Occidental Ins. Co. v. Chasteen

6 Citing cases

  1. Shatz v. American Surety Company of New York

    295 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956)   Cited 13 times
    In Shatz v. American Surety Company of New York, Ky., 295 S.W.2d 809, we held that a judgment of acquittal was incompetent and inadmissible in a civil action involving the same facts.

    This evidence was admitted as a "relative circumstance". Prior to the case of Wolff v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 282 Ky. 824, 140 S.W.2d 640, 130 A.L.R. 682, it was apparently settled in this state that a judgment of acquittal in a criminal prosecution was not competent evidence in a civil suit involving the same facts. Sovereign Camp of Woodmen of the World v. Purdom, 147 Ky. 177, 143 S.W. 1021; Bray-Robinson Clothing Co. v. Higgins, 210 Ky. 432, 276 S.W. 129; Occidental Ins. Co. v. Chasteen, 255 Ky. 710, 75 S.W.2d 363. The Wolff case, above cited, involved a judgment of conviction.

  2. Tennessee Odin Ins. v. Dickey

    228 S.W.2d 73 (Tenn. 1950)   Cited 17 times
    Holding evidence of insured's acquittal of arson was inadmissible for any purpose, and its admission was reversible error, in action to recover on insurance contract; "the jury might well have concluded that the insurance company's defense was false, even though the court instructed the jury that [acquittal evidence] should go only to [insured's] credibility"

    In Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112 S.E. 301, 31 A.L.R. 258, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case was held to be inadmissible. In Occidental Ins. Co. v. Chasteen, 255 Ky. 710, 75 S.W.2d 363 the suit was to recover for a fire loss; the plaintiff's prior acquittal of arson was excluded. To the same effect, Bobereski v. Insurance Co., 105 Pa. Super. 585, 161 A. 412; Girard v. Vermont Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 103 Vt. 330, 154 A. 666.

  3. Johnson v. Smith

    257 S.W.2d 20 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1951)   Cited 1 times

    In Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112 S.E. 301, 31 A.L.R. 258, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case was held to be inadmissible. In Occidental Ins. Co. v. Chasteen, 255 Ky. 710, 75 S.W.2d 363 the suit was to recover for a fire loss; the plaintiff's prior acquittal of arson was excluded. To the same effect, Bobereski v. Insurance Co., 105 Pa. Super. 585, 161 A. 412; Girard v. Vermont Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 103 Vt. 330, 154 A. 666.

  4. Gardner's Adm'r v. Dale

    219 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. Ct. App. 1949)   Cited 2 times

    The seventh question propounded to Mrs. Dale, testifying for herself, involved a transaction with the decedent, and when the court overruled an objection and permitted her to answer, the door was open to all that followed. We have held in numerous cases that where an objection to a particular class of testimony is overruled, the party objecting need not repeat the objection every time a similar question is asked since it may be assumed the court will adhere to the ruling throughout the trial, Bailey v. Bailey, 297 Ky. 400, 180 S.W.2d 316; Truitt v. Truitt's Adm'r, 290 Ky. 632, 162 S.W.2d 31, 140 A.L.R. 1127; Moran v. Choate, 253 Ky. 470, 69 S.W.2d 994, and this is true whether the line of interrogation is to the same or other witnesses. Occidental Insurance Co. v. Chasteen, 255 Ky. 710, 75 S.W.2d 363; City of Hazard v. Eversole, 237 Ky. 242, 35 S.W.2d 313; Koehler v. Com., 222 Ky. 670, 1 S.W.2d 1072; Brown's Adm'r v. Wilson, 222 Ky. 454, 1 S.W.2d 767. As was held in Truitt v. Truitt's Adm'r supra, a husband is not a competent witness to testify to a transaction with a decedent where his wife is disqualified under subsection 2 of section 606 of the Civil Code of Practice. Appellant contends that with Mr. and Mrs. Dale's testimony eliminated the evidence was insufficient to take the case to the jury, but we deem this contention without merit since there was other evidence which tended to show that Mrs. Dale performed the services described in her petition, and that they were performed pursuant to an agreement with the decedent.

  5. Chatt v. Commonwealth

    268 Ky. 141 (Ky. Ct. App. 1937)   Cited 8 times

    He usually repeated his objection each time the interrogation about this threat was resumed but not always. Having made one unsuccessful effort to keep out the evidence of this threat, he was not required to renew it each time the same or any other witness was interrogated about it. Cincinnati, N. O. T. P. Ry. Co. v. Bennette, 134 Ky. 19, 119 S.W. 181; Standard Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Riggs, 219 Ky. 51, 292 S.W. 476; Brown's Adm'r v. Wilson, 222 Ky. 454, 1 S.W.2d 767; City of Hazard v. Eversole, 237 Ky. 242, 35 S.W.2d 313; Occidental Ins. Co. v. Chasteen, 255 Ky. 710, 75 S.W.2d 363. Chatt denied having made any threat to kill Reid and testifies that he said this to Reid: "Roy, don't call the law, I think everything is all right now."

  6. Fidelity Guaranty Fire Corp. v. Ratterman

    90 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. Ct. App. 1936)   Cited 6 times

    Indeed, it was incompetent and prejudicial. Sowder v. Commonwealth, 261 Ky. 610, 88 S.W.2d 274; Crabb v. Larkin, 9 Bush, 154; Liverpool London Globe Ins. Co. v. Wright Allen, 166 Ky. 159, 179 S.W. 49; Occidental Ins. Co. v. Chasteen et al., 255 Ky. 710, 75 S.W.2d 363. This incompetent evidence was on the decisive point; that is, the intent of Wilkerson at the time he took possession of the automobile to convert it to his own use and deprive the owner thereof permanently, to establish which no other evidence was directed. Louisville N. R. Co. v. Frazee, 71 S.W. 437, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1273; Honaker v. Crutchfield, 247 Ky. 495, 57 S.W.2d 502; Occidental Ins. Co. v. Chasteen, supra.