Opinion
No. 2340–10.
2010-08-4
In the Matter of the Application of Florence O'BRIEN, Petitioner, for a Judgment under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules Ordering the re-calculation of Retirement Benefits v. NEW YORK STATE TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM and New York State Teachers' Retirement System Retirement Board, Respondent.
Brad A. Stuhler, Esq., Hauppauge, Attorneys for Petitioner. Andrew Cuomo, Attorney General of the State of New York, Aaron M. Baldwin, Esq., of counsel, Albany, Attorneys for Respondents.
Brad A. Stuhler, Esq., Hauppauge, Attorneys for Petitioner. Andrew Cuomo, Attorney General of the State of New York, Aaron M. Baldwin, Esq., of counsel, Albany, Attorneys for Respondents.
HENRY F. ZWACK, J.
In this CPLR Article 78 proceeding, petitioner argues that respondent improperly calculated her final average salary and argues that its determination is arbitrary and capricious. Respondent opposes the petition.
Petitioner argues that a yearly stipend she received for school years 2006–07, 2007–08 and 2008–09 was improperly not included in her final average salary. During those school years petitioner received $4,000.00, $5,000.00 and $6,000.00 respectively as provided pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The agreement provided for the stipends under what was called a “24–12” plan. Petitioner argues that the stipends were in exchange for her work developing and teaching summer school programs.
Respondent opposes the petition, arguing that the stipends were appropriately excluded from petitioner's final average salary. Respondent notes that the “24–12” plan allows a teacher to receive his or her salary in 24 payments over 12 months, as opposed to only over the course of the academic year. The plan requires participating teachers to “complete a total of 8 hours of work during each July and August.” Respondent argues that the stipend payments are not properly considered regular salary and that petitioner's work through the summers was not reported pursuant to the summer school salary schedule. Respondent agrees with petitioner that summer school compensation constitutes regular salary, but that the stipends at issue in the present case are separate and distinct from summer school compensation.
It is well established that when a court is reviewing an administrative determination, it “may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency making the determination but must determine whether the agency's decision has a rational basis and is not arbitrary and capricious” (Plante v. New York State Dept. of Environmental Conservation, 277 A.D.2d 639, 641 [3d Dept 2000]; see also Arrocha v. Bd. of Educ., 93 N.Y.2d 361, 363–64 [1999];Pell v. Bd. of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222 [1974] ). “An administrative action is arbitrary and capricious when it is without a sound basis in reason and without regard to the facts” (Clausen v. New York State Dept. of Health, 232 A.D.2d 917, 918 [3d Dept 1996] [citing Pell ] ). “Rationality is what is reviewed under both the substantial evidence rule and the arbitrary and capricious standard” (Pell, 34 N.Y.2d at 231).
When the judgment of the agency involves factual evaluations in the area of the agency's expertise and is supported by the record, such judgment must be accorded great weight and judicial deference.
(Flacke v. Onondaga Landfill Systems, Inc., 69 N.Y.2d 355, 363 [1987];see also City of Rensselaer v. Duncan, 266 A.D.2d 657, 659 [3d Dept 1999]; Regional Action Group for Environment, Inc. v. Zagata, 245 A.D.2d 798, 800 [3d Dept 1997] ). The court is required to defer to the agency regarding the construction of statutes and regulations that the agency administers, as long as that construction is not irrational or unreasonable (Metropolitan Associates, Ltd. Partnership v. New York State Div. of Housing & Community Renewal, 206 A.D.2d 251 [1st Dept 1994] ).
The Court concurs with respondent that it was not arbitrary or capricious for the stipends under the 24–12 plan to be deemed non-regular compensation. The Court has considered the arguments of each party along with the applicable statutes, regulations and case law. Even if the Court were to concur with petitioner that she presents a reasonable alternative for calculating her final average salary, the Court does not find that the respondent acted arbitrarily and capriciously or without a rational basis in calculating petitioner's final average salary in the manner that it did ( see, e.g., Holbert v. New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys ., 43 AD3d 530, 535 [3d Dep't 2007]; Miller v. New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 157 A.D.2d 890 [3d Dep't 1990] ). Therefore, the Court finds that judicial interference is not warranted in this case. The Court has considered the rationale for respondent's determination, notably that the stipend was in addition to base salary, that payments under the 24–12 plan were not based on performance of teaching service and were fixed based upon a teacher's length of service, that the main purpose of the 24–12 plan appears to be to offer teachers an option to receive salary over the entire calendar year, and that there is a separate arrangement for summer school teaching and compensation. Based upon the foregoing, the Court does not find that the determination of respondent was arbitrary, capricious or irrational under all the circumstances.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, that the petition is denied.
This constitutes the Decision, Order and Judgment of the Court. This Decision, Order and Judgment is returned to the attorneys for the respondent. All other papers are delivered to the Supreme Court Clerk for transmission to the County Clerk. The signing of this Decision, Order and Judgment shall not constitute entry or filing under CPLR 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable provisions of this rule with regard to filing, entry and Notice of Entry.