Opinion
NO. 2:09-cv-2669 FCD EFB.
October 29, 2009
ORDER
This matter is before the court on plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order seeking court order preventing the foreclosure sale of their residential property on November 2, 2009. Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank ("Chase") opposes the motion.
Jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry before the adjudication of any case before the court. See Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiffs have filed a pending motion to remand, contesting the court's jurisdiction, and, in their briefing in support of a temporary restraining order, continue to argue that this case was improperly removed from the state court. Without jurisdiction, this court cannot adjudicate the merits of this case or order any relief. See id. ("If the district court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action should have been dismissed, regardless of the parties' preference for an adjudication in federal court.").
The case was removed on September 23, 2009 from the Superior Court of California, County of Yolo, to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California by defendant Chase under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 based on federal question jurisdiction. Plaintiffs' complaint alleges causes of action for fraud, misrepresentation, negligence per se, unfair business practices, and injunctive relief. Defendant removed the case, asserting that plaintiffs also asserted violations of federal statutes, including the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., as well as related federal regulations through their state law claims. While plaintiffs only allude to their arguments relating to improper removal in their briefing, in their pending motion to remand, plaintiffs contend that the complaint only brings claims under state law theories and the federal statutes are cited only "as a standard by which to measure defendants' alleged misconduct." (Pls.' Mot. to Remand [Docket #7], filed Oct. 14, 2009, at 5.)
"The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the `well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Sacramento Metropolitan Air Quality Management Dist. v. United States, 215 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000). Federal jurisdiction may also lie if "it appears that some substantial disputed question of federal law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded state claims." Rains v. Criterion Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 345 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California, 463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983). However, "[w]hen a claim can be supported by alternative and independent theories — one of which is a state law theory and one of which is a federal law theory — federal question jurisdiction does not attach because federal law is not a necessary element of the claim." Id. (holding that the plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim did not give rise to federal question jurisdiction because it could be supported by violations of the state law constitution, not only violations of a federal statute); Lippit v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d 1033, 1043 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that California unfair competition law claims did not give rise to federal question jurisdiction because such claims are based on unfair or fraudulent conduct generally, and not necessarily violations of federal rules and regulations); Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chemicals, 29 F.3d 148, 153 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that negligence action alleging violations of local, state, and federal environmental laws did not confer federal question jurisdiction).
In this case, plaintiffs' claims do not rely solely on violations of federal law. Specifically, in their first cause of action for fraud, plaintiffs allege that "[t]he fraudulent scheme described herein perpetrated by defendants, and each of them, violated plaintiffs' rights under Federal and state law and regulations." (Compl., attached to Notice of Removal, filed Sept. 23, 2009, ¶ 22) (emphasis added). Similarly in their third cause of action for negligence, plaintiffs allege that defendants' failure to make certain disclosures "constitute[d] negligence in violation of Federal and state law" and that the alleged negligent conduct demonstrates "predatory lending practices prohibited by Federal and state laws and regulations." (Compl. ¶¶ 36-37) (emphasis added). As such, resolution of the potential federal issues raised in the complaint is not essential, and thus, determination of federal law is not a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded state claims. See Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 810 (1988) ("[A] claim supported by alternative theories in the complaint may not form the basis for [federal] jurisdiction unless [federal] law is essential to each of those theories.").
Neither plaintiffs' second nor fourth causes of action reference any federal statutes or regulations.
Because the court does not have federal question jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims, the court REMANDS this action back to the Superior Court of California, County of Yolo.
Defendant raises no basis for removal based upon diversity jurisdiction in its Notice of Removal.
IT IS SO ORDERED.