As has been observed many times: "A continuing violation is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not continual ill effects from an original violation." Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1981); accord Ocean Acres Ltd. v. Dare County Bd. of Health, 707 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1983). Here, any taking occurred at the time of the ordinance's enactment; what continued was the ill effect of the ordinance's enactment and the alleged taking.

Id. at 391. The Sixth Circuit has since declined to follow Gordon, see Kuhnle Bros. v. County of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516, 521 n. 4 (6th Cir. 1997), as have other courts of appeals, see, e.g., Ocean Acres Ltd. v. Dare County Bd. of Health, 707 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1983). In Ocean Acres, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed that "[a] continuing violation is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not continual ill effects from an original violation."

A use restriction on real property may constitute a taking if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use of the property.Ocean Acres, Ltd. v. Dare County Board of Health, 707 F.2d 103, 105 (4th Cir. 1983). Although federal courts have uniformly held that the condemnation of a private road for public use is a taking under the fifth amendment, e.g., United States v. 201.19 Acres of Land, 478 F.2d 1042 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. 10.0 Acres of Land, 533 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1976), in this case Currituck did not condemn a private road. Rather, it imposed a use restriction requiring that if Coastland's land were to be used for a subdivision, it must include a public access road.

Butcher's reliance on McCausland, 649 F.2d 278 and Ocean Acres Ltd. v. Dare Cty. Bd. of Health, 707 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1983) is misplaced (Dkt. No. 12 at 5). McCausland stands primarily for the proposition that § 1983 claims are subject to West Virginia's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Nat'l Adver., 947 F.2d at 1166 (quoting Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1981)). Because Spencer does not contend that the Chapel Hill police officers committed continual unlawful acts during the statutory period, he cannot sustain his constitutional claims on the basis of a continuing violation.See Ocean Acres Ltd. v. Dare County Bd. of Health, 707 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1983) (refusing to apply the continuing violation theory to toll the statute of limitations because plaintiff's allegations focused on "the initial acts taken by defendants, not on a continuing course of conduct"). Furthermore, the Town of Chapel Hill's alleged condonation of the participating officers' conduct does not constitute an independently compensable injury; if anything, it may be characterized as an "ill effect of an original violation" that is insufficient to toll the statute of limitations on Spencer's constitutional claims.

ition that the road closure constituted a continuing wrong such that every day that the road remained closed constituted a new injury. They first cite Gordon v. Warren, 579 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1978), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied the continuing violations doctrine in concluding that a temporary takings claim was not time barred because the alleged wrong—a city ordinance that prevented a developer from completing construction of an apartment complex—was a "continuing course of action [that] made it impossible for the plaintiffs to enjoy the full use of their property ...." Id., at 387, 391. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit later explained, however, the Sixth Circuit has not followed Gordon ; see Cowell v. Palmer, 263 F.3d 286, 293 (3d Cir. 2001) ; see also Kuhnle Bros., Inc. v. Geauga, supra, 103 F.3d at 521 n.4 ; and other federal circuit courts of appeals have also declined to adhere to Gordon's holding. See, e.g., Ocean Acres Ltd. Partnership v. Board of Health, 707 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1983). "The continuing violations doctrine is an equitable exception to a strict application of a statute of limitations where the conduct complained of consists of a pattern that has only become cognizable as illegal over time.... [W]hen a defendant's conduct is part of a continuing practice, an action is timely [as] long as the last act evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitations period; in such an instance, the court will grant relief for the earlier related acts that would otherwise be time barred."

See also Wallace v. New York, 40 F. Supp. 3d 278, 302 (E.D. N.Y. 2014) (explaining that "the clock on any challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, whose continued application works an ongoing constitutional violation, starts to run anew, every day that the statute applies"). The Court of Appeals also explained that a different result was reached in Ocean Acres, Ltd. v. Dare County Board of Health, 707 F.2d 103, 105 (4th Cir. 1983), where the "continuing wrong" exception was found not to apply based in part on the nature of the wrongful conduct and harm alleged. In contrast to the present case, the court in Ocean Acres ultimately concluded that the plaintiff's allegations of harm focused "'on the initial actions taken by defendants, not on a continuing course of conduct.'"

" The Court of Appeals also explained that a different result was reached in Ocean Acres, Ltd. v. Dare County Board of Health, 707 F.2d 103, 105 (4th Cir.1983), where the "continuing wrong" exception was found not to apply based in part on the nature of the wrongful conduct and harm alleged. In contrast to the present case, the court in Ocean Acres ultimately concluded that the plaintiff's allegations of harm focused " ‘on the initial actions taken by defendants, not on a continuing course of conduct.

Id. Furthermore, "[a] continuing violation is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not continual ill effects from the original violation." Id. at 293 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ocean Acres Ltd. v. Dare Cty. Bd. of Health, 707 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1983)).

("[W]hen a defendant's conduct is part of a continuing practice, an action is timely so long as the last act evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitations period; in such an instance, the court will grant relief for the earlier related acts that would otherwise be time barred."). Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 293 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Ocean Acres Ltd. v. Dare Cnty. Bd. of Health, 707 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1983)) Id.