O'Brien v. Brotherhood of the Union

5 Citing cases

  1. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. v. Anderson

    17 So. 2d 766 (Ala. 1944)   Cited 19 times
    In Inter-Ocean Casualty Company v. Anderson, 245 Ala. 534, 17 So.2d 766, the Supreme Court of Alabama considered a fact situation in which the insurer received a check from the insured and made several attempts up to and including the date of the insured's death to collect the check.

    Authorities, supra; Denton v. Provident L. A. Ins. Co., 238 Ky. 26, 36 S.W.2d 657. In absence of any showing to contrary, payment of delinquent premium must be deemed to have been made and accepted under provisions of policy relating to reinstatement, and insured is justified only in believing that payment was accepted under terms of policy which fixed the effect of receiving it. Richardson v. American Nat. Ins. Co., supra; Taylor v. Latin-American L. C. I. Co., 152 La. 740, 94 So. 375; American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Gallimore, Tex.Civ.App., 166 S.W. 17; Honea v. American Council, 139 Tenn. 21, 201 S.W. 127; Bienhoff v. North American Ins. Co., 153 Minn. 241, 190 N.W. 63; Ward v. Merchants' L. C. Co., 139 Minn. 262, 166 N.W. 221; Hope v. Travelers' Pro. Ass'n, 130 S.C. 381, 126 S.E. 45; O'Brien v. Brotherhood, 76 Conn. 52, 55 A. 577; Greenwaldt v. United States H. A. Ins. Co., 52 Misc. 353, 102 N.Y.S. 157; Union Central Relief Ass'n v. Thomas, supra. In absence of express agreement to contrary, check given for insurance premium is only conditional payment, and is presumptively received, not as payment, but as convenient means of getting the money, and will constitute payment only when and if check is paid. Wilder Mercantile Co. v. Le Maistre Gin. Co., 26 Ala. App. 275, 159 So. 260; Ross v. State L. I. Co., 225 Ala. 410, 143 So. 827. There is no statutory form of complaint for suit on accident policy; Form 12 does not apply. Benefit Ass'n v. Armbruster, 217 Ala. 282, 116 So. 164; Gilliland v. Order R. Cond., 216 Ala. 13, 112 So. 225.

  2. Rosen v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decor. Paper

    23 A.2d 153 (Conn. 1941)

    The defendant has asked for corrections and additions to this finding but no correction is permissible by which the position of the defendant will be materially benefited. The terms of the contract between Rosen and the defendant are determined by the constitution and bylaws of the defendant as existing when he became a member and as amended from time to time while he continued as such. O'Brien v. Brotherhood of the Union, 76 Conn. 52, 57, 55 A. 577; Gilmore v. Knights of Columbus, 77 Conn. 58, 62, 58 A. 223; Masonic Mutual Benefit Association v. Severson, 71 Conn. 719, 724, 43 A. 192; Coughlin v. Knights of Columbus, 79 Conn. 218, 220, 64 A. 223. "It is the time when dues become payable, not the month for which they are paid, which must determine whether a member is in arrears for more than three months' dues." Cunningham v. United Association of Journeymen Plumbers, 114 Conn. 309, 312, 158 A. 807. Having paid the dues within the time required by the local union, which was not contrary to any provision of the constitution of the parent union, it follows that the plaintiff as the designated beneficiary was entitled to the benefit of $300 established for a ten-year membership.

  3. Kane v. Knights of Columbus

    84 Conn. 96 (Conn. 1911)   Cited 4 times

    The contract of insurance of the plaintiffs was determined by the constitution and laws of the defendant corporation as amended from time to time and the agreements made thereunder between them and the defendant. Coughlin v. Knights of Columbus, 79 Conn. 218, 220, 64 A. 223; O'Brien v. Brotherhood of the Union, 76 Conn. 52, 55, 55 A. 577. The charter expressly gave the Order the right to "make and execute necessary by-laws . . . for the management of said society and its property;" it was granted subject to amendment, and an amendment in 1889 re-enacted in subsequent amendments, gave it power to alter and repeal said constitution, by-laws, rules, and regulations.

  4. Coughlin v. Knights of Columbus

    79 Conn. 218 (Conn. 1906)   Cited 18 times

    The terms of said contract are determined by the constitution and laws of the defendant as existing when Coughlin became a member, and amended from time to time. O'Brien v. Brotherhood of the Union, 76 Conn. 52, 55 A. 577; Gilmore v. Knights of Columbus, 77 Conn. 58, 58 A. 223; Masonic Mutual Benefit Asso. v. Severson, 71 Conn. 719, 43 A. 192. The answer alleges all the provisions of the defendant's charter, constitution and laws, and sets forth a copy thereof which is admitted to be substantially correct.

  5. Taufer v. Brotherhood of Painters

    137 App. Div. 838 (N.Y. App. Div. 1910)   Cited 1 times

    If, instead of expulsion, the penalty is reduced to qualified reinstatement, so much the less may the member complain. The conclusion in the Hart case was fully sustained by this court (First Department) in Stanton v. Eccentric Association of Firemen ( 130 App. Div. 129), and has the support of Rubino v. Fraterna Association ( 29 Misc. Rep. 339); Jennings v. Chelsea Division Benefit Fund Soc. (28 id. 556); Saerwein v. Jamour (32 id. 701) and O'Brien v. Brotherhood of the Union ( 76 Conn. 52). Contrary decisions would be more helpful if they stated reasons for holding such a by-law unreasonable. In Skelly v. Private Coachmen's Benevolent, etc., Soc. ( supra) the chief justice well said: "In Brice's Ultra Vires, it is said: `The law has deemed it the more advisable course, to leave rules, for the most part, to the discretion of the corporations and those composing them, who may be reasonably supposed to know what is most conducive to their own interests and welfare' (Green's Brice's Ultra Vires, p. 12).