Opinion
1:22-CV-00194-SPB-RAL
07-24-2023
GREGORY DEVON OBEY, Plaintiff v. UNIT MANAGER COLLEY, OFFICER DONOGHUE, OFFICER BAILEY, FCI MCKEAN HEALTH SERVICE WORKER ON SHIFT DURING THE DAY OF INCIDENT, JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-10; J. WALKER, AND LT. BLANKENSHIP, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ECF NO. 16
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, for summary judgment based on Plaintiffs failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. ECF No. 16. It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' alternative motion for summary judgment be GRANTED. Because Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on their exhaustion defense, it is further recommended that the motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim be DENIED, as moot.
II. Report
Plaintiff Gregory Devon Obey, an inmate currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution at McKean (FCI-McKean), brings this pro se civil rights action against four named and one unnamed individuals employed at FCI-McKean: Unit Manager Colley, Officer Donoghue, Lt. Blankenship, J. Walker, and “FCI McKean Health Service Worker on Shift During the Day of Incident.” ECF No. 8. See ECF No. 10. The Complaint asserts Fourteenth Amendment due process and Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims and a state law medical malpractice claim based on alleged inadequacies in the medical treatment Obey received for abdominal distress and a ruptured ulcer. ECF No. 10. Obey sues each Defendant in his or her individual and official capacities and requests compensatory and punitive damages and declaratory relief. ECF No. 10, p. 6.
The Complaint also named Officer Bailey as a Defendant and eight John/Jane Doe Defendants. On Obey's motion (ECF No. 8), the spelling of Defendant Unit Manager Colley and Officer Donoghue was corrected, J. Walker was substituted for John Doe Defendant 1, Lt. Blankenship was substituted for John Doe 2, “FCI McKean Health Service Worker on Shift During the Day of Incident” was substituted for Defendant “FCI McKean Medical Staff,” and all claims against Officer Bailey and all remaining John and Jane Doe Defendants were dismissed. ECF No. 9.
Blankenship, Donoghue, and Walker (collectively, “Defendants”) have moved to dismiss Obey's Complaint pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). ECF No. 16. Defendants have alternatively moved for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, arguing that Obey failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies. Id. Pursuant to the Local Rules of this Court, Defendants have also filed a Concise Statement of Material Facts (“Concise Statement”) and exhibits in support of their request for summary judgment. ECF 19. See LCvR 56(B). The Court ordered Obey to respond to Defendants' motion and notified the parties that the “pending motion may be treated, either in whole or in part, as a motion for summary judgment” in accordance with the Court of Appeals' direction in Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2010). ECF No. 20. Obey filed a brief in opposition to the motion (ECF No. 21) and a “Statement of Disputed Facts” (ECF No. 22), which the Court has construed as his responsive Concise Statement under LCvR 56(C). Obey's Statement of Disputed Facts does not respond to Defendants' Concise Statement's factual assertions regarding his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Obey also has not submitted any exhibits or other evidentiary materials to controvert Defendants' assertions. Defendants have filed a reply to Obey's brief in opposition (ECF No. 23), and Obey has filed a sur-reply (ECF No. 24).
Blankenship, Donoghue, and Walker's motion notes that Colley and the Defendant described as “FCI-McKean Health Services Worker on Staff the Day of the Incident” have not been served because “Colley is not a current employee of FCI-McKean” and “is not in BOP's system,” and the “BOP has not yet been able to identify the FCI-McKean Health Services Worker on Staff the Day of the Incident” because it lacks pertinent details. ECF No. 17 n.3.
Defendants appended to their Concise Statement a copy of an Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval and a Declaration. See ECF No. 19, 79-1. Defendants also attached a copy of these documents to their brief in support of their motion. See ECF No. 17, 17-1.
A. Material Facts
Obey's Complaint alleges that between April 30, 2022 and May 5, 2022, Defendants and medical staff at FCI-McKean ignored his repeated reports of severe abdominal pain and his pleas for medical attention until he was transported to a hospital in Olean, New York, where he was diagnosed with a ruptured ulcer and received surgery. See ECF No. 10.
In their Concise Statement, Defendants state that “BOP records show that [Obey] has not filed any sort of Administrative Remedy Request since October 2019,” let alone “an Administrative Remedy Request related to the events described in his Complaint.” ECF No. 19, ¶ 6. As evidentiary support for this factual assertion, Defendants have submitted a declaration from Jonathan Kerr, a Senior CLC Attorney for the BOP's Northeast Regional Office, and a computer log dated October 31, 2022, which lists the Administrative Remedy Requests that Obey had submitted during his incarceration. ECF No. 19-1. Citing to the log, Kerr attests that, “There is no record of an Administrative Remedy filing by Plaintiff related to the subject matter in the complaint.”. ECF No. 19-1, p. 1. Kerr further attests to the accuracy of the log and his authority to certify its accuracy. See id, pp. 1-2.
This log is titled “Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval” regarding Obey's Administrative Remedy Requests.
The log memorializes that Obey last filed an Administrative Remedy Request in October 2019, well before the events upon which he bases his claims in this case. See id., pp. 4-5. And, as Defendants correctly note, none of Obey's responsive filings “address, let alone rebut, Defendants' exhaustion argument.” ECF No. 23, p. 1.
B. Standard of Review
1. Motion for Summary Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the district court to enter summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under this standard “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A disputed fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome under applicable substantive law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).
When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial, the court must view the record and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party. Moore v. Tartier, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v. Consol. Rail Corp., 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). To avoid summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party may not rest on the unsubstantiated allegations of his or her pleadings. Instead, once the movant satisfies its burden of identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond his pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or other record evidence to demonstrate specific material facts that give rise to a genuine issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). On a motion for summary judgment, “a pro se plaintiff is not relieved of his obligation under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 56 to point to competent evidence in the record that is capable of refuting a defendant's motion ...” Dawson v. Cook, 238 F.Supp.3d 712, 717 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (citation omitted). Put another way, pro se status does not relieve a non-moving party of his “obligation under Rule 56(c) to produce evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (quoting Boykins v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 78 F.Supp.2d 402, 408 (E.D. Pa. 2000)); see also Winfield v. Mazurkiewicz, 2012 WL 4343176, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2012).
C. Discussion
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (the PLRA), requires a prisoner to exhaust any available administrative remedies before he commences a lawsuit challenging the conditions of his confinement. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA is an affirmative defense that defendants must plead and prove. Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002). “Exhaustion is thus a non-jurisdictional prerequisite to an inmate bringing suit...” Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2018). “[F]or that reason ... it constitutes a ‘threshold issue that courts must address to determine whether litigation is being conducted in the right forum at the right time.'” Id. (quoting Small v. Camden County, 728 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 2013)) (certain internal quotations omitted). This exhaustion requirement applies to all claims relating to prison life which do not implicate the duration of the prisoner's sentence. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
Proper exhaustion under the PLRA requires that an inmate “complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules.” Downey v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88). Individual prisons provide these procedural rules. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2004) (determining whether “a prisoner has ‘properly' exhausted a claim ... is made by evaluating the prisoner's compliance with the prison's administrative regulations governing inmate grievances”). Thus, “prison grievance procedures supply the yardstick” for the district court to measure procedural default. Spruill, 372 F.3d at 230-31. This includes the strict compliance with deadlines for submissions of grievances and appeals. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 95. A procedurally defective administrative grievance, even if pursued to final review, precludes action in federal court. Fennell v. Cambria Cty. Prison, 607 Fed.Appx. 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2015).
The Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has a four-step administrative-remedies process federal inmates must complete to satisfy the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-542.19. First, an inmate must informally present an issue of concern to the staff, who will try to resolve the issue. 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a). Second, if the inmate is dissatisfied with the informal resolution of the issue, the inmate must submit a formal, written Administrative Remedy Request (Request) on a BP-9 form for resolution by the Warden within 20 days following the date on which the basis for the Request occurred. 28 C.F.R. § 542.14. Third, an inmate who is not satisfied with the Warden's response may submit an appeal on a BP-10 form to the Regional Director within 20 days from the date that the Warden signed the response. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15. Fourth, an inmate who is not satisfied with the Regional Director's response may submit a final appeal on a BP-11 form to the General Counsel at the Central Office of Appeals within 30 calendar days of the Regional Director's signed response. Id.
Defendants have met their threshold burden of demonstrating through record evidence that Obey has not filed any Administrative Remedy Request related to the events described in his Complaint. Indeed, the declaration of Jonathan Kerr and the accompanying log demonstrate that Obey has not submitted an Administrative Remedy Request since October 2019, well before the events at issue in this case. Obey has failed to respond to these facts, let alone dispute them with evidence. Thus, no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Obey's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies concerning the alleged inadequacy of the medical treatment he received in April and May of 2022 and his conditions of confinement at that time. Accordingly, Blankenship, Donaghue, and Walker are entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 621 Fed.Appx. 725, 727 (3d Cir. 2015).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant Blankenship, Donoghue, and Walker's motion for summary judgment and deny their motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, without prejudice to Defendants' right to reassert the motion to dismiss if the Court declines to adopt the undersigned's summary judgment recommendation.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).