Unless a longer time affirmatively appears in evidence, courts assume a reaction time of 3/4 second [Vietmeier v. Voss, Mo., 246 S.W.2d 785, 788(5); Koogler v. Mound City Cab Co., Mo., 349 S.W.2d 233, 237(6); Roach v. Lacho, Mo., 402 S.W.2d 344, 350(11); Schneider v. Dannegger, Mo.App., 435 S.W.2d 416, 419(4)], which appears to be a relatively fast time. Dillon v. Hogue, Mo.App., 381 S.W.2d 599, 604 (note 4). See Ochs v. Wilson, Mo.App., 427 S.W.2d 748, 753; Am. Jur.2d Desk Book, Doc. No. 176, p. 456. As indicating that defendant had not seen plaintiff's automobile as soon as he could and should have done so, plaintiffs' counsel in oral argument pointed to this question and answer among those culled from defendant's pretrial deposition and read into evidence: "Q. Do you know what speed you had accelerated to? A. Just enough to get beside the [blue Ford] a little ways and then I seen [plaintiff's] car.

" (Emphasis in original — citing authorities.) In Ochs v. Wilson, 427 S.W.2d 748, 752 (Mo.App. 1968), the court said: "Automobiles are so commonly and universally used that knowledge and information concerning their operation is widely known.... For that reason our courts have frequently taken judicial notice that an automobile traveling at a given speed may be stopped within certain limits ... and have likewise taken judicial notice that a motor vehicle traveling at a certain speed cannot be stopped within a stated number of feet."

Our courts may take judicial notice that an automobile traveling at a given speed may be stopped within certain limits. Ochs v. Wilson, 427 S.W.2d 748, 752 (Mo.App. 1968). Not taking into account reaction time, the actual braking distance of a car traveling 40 m.p.h. ranges from 76 feet to 120 feet. Blashfield, Automobile Law and Practice, 3rd Ed., § 3.3,p. 38. Keeping in mind that defendant's time and distance estimate were approximations, Vaeth v. Gegg, 486 S.W.2d 625, 628 (Mo. 1972), defendant's evidence is consistent with plaintiff's stopping in the shortest distance possible traveling at 40 miles per hour.

That testimony was not binding upon the jury which could find, from the fact that Love did swerve to his right 2 1/2 to 3 feet, that Wayman A. could have done likewise. There are no conclusive matters of physical impossibility in this case as were present in appellants' cited case of Ochs v. Wilson, 427 S.W.2d 748 (Mo.App. 1968). These additional issues are ruled against appellants.

Taylor testified that he drove the two hundred feet into the intersection at 35 miles per hour. At that speed, a car elapses some 42 feet of highway during the normal three-quarter second reaction time by a motorist to danger. Ochs v. Wilson, 427 S.W.2d 748, 752[7-9] (Mo.App. 1968). That a modern car is quick to respond and mobile for maneuver are facts of judicial notice.

See: Gottlieb v. Szajnfeld, 550 S.W.2d 936 (Mo.App. 1977), (distance calculated as being "very close" and reaction "almost simultaneously"); Skelton v. General Candy Co., 539 S.W.2d 605 (Mo.App. 1976), (distance estimated at "a few steps"). Union Electric relies on Ochs v. Wilson, 427 S.W.2d 748 (Mo.App. 1968), and Stonefield v. Flynn, 347 S.W.2d 472 (Mo.App. 1961). In both cases, the court applied the physical facts rule to estimates of speed and distance to establish that the testimony of a witness was so manifestly impossible as to strip it of any probative value.

30 Am.Jr.2d, Evidence, § 1086. See e. g., Gilpin v. Gerbes Supermarket, Inc., 446 S.W.2d 615 (Mo.banc 1969); Kelly v. Terminal RR Ass'n of St. Louis, 315 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. 1958); Ochs v. Wilson, 427 S.W.2d 748 (Mo.App. 1968); Ewen v. Spence, 405 S.W.2d 521 (Mo.App. 1966). The "physical facts" rule applies only when the conflicting testimony goes to some vital issue in the case.

When defendant could and should have seen Kevin, Kevin's location and conduct must have been such that defendant, in the exercise of the highest degree of care, knew or should have known that there was a likelihood of injury and, at that moment, the relative positions of defendant's car and Kevin must have been such that defendant had the time, distance, means and ability to take effective precautionary action. Ochs v. Wilson, 427 S.W.2d 748 (Mo.App. 1968). In the instant case, mindful that Kevin's tender age made him less appreciative of potential danger and that such is a factor requiring proper consideration ( Graham v. Conner, 202, supra, and cases therein cited), and after viewing all the evidence and the reasonable inferences springing therefrom in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the cold, harsh reality remains that no substantial evidence existed from which the jury could find or reasonably infer that defendant could and should have seen Kevin in a position of danger in time to have taken effective precautionary action when the duty to do so arose. The record is silent as to the relative positions of defendant's car and Kevin with respect to the point of impact prior to the time Kevin "jumped in front" of defendant's car from "the shoulder of the driveway".

But accepting Sergeant Hancock's statement that lights were burning at some unspecified time after the accident and ignoring the general rule that it is not permissible to infer backwards from a past condition to establish the existence of a like condition at a previous time [Dugan v. Rippee, Mo.App., 278 S.W.2d 812, 816(8)], there is no testimony or evidence as to where the Camaro was situate or in what direction its lights may have been shining before it was observed by the defendant which would permit the jury to reasonably find that defendant could have seen the Camaro sooner than she did [O'Neill v. Claypool, Mo., 341 S.W.2d 129, 135(12)] and in time thereafter to have taken available and effective precautionary action. Ochs v. Wilson, Mo. App., 427 S.W.2d 748, 751. Much of what has been said anent plaintiffs' charge of primary negligence regarding lookout applies to their claim of humanitarian negligence.

It is necessary of course that in order to make a submissible case of failure to maintain a lookout, substantial evidence must be produced showing that the defendant driver, in the exercise of the highest degree of care, could and should have seen the other vehicle and realized the danger of collision in time thereafter to have taken available and effective precautionary action. Ochs v. Wilson, Mo.App., 427 S.W.2d 748, 751[2]; Zalle v. Underwood, Mo., 372 S.W.2d 98, 102[3]. In the instant case when Novasak was a hundred feet north of the intersection he had already slowed to 5 miles per hour and never accelerated.