Docket No. 15).
II. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). An issue is "genuine" when a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party based on the evidence in the record. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual dispute is "material" when it could affect the outcome of the case under the governing law.Id.
A party seeking summary judgment initially bears responsibility for informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on a particular issue at trial, the moving party's initial Celotex burden can be met simply by demonstrating "to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case."Id. at 325.
After the moving party has met its initial burden, "the adverse party's response, by affidavits or otherwise as provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). Summary judgment is therefore appropriate when the non-moving party fails to rebut the motion by making a factual showing that is "sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court must view the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The court must determine not whether the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other, but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. If the non-moving party has produced more than a "mere scintilla of evidence" demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact, then the court may not credit the moving party's version of events against its opponent's version, even if the quantity of the moving party's evidence far outweighs that of its opponent. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992).
III. DISCUSSION
A private party may bring a civil cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against any person who deprives the party of his or her constitutional rights while acting under color of state law. Section 1983 provides pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects . . . any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured. . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, to succeed on a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the violation of a right secured by the United States Constitution or a federal statute; and (2) that a person acting under color of state law committed or caused the alleged deprivation. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994). Section 1983 does not itself confer any substantive rights, but instead provides a remedy for the violation of federally-protected rights. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985).
Here, Plaintiff has alleged a violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment secures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend IV. There is no dispute that the police officers acted under color of state law.
This Memorandum and Order is organized by the claims brought against Defendants. First, I will consider Plaintiff's claims against Officers Iezzi and Coleman. Second, I will analyze Plaintiff's claim against the City.
A. The Claims Against Officers Iezzi and Coleman
1. The False Arrest and False Imprisonment Claims
Plaintiff alleges that his arrest, detention, and imprisonment were improper because the police lacked probable cause. Defendants aver that they are entitled to summary judgment because the undisputed facts demonstrate that they had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. I agree with Defendants and hold that no reasonable jury could find that the police lacked probable cause. These claims will be dismissed.
"The Fourth Amendment prohibits arrests [made] without probable cause." Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2000). An arrest made without probable cause creates a cause of action for false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988). To succeed on a claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must allege the following two elements: (1) there was an arrest; and (2) the arrest was made without probable cause. Id. In addition, "where the police lack probable cause to make an arrest, the arrestee has a claim under [section] 1983 for false imprisonment based on a detention pursuant to that arrest." Groman v. Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995).
While a "false imprisonment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is based on the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against deprivations of liberty without due process of law," Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979), the claim is derivative of a Fourth Amendment violation for arrest without probable cause.See Groman, 47 F.3d at 636. Thus, a plaintiff who demonstrates that he was arrested and detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment has two distinct claims under section 1983. The defendant may defeat both claims by demonstrating that there was probable cause to arrest.
The Supreme Court has defined probable cause as "facts and circumstances `sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.'"Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 11-12 (1975) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). This standard exists to "safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy" and to allow "leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection." Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 112 (quotations and citations omitted). While probable cause requires more than a "mere suspicion," it does not require law enforcement officers to have sufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482-83 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Moreover, the Supreme Court has noted that "innocent behavior frequently will provide the basis for a showing of probable cause. . . . [T]he relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is `innocent' or `guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n. 13 (1983). District courts in the Third Circuit are to apply a "common sense approach," based on the totality of the circumstances, to determine whether there was probable cause to arrest. Paff v. Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425, 436 (3d Cir. 2000).
The determination of whether law enforcement officers had probable cause to arrest is generally a question for the jury in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Deary v. Three Un-Named Police Officers, 746 F.2d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 1984). However, "where no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and where credibility conflicts are absent, summary judgment may be appropriate." Id. The issue of probable cause is only for the jury where "there is sufficient evidence whereby a jury could reasonably find that the police officers did not have probable cause to arrest." Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 818 (1997) (citations omitted).
In this case, the undisputed facts in the record demonstrate that the police had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff in light of: (1) the confidential first-time informant's tip; (2) Plaintiff's presence with Williams both before and after the narcotics transactions; and (3) Officer Iezzi's law enforcement and narcotics experience.
a. Officer Iezzi reasonably relied on the informant's tip because he met with the informant face-to-face and the police independently corroborated the information.
Officer Iezzi reasonably relied on the information given to him by the confidential informant as part of the "facts and circumstances" warranting the police's belief that Plaintiff had committed a crime. The Supreme Court uses a flexible standard to assess the value and reliability of an informant's tip in light of the totality of the circumstances. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-35. An informant who relates his or her information to a law enforcement officer during an in-person meeting is more reliable than an anonymous caller. United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Christmas, 222 F.3d 141, 144 (4th Cir. 2000)). This is because the law enforcement officer has an opportunity to assess the informant's credibility and demeanor face-to-face. Id. Moreover, the Supreme Court has found that the corroboration of an informant's information by independent police work further increases the informant's reliability. Gates, 462 U.S. at 241-42.
In this case, the informant who met with Officer Iezzi was both confidential and a first-time informant. The informant's first-time status negatively impacts his or her reliability. However, the informant met with Officer Iezzi in-person for approximately one hour. The face-to-face meeting therefore gave Officer Iezzi sufficient time to assess the informant's credibility and demeanor, increasing the reliability of the informant's tip. Furthermore, much of the informant's information was corroborated through independent police work. For example, the police surveillance team witnessed Williams selling narcotics while driving a black Acura — two facts that were initially disclosed to Officer Iezzi by the informant at the meeting. Accordingly, I find that Officer Iezzi reasonably relied on the informant's tip, including the information that Williams sold narcotics for or with another person. This finding weighs in favor of determining that the police had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.
b. Plaintiff's presence with Williams before and after the narcotics transactions weighs in favor of finding probable cause to arrest.
I also find that Plaintiff's presence on the same streets and at the same time as Williams, both before and after the narcotics transactions, weighs in favor of finding that the police had probable cause. I note that mere association with a suspect or presence at a crime scene does not create probable cause. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593 (1948). Instead, "a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person. This requirement cannot be undercut or avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists probable cause to search or seize another." Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91.See also United States v. Moreno, 897 F.2d 26, 31 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[M]ore than physical companionship and/or a working relationship is required to establish probable cause with respect to a companion of a suspect").
The facts in this case go beyond mere association and companionship, and are therefore distinguishable from the cases cited above. As an initial matter, Plaintiff was not simply present at the crime scene or associated with Williams. Rather, Plaintiff arrived at nearly the same time and within a block of Williams, both before and after the narcotics transactions, within a short period of time. The timing and location of Plaintiff's arrivals are unlikely to be a mere coincidence because: (1) there is no evidence that Williams told Plaintiff where he planned to go after they met at 2000 Mercy Street; and (2) the close proximity of both men during each of their encounters suggests a coordination of plans. Moreover, Plaintiff himself testified that he and Williams spoke to each other on Mercy Street. This fact would suggest to a reasonable law enforcement officer that the two were familiar with each other and weighs in favor of the police's belief that they worked together. These facts lend further support to my finding that the police had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.
Whether Plaintiff knew Williams as a friend is irrelevant to the issue of probable cause in this case. There is no evidence that the police surveillance officers knew the two men were friends, and a reasonable law enforcement officer could conclude that the familiarity between them was bred by a working relationship.
c. Officer Iezzi's experience in law and narcotics enforcement strengthens my finding that the police had probable cause to arrest.
Finally, viewing the facts in this case through the "prism" of Officer Iezzi's experience in narcotics enforcement weighs in favor of finding that the police had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. The Third Circuit has held that district courts must take the knowledge, experience, and expertise of law enforcement personnel into consideration when determining if they had probable cause to arrest. See United States v. Nelson, 284 F.3d 472, 475 (2002). Specifically, the Third Circuit has stated:
[T]he Supreme Court "reiterated that courts are not to evaluate [ Fourth Amendment] factors in isolation, but are instead to evaluate the totality of the circumstances, and to afford to [law enforcement] officers the opportunity to `draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that `might well elude an untrained person.'"Nelson, 284 F.3d at 475 (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 266 (2002)).
Officer Iezzi's experience as a narcotics law enforcement officer is particularly relevant in this case. Officer Iezzi had been a police officer for 14 years and had worked in the South Narcotics Field Unit for 12 years at the time of Plaintiff's arrest. Officer Iezzi testified at his deposition that, based on his experience, he believed some of the narcotics found in the Acura were originally in Plaintiff's green Oldsmobile. This belief, based on Officer Iezz's experience, bolsters my finding that the police had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for a narcotics violation.
d. The police had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff based on the factors discussed above.
After considering all of the facts described above, I hold that no reasonable juror could find that the police lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. I note that no single fact standing alone would support a finding of probable cause. However, after considering the informant's tip and reliability, as well as the presence of Plaintiff at the crime scene and the apparent coordination of movement between Plaintiff and Williams as appraised by an experienced narcotics enforcement officer, I find that the police had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Furthermore, there are no credibility issues as to any material facts and summary judgment is therefore appropriate on Plaintiff's false arrest and false imprisonment claims.
Defendants argue in their motion for summary judgment that the police had sufficient "reasonable suspicion" to stop and detain Plaintiff in this case. Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968), a law enforcement officer may, "consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). "Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content[,] . . . but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause." Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
The facts in this case do not implicate or necessitate aTerry analysis. Rather, the uncontested facts show that the police arrested Plaintiff as he approached the black Acura driven by Williams. There is no indication in these facts that the police stopped or detained Plaintiff before arresting him. Accordingly, a Terry analysis is unnecessary.
2. The Malicious Prosecution Claim
Plaintiffs also bring a malicious prosecution claim against Officers Iezzi and Coleman. Defendants argue in their motion that Plaintiff has failed to meet all of the requirements necessary to succeed on a claim for malicious prosecution at trial.
To prove a malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that:
(1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff's favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff cannot meet three of the four requirements necessary to prove a malicious prosecution claim under section 1983. First, Plaintiff fails the initiation element. "In most circumstances, a plaintiff cannot proceed against a police officer for a claim of malicious prosecution because a prosecutor, not a police officer, `initiates' criminal proceedings against an individual." Stango v. Rodden, No. 00-5709, 2001 WL 1175131, at *4 (E.D. Pa., Aug. 21, 2001) (quotations and citations omitted). A police officer may, however, be found to have "initiated" a criminal proceeding if the officer knowingly provided false information to a prosecutor or otherwise prevented the prosecutor from making an informed decision to prosecute. Id.
In this case, neither Officer Iezzi nor Officer Coleman is a prosecutor. Therefore, they cannot have initiated the case against Plaintiff under the Stango general rule. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that Defendants knowingly provided false information to the prosecutors who charged Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that Officer Iezzi's statement at his deposition that he failed to include certain information in his investigation report constitutes an intentional provision of false information to the prosecutor. This apparent error is irrelevant to the analysis here. There is no evidence that Officer Iezzi's error was malicious or intentional. Nor do the facts suggest that the error prevented the Philadelphia District Attorney from making an informed decision to prosecute. In fact, the information excluded from the Investigation Report was immaterial to a finding of probable cause. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to meet the first element of his malicious prosecution claim under section 1983.
Second, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that there was no probable cause to bring the criminal proceedings against him in this case. As described in the analysis in section "A.1" above, the police had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. As a result, Plaintiff fails the third element of a malicious prosecution claim.
Finally, there is no evidence on these facts that Defendants acted maliciously or for any purpose other than to bring Plaintiff to justice. The only evidence offered by Plaintiff is Officer Iezzi's failure to include information in the Investigation Report. As described supra, there is no evidence in this case suggesting that the failure to include the information was malicious or for any purpose other than to bring Plaintiff to justice. Accordingly, Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim fails.
3. The Qualified Immunity Defense
Defendants argue that even if the police did not have probable cause, and if Plaintiff had met each element of a malicious prosecution claim, they are still entitled to summary judgment because Officers Iezzi and Coleman are shielded by the defense of qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity protects public officials performing discretionary functions from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep't, 421 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2005). See also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). In the Third Circuit, "qualified immunity is an objective question to be decided by the court as a matter of law," although "[t]he jury . . . determines disputed historical facts material to the qualified immunity question." Bennett v. Murphy, 274 F.3d 133, 136 (3d Cir. 2002).
The Third Circuit has established a two-step analysis for determining whether qualified immunity bars a section 1983 claim.Harvey, 421 F.3d at 192. First, I must determine whether Defendants violated Plaintiff's "clearly established" rights.Id. "This entails a finding of a constitutional or statutory violation as well as a finding that the violated right was clearly established at the time of the violation." Id. Second, I must consider whether a reasonable police officer would have believed that his or her conduct deprived Plaintiff of a clearly established right. Harvey, 421 F.3d at 192. "If the plaintiff fails to make out a constitutional violation, the qualified immunity inquiry is at an end; the [law enforcement] officer is entitled to immunity." Bennett, 274 F.3d at 136.
Here, I have already determined that the police had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Accordingly, there was no violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights and the qualified immunity defense shields Officers Iezzi and Coleman from liability. Even if there had been a constitutional violation, a reasonable police officer would not have believed the actions of the police here violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights after considering the facts I have described in section "A.1" above. Accordingly, Officers Iezzi and Coleman are entitled to qualified immunity and therefore to summary judgment on the claims brought against them.
B. The Claim Against the City of Philadelphia
In Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), the Supreme Court held that municipalities may not be found liable on a theory of respondeat superior under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Municipalities and their officials may only be found liable for a violation of section 1983 when a municipal employee or official deprives the plaintiff of his or her federally protected rights pursuant to a municipal policy or custom. Id. Thus, in order to recover from a municipality under section 1983, a plaintiff must: (1) identify a policy or custom that deprived him or her of a federally protected right; (2) demonstrate that the municipality, by its deliberate conduct, acted as the "moving force" behind the alleged deprivation; and (3) establish a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the plaintiff's injury. Bd. of the County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997).
A municipal policy, for purposes of section 1983, is a "statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by [a government] body's officers." Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Such a policy "generally implies a course of action consciously chosen from among various alternatives." Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823. A municipal custom, by contrast, is a "persistent and widespread" practice of municipal action that is "so permanent and well[-]settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law." Monell 436 U.S. at 691.
In this case, there is no evidence in the record that the City maintained a policy or custom of depriving persons of their federally protected rights. Therefore, I will grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons described above, I will grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment in its entirety and dismiss this case. An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 26th day of May, 2006, upon consideration of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 13) and Plaintiff's response thereto (Docket No. 15), it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case for statistical purposes.