Opinion
November 10, 1986
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Monroe County, Doyle, J.
Present — Doerr, J.P., Green, Balio, Lawton and Schnepp, JJ.
Order unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed without costs, in accordance with the following memorandum: Supreme Court abused its discretion in awarding counsel fees to plaintiff in the judgment of divorce granted on September 4, 1984 in the absence of reliable information concerning defendant's financial circumstances and without conducting an appropriate hearing on this issue (see, Walsh v Walsh, 92 A.D.2d 345; Alwardt v Alwardt, 41 A.D.2d 592). The order denying defendant's motion to reopen the default judgment of divorce is modified by striking everything following the word "denied" in the first decretal paragraph of the order dated July 11, 1985 and by substituting therefor the following: "except that the motion is granted to the extent of according defendant a hearing at which he may appear and offer evidence on the limited question of the propriety of the allowance for counsel fees in the sum of $850. This limited grant of defendant's motion to vacate the default judgment of divorce is conditioned upon payment by defendant of the sum of $250 to plaintiff." Defendant's time to comply with this condition is extended until 20 days after service upon him of a copy of the order to be made herein with notice of entry. Upon compliance with the condition the matter is remitted to Monroe County Trial Term for an immediate hearing and if necessary the entry of an appropriate amended judgment (see, Lucas v Lucas, 109 A.D.2d 781; Ray v Ray, 108 A.D.2d 905; Daly v Daly, 74 A.D.2d 814; Marshall v Marshall, 65 A.D.2d 551). In the event that this condition is not complied with, then the order is affirmed with costs.