Opinion
FBTFA156047948
02-16-2016
Loveth Obunbiyi v. Oluseyi Obunbiyi
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Gerard I. Adelman, J.
Before the court is the dissolution action between the plaintiff, Loveth Obunbiyi, and the defendant, Oluseyi Obunbiyi. This case was tried on Tuesday January 19, 2016. Both parties testified and the plaintiff introduced seven documents through counsel as full exhibits for the court's consideration. The defendant introduced three exhibits through counsel.
BACKGROUND
The parties were married in Nigeria on July 10, 2004. The plaintiff is thirty-seven years old, and the defendant is thirty-nine. Both are in good health. They moved to Connecticut in 2006, and have four minor children issue of the marriage ranging in age from almost four years old to fifteen years old. The parties purchased the current marital home located at 438 Chopsey Hill Road in Bridgeport in March of 2011. Both parties agree that the plaintiff left the marital home with the children in November of 2014, and that the defendant has resided there alone since that date.
They also agree that since the plaintiff left, she has not contributed to the cost of the marital home. The parties differ slightly as to the present fair market value of said property with the plaintiff setting a figure of approximately $130,000 and the defendant $120,000. Both agree that the present mortgage balance is approximately $118,000. The parties are not current on their mortgage payments, although no foreclosure action has been commenced. Given these facts it is unlikely that the property could be sold successfully and they might need the permission of the mortgage holder to engage in a short sale. See, e.g., Norwich v. Norwich Harborview Corp., 156 Conn.App. 45, 49-50, 111 A.3d 956 (2015) (defaulting party requires permission from mortgagee to engage in short sale).
The plaintiff is the owner and operator of TSO African Hair Braiding (TSO), which constitutes her sole source of income. This business has been in operation for approximately three years having started operation in 2012. Her tax returns for 2012, 2013, and 2014 were entered into evidence (plaintiff's exhibits 1, 2 and 3, respectively). Only the 2014 return provides any productive information as to the business income since TSO was not operational long enough in 2012 to provide accurate information and her gross business sales from the business in 2013 was under $10,000.00. In 2014 she earned a gross income of $38,249 and had $19,553 net of business expenses. That would translate into a weekly gross income of $360. On the plaintiff's current financial affidavit she shows a weekly gross income of $388, which is certainly in line with her income for the prior year.
The plaintiff has not yet filed her taxes for 2015.
The defendant testified that he was trained as an automobile mechanic in Nigeria, but is currently employed as a courier for People's Bank. However, he lists his employer as being Contractor Management Services located in Cromwell, Connecticut, and on his tax returns indicates that he is self-employed on his tax returns. No testimony was solicited to explain the details of these arrangements and the plaintiff has not raised any questions regarding his earnings from this employment.
I. Income
The parties have differing views on the remaining issues. First, in addition to the defendant's aforementioned employment, he also operates a side business called Lucky Auto Mobile Mechanic. The defendant testified that under this side business, he performs oil changes and simple repair work in the driveways of his customers. According to his financial affidavit he generates less than $4,000.00 gross annually from this work. On this point there is considerable disagreement.
The plaintiff testified that during their marriage not only did he do auto repair work, but that he bought, repaired and sold vehicles both in Bridgeport and in Nigeria. Her testimony was that he would typically send two to three cars to Africa yearly. All of this work was undocumented and unreported. Although the defendant denied that he did more than occasional oil changes and the like, he did claim that he had $6,500.00 in cash in the house, and when the plaintiff left, she took money.
On this issue of the side business, the court finds that the plaintiff is more credible in her account than the defendant. " It is the sole province of the trial court to weigh and interpret the evidence before it and to pass on the credibility of the witnesses . . . It has the advantage of viewing and assessing the demeanor, attitude and credibility of the witnesses and is therefore better equipped than we to assess the circumstances surrounding the dissolution action." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Zahringer v. Zahringer, 124 Conn.App. 672, 679-80, 6 A.3d 141 (2010). " Credibility must be assessed . . . not by reading the cold printed record, but by observing firsthand the witness' conduct, demeanor and attitude." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schoenborn v. Schoenborn, 144 Conn.App. 846, 851, 74 A.3d 482 (2013).
One of the many factors that resulted in the court's conclusion as to the plaintiff's credibility on this point was the defendant's comment to plaintiff's counsel when asked about the car selling business. His answer was that " she has to prove it." This response was quite evasive. See, e.g., Cummings v. Meriden Property Management, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-14-6023999-S, (April 29, 2015, Gleeson, J.) (court may take into account evasive and incomplete responses); Luv Monkey II, LLC v. First American Title Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-07-5011398-S, (September 27, 2010, Rittenband, J.).
Beyond this, the court believes that she did prove it by a preponderance of the evidence. Among the other factors that the court considered were the following: (1) prior to the separation the parties not only paid their bills, but drove new cars and accumulated cash that they kept in their home; and (2) in the year prior to the plaintiff leaving, the defendant had some rather significant deposits into his accounts including wire transfers from Africa. His explanation for the wire transfers was that they were either gifts from his wealthy uncle in Nigeria to help him pay his bills or funds sent by that uncle for the defendant to give to the uncle's son. In his testimony, however, he never expressed having any difficulty paying his bills until the plaintiff left and stopped contributing to the household expenses. These wire transfers were all received before the plaintiff left, and no evidence of such deposits was offered after the parties separated and the defendant's alleged financial hardship began. The fact that such money went into his accounts, as well as his expenses far exceeded his stated income is a clear indication that there must have been an additional income source. These inconsistencies and contradictions between the evidence and the defendant's testimony undermine his credibility. See Gonzalez v. Commissioner of Correction, 58 Conn.App. 371, 372, 752 A.2d 85, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 921, 759 A.2d 1024 (2000).
Additionally, the paychecks that the defendant deposited into his account frequently exceeded the amount he revealed on his financial affidavit. On his current financial affidavit, he indicated a weekly gross income from employment of $390 from his employment. The affidavit that he filed over the summer showed a gross income of $336. His bank records (plaintiff's exhibit 6) show repeated payroll deposits of at least $454.14 throughout the months of March, April and May 2015. These deposits are presumably net of taxes since on his affidavit he shows deductions taken from the gross amounts by his employer. See Favrow v. Vargas, 222 Conn. 699, 704, 610 A.2d 1267 (1992) (net weekly income equals gross weekly income after deductions).
The last month of bank records does show slightly lower payroll amounts and records from 2013 and 2014 show consistently higher amounts. The record does not indicate how his average income was reached and the plaintiff has used his stated income for child support calculation purposes.
In addition to this income, both parties testified that they had received a settlement from a motor vehicle accident involving the plaintiff and at least two of the four children. The defendant testified that he had a claim for loss of consortium in the action and that was not disputed by the defendant. They also agree that the plaintiff took the net proceeds from the lawsuit when she left the marital home with the four minor children. The total settlement amounted to approximately $14,000, all of which the plaintiff retained. In addition to the approximate $6,500 in cash that the plaintiff took from the marital home as well, the plaintiff consequently acknowledges that she took about $20,500 with her and used that money to support herself and the four children.
The parties differed somewhat in the exact amount, but it appears that is was very close to the $14,000 amount if not that sum exactly.
II. Real Estate Transactions
Another serious point of disagreement was over the plaintiff's claim that the parties purchased land in Nigeria during the marriage, and that they were constructing an " eight flat" building on that land. The plaintiff testified that they used money from the car sales to finance this project and it was being done slowly as money was available. She testified that her name was not on the documents because in the Nigerian culture the man controls the money and family assets. She was unhappy about that arrangement according to her testimony.
The defendant completely denied that there was ever any land or a building in Nigeria. In his proposed orders, however, he agreed that if it did exist the plaintiff could have it free and clear of any claim by him. The plaintiff was not able to offer any evidence that such a transaction for the purchase of land or for the construction of a building ever took place. Although the court, having experience in other similar cases, finds the plaintiff's testimony to be reasonable, without any evidence beyond her testimony, there is no valid order that the court can make under these circumstances. See, e.g., deFur v. deFur, 37 Conn.App. 450, 452, 656 A.2d 703 (1995) (court cannot make order without specific factual finding); Alexander v. Vernon, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. X07-CV-02-0078935-S, (May 3, 2004, Sferrazza, J.) (dispute cannot be resolved if remains in the " shadows of speculation."). The court will accept the defendant's proposed order regarding this issue and leave future proof to the plaintiff to obtain so that she might enforce such an order.
III. Pendente Lite Orders and Arrearage
A pendente lite support order was entered in the case regarding child support on May 14, 2015 (#102.01). See General Statutes § 46b-83 (authorizing orders pendente lite). In that order, the defendant was required to pay $203.00 per week to support the four minor children, commencing with the first payment on Friday May 15, 2015. The defendant completely failed to honor the court order from the very beginning. On May 29, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt alleging incomplete compliance with the support order (#112.00). When that motion was heard on August 24, 2015, the court did not find that the defendant's violation was willful, and therefore he was not found to be in contempt. Brody v. Brody, 315 Conn. 300, 318-19, 105 A.3d 887, 899 (2015). However the court found the arrearage to be $1,554, and reduced the weekly support to $186.00 with a $20.00 per week payment on the arrearage for a total effective weekly order of $206.00 (#118.00).
The defendant argued that this order was retroactive to May 14, 2015, but there is no such language in the order.
Arrearage is calculated by multiplying the order by the number of weeks and subtracting the amount that has already been paid, and if there is less paid than owed, there is an arrearage. See Regs. Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-3a (providing guidelines); Regs. Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-1 (defining arrearage). For this calculation, one would only consider the support order and not the arrearage order. Unkelbach v. McNary, 244 Conn. 350, 367, 710 A.2d 717 (1998). Any money not paid against the arrearage would not increase the arrearage; it simply would not reduce it. E.g., Diamond v. Diamond, 32 Conn.App. 733, 739, 631 A.2d 1157 (1993) (there is only " new" arrearage upon nonpayment, but no increase in arrearage).
Since there is no contempt motion pending, the issue of whether or not the defendant made the payments as ordered by the court is not relevant here.
In this case, there were fifteen (15) weeks from the first court order on May 14, 2015 until the week ending before the second court order in August. Multiplying the $203.00 weekly order by 15 weeks equals $3,045.00. There were twenty-one (21) weeks from the second court order to the week ending before the trial in January 16. Multiplying the $186.00 weekly order by 21 equals $3,906.00. The two orders combined establishes that full compliance with the support orders would have required a payment of $6,951.00. Giving the defendant credit for all payments he claims to have made those payments total $5,294.00 leaving a balance of child support--an arrearage--due and owing of $1,657.00.
The plaintiff questioned the accuracy and validity of some of the checks offered by the defendant in support of his claim (defendant's exhibit " C"). This, however, is not at issue as the court does not yet know whether the checks are valid.
IV. Tax Claims
There was one pending motion that the court was asked to resolve as part of the trial. Defendant filed a motion seeking an order allowing him to claim all four children for income tax filing purposes in tax year 2015 (#123.00). The uncontroverted testimony was that for tax year 2014 the plaintiff filed her taxes as " head of household" and claimed all four children as dependents. This was done unilaterally and without any prior discussion with the defendant. Accordingly, he is asking to claim all four children as dependents this year and then divide the exemptions in future years. Because of the benefit in claiming the head of household status for income taxation purposes, the court will accordingly fashion an appropriate remedy for the resolution of this issue. See, e.g., Watson v. Watson, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. FA-10-4013021-S, (January 12, 2012, Suarez, J.) (ordering parties to alternate parties' filing status); Couture v. Couture, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. FA-05-4101955-S, (January 9, 2007, Swienton, J.) (same).
Although the plaintiff employed the services of a well known tax preparation company clearly this was not the correct filing status. It is unknown what the plaintiff told the tax preparer to lead to this error, but the correct status would have been " Married, filing separately."
V. Custody
Regarding the children, the plaintiff testified that the defendant has not had any contact with them since he was ordered to pay support. She alleges that although she has offered to allow the children to visit him on several occasions, he has declined. His testimony was that he has seen the children briefly at the end of the school day for last several weeks. That is hardly an indication of an involved parent, but nevertheless does not preclude him from any custodial rights.
When making a determination as to custody, " the rights and responsibilities of both parents shall be considered and the court shall enter orders accordingly that serve the best interests of the child and provide the child with the active and consistent involvement of both parents commensurate with their abilities and interests." General Statutes § 46b-56(b). " In making . . . any order . . . the court shall consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so may consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of the following factors . . . (5) the past and current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the child's siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the best interests of the child; (6) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders . . . (8) the ability of each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child; (9) the child's adjustment to his or her home, school and community environments . . . (13) the child's cultural background . . ."
The defendant has provided for the children, and while his contact now is limited, he contacts his children. Moreover, he testified that he plans on furthering their education. There is therefore no indication that the parties could not co-parent, with the children residing with the plaintiff. This did not appear to be a major concern as neither party raised that as an issue.
VII. Alimony
Finally, the plaintiff has requested that she receive periodic alimony from the defendant. " Historically, alimony was based [on] the continuing duty of a divorced husband to support an abandoned wife and should be sufficient to provide her with the kind of living [that] she might have enjoyed but for the breach of the marriage contract by the [husband]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dan v. Dan, 315 Conn 1, 9, 105 A.3d 118 (2014). " In determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the court shall consider the evidence presented by each party and shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make . . . General Statutes § 46b-82.
A review of the respective financial affidavits of the parties would indicate that after the payment of the child support order, the plaintiff will have the greater share of the combined recorded and documented net disposable income of the family. In fact, based on the stated income of the parties, she would have almost seventy (70%) percent of that income. Given the fact that the court found the defendant to have more income than has been disclosed, such a ratio is not unacceptable to the court. It is within the trial court's discretion to order the distribution of assets unequally when appropriate. Desai v. Desai, 119 Conn.App. 224, 237, 987 A.2d 362 (2010). Additionally, given this rationale it would also be appropriate for the court to grant to the plaintiff a nominal alimony order. " [A] nominal alimony award may often be appropriate when the present circumstances will not support a substantial award. Nominal awards, however, are all that are necessary to afford the court continuing jurisdiction to make appropriate modifications. [Our Supreme Court has] stated that because some alimony was awarded, [one dollar per year] with no preclusion of modification, if the circumstances warrant, a change in the award can be obtained at some future date." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Simmons v. Simmons, 244 Conn. 158, 186, 708 A.2d 949 (1998).
" General Statutes § 46b-81(c) directs the court to consider numerous separately listed criteria. No language of presumption is contained in the statute. Indeed, § 46b-81(a) permits the farthest reaches from an equal division as is possible, allowing the court to assign to either the husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other. On the basis of the plain language of § 46b-81, there is no presumption in Connecticut that marital property should be divided equally prior to applying the statutory criteria." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Desai v. Desai, 119 Conn.App. 224, 238, 987 A.2d 362 (2010). In the previous sections of this decision, the court has explained its reasoning for the property distribution, and has further explained the reasoning for the support order. It is therefore unnecessary to reiterate this when reaching a determination as to the amount of alimony.
CONCLUSION
Although it is clear that the marriage has ultimately failed and that there is no reasonable hope for any sort of reconciliation, the court cannot find that either party was more at fault for the breakdown than was the other. Having reviewed carefully the testimony of the parties including their demeanor while on the stand, having reviewed evidence, and having considered the statutory criteria of the appropriate statutes as well as the case law of our state, the court makes the following findings of fact:
A. The court has jurisdiction over this matter;
B. All statutory stays have expired;
C. The allegations of the complaint have been proven;
D. The marriage has broken down irretrievably and there is no reasonable hope of reconciliation;
E. There are four children issue of the marriage, to wit: Oluwatoyin Ogunbiyi born in October 2000; Babajide Ogunbiyi born in August 2003; Olayiwola Ogunbiyi born in December 2007; and Blessings Ogunbiyi born in February 2012;
This child is shown as Jide Ogunbiyi in the complaint. That appears to be a nickname and not the child's legal name.
This child is shown as James Ogunbiyi in the complaint. That appears to be a nickname and not the child's legal name.
F. The four minor children have been the recipients of assistance from Husky Insurance coverage during the marriage and the plaintiff and the minor children have recently been found qualified for food stamp assistance;
G. The State of Connecticut has not been given notice of this matter;
H. The presumptive child support per the Child Support Guidelines is $186.00 per week for four minor children;
I. There is an arrearage of unpaid child support in the amount of $1,657.00 as of January 19, 2016;
J. The plaintiff is the sole owner of TSO African Hair Braiding which appears to be an unincorporated business;
K. The defendant is the sole owner of Lucky Auto Mobile Mechanic which appears to be an unincorporated business which he operates as a side business to his primary employment;
L. Without being able to specify the exact amount of money the defendant has generated and can currently generate through his auto business, it has been of a sufficient amount in the past to provide the family with an adequate income and the court can find no reason to believe that the defendant will not be able to continue to generate such income postjudgment;
M. The court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that this income has been in the range of $7,500 to $10,000 in past years prior to the start of the present litigation;
N. There is negligible equity in the marital home located at 438 Chopsey Hill Road, Bridgeport, Connecticut;
O. The court cannot find by a preponderance of the evidence that the parties own--either jointly or individually--any real property in the nation of Nigeria;
P. It is in the best interests of the minor children for the parties to share legal custody and for them to reside primarily with the plaintiff;
Q. Had the parties remained an intact family, it would have been their hope to support their children with their postmajority educational efforts; and
R. The plaintiff unilaterally filed her 2014 taxes claiming all four children as dependents without any consultation or agreement of the parties.
In consideration of the factual findings as enumerated above, the court hereby
ORDERS:
I. The marriage of the parties is dissolved based on irretrievable breakdown;
II. The parties shall share joint legal custody of the four minor children and their principal residence shall be with the plaintiff;
III. The defendant shall have reasonable and liberal parental access to the minor children which shall include, as a minimum, the following:
A. Alternating Sundays from 1 PM to 5 PM commencing with the first Sunday following the filing of this Memorandum of Decision by the court;
B. Father's Day from 1 PM to 5 PM;
C. Three hours on Christmas to be arranged by mutual agreement of the parties, and the agreement must not be unreasonably denied;
D. Mother's Day shall always be with the plaintiff regardless of the weekly schedule;
E. The parties may agree to other parenting times and said additions should be memorialized in writing;
IV. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff as child support for the four minor children $186.00 per week:
A. The defendant owes to the plaintiff a child support arrearage in the amount of $1,657 as of January 19, 2016;
B. Said arrearage shall be paid at the rate of $40 per week;
C. Any balance of said arrearage still existing at the time the defendant receives any tax refund(s) for tax year 2015 shall be paid by applying 80% of said refund(s) or the remaining balance which ever amount is greater;
V. The parties shall each provide medical and dental insurance coverage for the minor children if it is available to either party through employment at reasonable cost;
A. If said insurance is not available, they shall cooperate in maintaining the minor children on the Husky Insurance Program or its successor;
B. The parties shall share equally any uncovered or unreimbursed medical and/or dental costs for the minor children;
C. The State of Connecticut may move to open this judgment to protect any interest the State may have since the plaintiff did not give appropriate notice to the State of the proceedings;
D. The State of Connecticut in care of the Attorney General's Office shall be forwarded a copy of this Memorandum of Decision by the clerk's office;
VI. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff periodic alimony in the amount of $1.00 per year;
A. Said alimony shall terminate upon the death of either party, the plaintiff's remarriage or February 28, 2026;
B. Said alimony shall be subject to modification pursuant to General Statues § 46b-86(b);
VII. The defendant shall obtain and maintain life insurance on his life naming the plaintiff as beneficiary for the benefit of the minor children in the amount of $100,000;
A. Said insurance must be obtained no later than April 30, 2016;
B. The defendant shall provide the plaintiff with proof of said insurance when obtained and shall provide proof annually on April 30th that said insurance is being maintained;
C. If the annual premium expense for said life insurance exceeds $500, the defendant shall obtain as much such insurance that can be reasonably be obtained at a cost not to exceed $500 per year;
VIII. The plaintiff shall claim the three youngest minor children for all income tax filing purposes for tax year 2015 and the defendant shall claim the oldest child;
A. If the defendant has paid the present child support arrearage of $1,657 in full by October 31, 2016, he may claim the three youngest minor children for all income tax filing purposes for tax year 2016, and the plaintiff shall claim the oldest child;
B. If the arrearage is not paid in full by October 31, 2016, the same allocation of dependency exemptions shall be used for tax year 2016 as was ordered for tax year 2015;
C. Regardless of how they claim the minor children for tax year 2016, commencing with tax year 2017 they shall share the dependency exemptions equally each year;
1. The plaintiff shall claim the two youngest children and the defendant shall claim the two oldest children;
2. If and when there is an odd number of dependents to claim, the plaintiff shall take the extra dependent in all even years and the defendant shall do so in all odd years;
D. Under the present custody orders, it is presumed that the plaintiff will file as " head of household" and the defendant shall file as " single";
IX. The defendant shall have exclusive use of the former marital home located at 438 Chopsey Hill Road, Bridgeport, Connecticut and he shall be solely liable for all costs associated with the ownership and occupancy of said premises and shall hold harmless the plaintiff from any and all such costs or liabilities;
A. The plaintiff shall quitclaim to the defendant all of her right, title and interest said deed to be prepared by the defendant at his expense and shall be recorded on the Bridgeport land records at his expense. Said deed shall be executed and delivered to the defendant within thirty (30) days of its receipt;
B. If possible, the defendant is to bring the mortgage, taxes and insurance on said property current no later than April 30, 2016;
1. If successful, the defendant shall refinance the current mortgage in order to remove the plaintiff's name from said obligation on or before April 30, 2019;
2. If the defendant is unable to remove the plaintiff's name from the mortgage obligation, he shall list the property for sale no later than June 1, 2019;
a. The property shall be aggressively marketed for a quick sale;
b. The defendant shall follow all reasonable recommendations of the realtor given the listing including pricing the property, adjusting the price downward; making repairs and marketing strategies;
c. Any offers within five (5%) percent of the listing price shall be accepted;
d. The defendant shall keep any and all net proceeds from said sale free and clear of any claim from the plaintiff and he shall be liable for any shortfalls or deficiencies related to said sale;
3. If the defendant is unable to bring the mortgage, taxes and insurance current as described above, he shall list said property for sale as described in ¶ IX.B.2.a-d above except that the listing must be achieved no later than June 1, 2016;
C. The court shall retain jurisdiction over the real property until the mortgage is refinanced or the property sold whichever is the first to occur;
X. The plaintiff shall own free and clear of any claim by the defendant any property owned by the parties, either jointly or in separate names, located in the nation of Nigeria;
A. The plaintiff shall be solely liable for any expenses, costs or expenses related to said property;
B. The defendant shall execute and deliver to the plaintiff, at no cost to her, any and all documents reasonably necessary to effectuate this provision;
C. The court shall retain jurisdiction over this provision until the property transfer is completed or June 30, 2026, whichever is the first to occur;
XI. The court will retain jurisdiction regarding post-majority educational orders for the minor children;
XII. The plaintiff will retain ownership of her business, TSO African Hair Braiding, free and clear of any claims by the defendant, and the plaintiff shall be solely responsible for any liability and/or costs associated with said business;
XIII. The defendant will retain ownership of his business, Lucky Auto Mobile Mechanic, free and clear of any claims by the plaintiff, and the defendant shall be solely responsible for any liability and/or costs associated with said business;
XIV. The plaintiff shall retain as her property free and clear of any claims by the defendant the 2011 Nissan Pathfinder motor vehicle, her bank accounts and all personal property now in her possession;
XV. The defendant shall retain as his property free and clear of any claims by the plaintiff the 2013 Toyota Camry motor vehicle, his bank accounts, and all personal property now in his possession;
XVI. Each party shall be solely liable for the debts as listed on their respective financial affidavits and shall hold harmless and indemnify the other from said liabilities with the sole exception of the Home Depot debt in the approximate balance of $4,000 which shall be the defendant's sole obligation; and
XVII. Each party shall be solely liable for their own legal fees and costs associated with this litigation.