A demand to change venue based on the designation of an improper county ( see CPLR 510) "shall be served with the answer or before the answer is served" (CPLR 511 [a]). Since the appellants failed to serve a timely demand for a change of venue and failed to make a motion within the 15-day period required under the statute ( see CPLR 511 [b]), they were not entitled to change the venue of this action as of right ( see Baez v Marcus, 58 AD3d 585, 586; Jeffrey L. Rosenberg Assoc., LLC v Lajaunie, 54 AD3d 813, 816; Obas v Grappell, 43 AD3d 431). Thus, their motion "became one addressed to the court's discretion" ( Callanan Indus. v Sovereign Constr. Co., 44 AD2d 292, 295; see Baez v Marcus, 58 AD3d at 586; Jeffrey L. Rosenberg Assoc., LLC v Lajaunie, 54 AD3d at 816; Obas v Grappell, 43 AD3d at 432).

Here, since the defendants failed to serve a timely demand for a change of venue to New York County, and failed to make a motion for that relief within the statutory 15-day period ( see CPLR 511[b] ), they were not entitled as of right to a change of venue to New York County ( seeObas v. Grappell, 43 A.D.3d 431, 841 N.Y.S.2d 595; Joyner-Pack v. Sykes, 30 A.D.3d 469, 817 N.Y.S.2d 342; Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Ermar Painting & Contr., Inc., 8 A.D.3d 229, 230, 777 N.Y.S.2d 661). Thus, their motion " became one addressed to the court's discretion" ( Callanan Indus. v. Sovereign Constr. Co., 44 A.D.2d 292, 295, 354 N.Y.S.2d 486; seeObas v. Grappell, 43 A.D.3d at 432, 841 N.Y.S.2d 595; Pittman v. Maher, 202 A.D.2d 172, 175, 608 N.Y.S.2d 199).

The time period prescribed by CPLR § 511 is not merely directory but requires strict compliance. Obas v.Grappell , 43 AD3d 431 (2nd Dept. 2007); Pittman v. Maher, 202 AD2d 172 (2nd Dept. 1994). Once it is determined that plaintiff has selected an improper venue and that defendant has complied with CPLR § 511, the court should grant a defendant's motion to change venue.

Thus, his "motion became one addressed to the court's discretion" ( Forbes v. Rubinovich, 94 A.D.3d at 809, 943 N.Y.S.2d 120 ; seeBrash v. Richards, 87 A.D.3d at 557, 929 N.Y.S.2d 745 ; Accardi v. Kaufmann, 82 A.D.3d at 803, 918 N.Y.S.2d 371 ; Thomas v. Guttikonda, 68 A.D.3d at 854, 889 N.Y.S.2d 679 ). The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the motion since the defendant failed to demonstrate that he moved promptly for a change of venue even after ascertaining the plaintiff's alleged true residence, as he did not set forth with any specificity when he received such information, and how much time transpired before he made his motion (seeBaez v. Marcus, 58 A.D.3d 585, 586, 874 N.Y.S.2d 134 ; Obas v. Grappell, 43 A.D.3d 431, 432, 841 N.Y.S.2d 595 ). Moreover, the defendant failed to submit sufficient evidence of the criteria necessary to demonstrate entitlement to a change of venue pursuant to CPLR 510(3) (seeGorodetsky v. Bridgewater Wholesalers, Inc., 161 A.D.3d 722, 723–724, 77 N.Y.S.3d 82 ; Ambroise v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 143 A.D.3d 927, 928, 39 N.Y.S.3d 255 ).

. Since the appellants failed to serve a timely demand for a change of venue and failed to make a motion for that relief within the statutory time period, they were not entitled to a change of venue as of right, and their motion became one addressed to the court's discretion (see Carobert v. Baldor Elec. Co., 102 A.D.3d at 906, 958 N.Y.S.2d 611 ; Thomas v. Guttikonda, 68 A.D.3d at 854, 889 N.Y.S.2d 679 ; Obas v. Grappell, 43 A.D.3d 431, 841 N.Y.S.2d 595 ). Here, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the appellants' motion.

In this case, the plaintiff properly placed venue in Kings County, as that was the county where he resided at the time this litigation was commenced. A few years after the commencement of the action, the defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 510 and 511 to change the venue of the action from Kings County to Westchester County in "the court's discretion" ( Callanan Indus, v Sovereign Constr. Co., AA AD2d 292, 295 [1974]; see Baez v Marcus, 58 AD3d 585, 586; Obas v Grappell, 43 AD3d 431, 432; Pittman v Maker, 202 AD2d 172, 175). Inasmuch as venue was originally properly placed in Kings County, and the defendants failed to demonstrate that they would be prejudiced or would suffer any particular hardship by retaining venue in Kings County, or that the interests of justice would best be served by changing the venue of the action to Westchester County, it was not an improvident exercise of discretion to, inter alia, deny the defendants' motion.

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the appellant's motion, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 510 (1) and 511 to change the place of trial of the action from Kings County to Ulster County ( see Baez v Marcus, 58 AD3d 585, 586; Obas v Grappell, 43 AD3d 431, 432; Callanan Indus, v Sovereign Constr. Co., 44 AD2d 292, 295). The appellant failed to meet its initial burden of demonstrating that none of the parties resided in Kings County when the action was commenced ( see CPLR 503 [u]; Baez v Marcus, 58 AD3d at 586; Galon v Delacruz, 4 AD3d 449; Llorca v Manzo, 254 AD2d 396, 397).

Since the defendants failed to serve a timely demand for a change of venue to New York County, and failed to make a motion for that relief within the statutory 15-day period ( see CPLR 511 [b]), they were not entitled, as of right, to a change of venue to New York County ( see Joyner-Pack v Sykes, 30 AD3d 469; Harleysville Ins. Co. v Ermar Painting Contr., Inc., 8 AD3d 229, 230; Runcie v Cross County Shopping Mall, 268 AD2d 577). Thus, their motion "'became one addressed to the court's discretion'" ( Obas v Grappell, 43 AD3d 431, 432, quoting Callanan Indus, v Sovereign Constr. Co., 44 AD2d 292, 295). The record belies the defendants' assertion that their 10-month delay in moving for a change of venue was caused by "any willful omissions and misleading statements on the plaintiffs part" regarding its principal office ( Horowicz v RSD Transp., 249 AD2d 511; see CPLR 503 [c]; cf. Philogene v Fuller Auto Leasing, 167 AD2d 178).

Notably, no formal motion seeking dismissal of the petition against the State Board of Elections is pending before this Court. Accordingly, the Court declines to render a determination as to whether the State Board of Elections should be dismissed from this proceeding as an improper party. As the State Board of Elections remains a party to this proceeding, the moving respondents have failed to demonstrate that a change in venue is warranted as of right, and the motion therefore "[becomes] one addressed to the court's discretion" (Callanan Indus, v Sovereign Constr. Co.. 44 A.D.2d 292, 295 [ 1974 ]; see, Obas v Grappell 43 A.D.3d 431, 432 [2007]). Discretionary venue determinations will not be disturbed unless the Court clearly abuses its discretion (see. Blaine v International Bus. Machines Corp.. 91 A.D.3d 1175 [2012]).

When the venue chosen by a plaintiff is improper, and the defendant properly serves with its answer a demand for change of venue pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 511(b) followed by a motion to change venue to a proper county pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 503(a), 510, and 511, the defendant is entitled as of right to a change of venue. [Thomas v. Guttikonda, 68 AD3d 853 (2d Dept 2009); Obas v. Grappell, 43 AD3d 431 (2d Dept 2007); Agostino Antiques, Ltd. v. CGU-American Employers' Ins. Co., 6 AD3d 469 (2d Dept 2004)]. Such a motion made by a defendant should be granted particularly where the plaintiff fails to show that the county specified by the defendant is improper, or the county specified by plaintiff is proper.