However, the Supreme Court erred in its interpretation of paragraph 26 of the parties' stipulation. "A stipulation of settlement ‘is a contract subject to [the] principles of contract interpretation, and a court should interpret the contract in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning’ " ( O'Brien v. O'Brien, 115 A.D.3d 720, 723, 981 N.Y.S.2d 780, quoting Matter of Filosa v. Donnelly, 94 A.D.3d 760, 760, 941 N.Y.S.2d 671 ). "Where such an agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face, the parties' intent must be construed from the four corners of the agreement, and not from extrinsic evidence" ( Herzfeld v. Herzfeld, 50 A.D.3d 851, 851–852, 857 N.Y.S.2d 170 ).

A stipulation of settlement is a contract between the parties thereto and, as such, is subject to principles of contract interpretation (see O'Brien v O'Brien, 115 A.D.3d 720, 723; Aivaliotis v Continental Broker-Dealer Corp., 30 A.D.3d 446, 447). When interpreting a contract, a court must read the document as a whole to determine the parties' purpose and intent, giving a practical interpretation to the language used so that the parties' reasonable expectations are realized (see O'Brien v O'Brien, 115 A.D.3d at 723; Aivaliotis v Continental Broker-Dealer Corp., 30 A.D.3d at 447; Petracca v Petracca, 302 A.D.2d 576, 576-577).

However, we agree with the Family Court's denial of the mother's objection to so much of the Support Magistrate's order as denied that branch of the mother's petition which was to modify the provision of the parties' stipulation of settlement regarding the claiming of the parties' children as dependents for income tax purposes. A stipulation of settlement which is incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce is a contract, the terms of which are binding on the parties, and subject to the principles of contract interpretation (seeO'Brien v. O'Brien, 115 A.D.3d 720, 723, 981 N.Y.S.2d 780 ; Matter of Moss v. Moss, 91 A.D.3d 783, 937 N.Y.S.2d 270 ; Hyland v. Hyland, 63 A.D.3d 1106, 1107, 882 N.Y.S.2d 276 ). In interpreting a marital contract, a court should construe it in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning so as to "give fair meaning to all of the language employed by the parties to reach a practical interpretation of the expressions of the parties so that their reasonable expectations will be realized" ( Hyland v. Hyland, 63 A.D.3d at 1107, 882 N.Y.S.2d 276 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

A stipulation of settlement “is a contract subject to [the] principles of contract interpretation, and a court should interpret the contract in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning” (O'Brien v. O'Brien, 115 A.D.3d 720, 723, 981 N.Y.S.2d 780 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Filosa v. Donnelly, 94 A.D.3d 760, 760, 941 N.Y.S.2d 671 ; Matter of Cricenti v. Cricenti, 60 A.D.3d 1052, 1053, 877 N.Y.S.2d 349 ; Herzfeld v. Herzfeld, 50 A.D.3d 851, 851, 857 N.Y.S.2d 170 ). “[W]hen interpreting a contract, the court should arrive at a construction which will give fair meaning to all of the language employed by the parties to reach a practical interpretation of the expressions of the parties so that their reasonable expectations will be realized” (O'Brien v. O'Brien, 115 A.D.3d at 723, 981 N.Y.S.2d 780 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Hepburn v. Hepburn, 78 A.D.3d 1001, 1002, 911 N.Y.S.2d 638 ; Herzfeld v. Herzfeld, 50 A.D.3d at 851, 857 N.Y.S.2d 170 ).

"An agreement to make a testamentary provision is an enforceable contract provided it is supported by valid consideration" ( Gutman v. Gutman, 31 A.D.3d 709, 709, 819 N.Y.S.2d 771 ). While "[a] court should not, under the guise of contract interpretation, imply a term which the parties themselves failed to insert or otherwise rewrite the contract" ( O'Brien v. O'Brien, 115 A.D.3d 720, 723, 981 N.Y.S.2d 780 [internal quotation marks omitted]), in the context of contracts to make bequests, "a prohibition against lifetime transfers of property made in bad faith or with the intent to defeat the purpose of an agreement to make a testamentary disposition is always inferred" ( Matter of Shvachko, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 31941[U], *6, 2016 WL 6135588 [Sur. Ct., New York County], citing Rastetter v. Hoenninger, 214 N.Y. 66, 108 N.E. 210 ). The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the constructive trust and breach of contract causes of action, which, contrary to the defendant's contentions, were timely asserted (seeMorris v. Gianelli, 71 A.D.3d 965, 967, 897 N.Y.S.2d 210 ).

Further, while the parties had an issue with communication with respect to the issue of immunization, the defendant did not set forth any evidence to indicate that the parties’ relationship was so acrimonious that joint legal custody is not feasible (see Matter ofRivas v. Rivas, 193 A.D.3d 745, 141 N.Y.S.3d 892 ). Since the defendant did not demonstrate that the plaintiff engaged in contemptuous conduct that caused her to be prejudiced, she is not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees (see Judiciary Law § 773 ; O'Brien v. O'Brien, 115 A.D.3d 720, 724, 981 N.Y.S.2d 780 ). DILLON, J.P., AUSTIN, DUFFY and BARROS, JJ., concur.

Further, while the parties had an issue with communication with respect to the issue of immunization, the defendant did not set forth any evidence to indicate that the parties' relationship was so acrimonious that joint legal custody is not feasible ( see Matter of Rivas v Rivas, 193 A.D.3d 745 ). Since the defendant did not demonstrate that the plaintiff engaged in contemptuous conduct that caused her to be prejudiced, she is not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees ( see Judiciary Law § 773; O'Brien v O'Brien, 115 A.D.3d 720, 724). DILLON, J.P., AUSTIN, DUFFY and BARROS, JJ., concur.

Elsewhere in the agreement, Judith was expressly granted the right to "sell or otherwise convey" her real property. Interpreting the agreement "in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning" ( O'Brien v. O'Brien, 115 A.D.3d 720, 723, 981 N.Y.S.2d 780 [2d Dept. 2014] ), we cannot extrapolate that Henry alone was prohibited from conveying the subject property to Lawton. To do so would "imply a term which the parties themselves failed to insert or otherwise rewrite the contract" ( id. ).

Here, the defendant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff disobeyed a clearly expressed, unequivocal mandate of the judgment of divorce. This is so with respect to the former marital residence, because the judgment of divorce contains no provision placing responsibility for selling the residence solely upon the plaintiff, and neither party exercised reasonable efforts to effectuate the sale of the residence (seeO'Brien v. O'Brien, 115 A.D.3d 720, 723–724, 981 N.Y.S.2d 780 ). Further, with respect to the plaintiff's pension, the judgment of divorce placed responsibility upon the defendant, not the plaintiff, to submit a QDRO in order to effectuate payment of the defendant's share of the pension, and there is no indication in the record that the defendant fulfilled her obligation.

The Support Magistrate's findings regarding the father's income were based on credibility determinations and were supported by the record (seeMatter of Julianska v. Majewski, 78 A.D.3d at 1183, 911 N.Y.S.2d 655 ). Therefore, the Support Magistrate providently exercised her discretion in declining to award counsel fees to the mother (seeMatter of Heintzman v. Heintzman, 157 A.D.3d at 692, 68 N.Y.S.3d 508 ; O'Brien v. O'Brien, 115 A.D.3d 720, 724, 981 N.Y.S.2d 780 ; Matter of Nieves–Ford v. Gordon, 47 A.D.3d at 937, 850 N.Y.S.2d 588 ; cf.Matter of Wiener v. Salamy, 142 A.D.3d 1179, 37 N.Y.S.3d 909 ). Accordingly, we agree with the Family Court's determination denying the mother's objections to the order dated April 4, 2017.