Oats v. Darden

3 Citing cases

  1. State v. Gant

    159 S.E. 427 (N.C. 1931)   Cited 11 times

    The statute, C. S., 356, is as follows: "When a sheriff, coroner, constable, clerk, county or town treasurer, or other officer, collects or receives any money by virtue or under color of his office, and on demand fails to pay the same to the person entitled to require the payment thereof, the person thereby aggrieved may move for judgment in the Superior Court against such officer and his sureties for any sum demanded; and the court shall try the same and render judgment at the term when the motion shall be made, but ten days notice in writing of the motion must have been previously given." The summary remedy against certain public officials has been provided for by statute practically ever since this has been a commonwealth, and held to be constitutional. Anonymous case, 2 N.C. 29; Oats v. Darden, 5 N.C. 500; Broughton v. Haywood, 61 N.C. 380. In Worth v. Cox, 89 N. c., at p. 49, it is said: "The office is accepted and the bond given under the known conditions of the law that permits this direct and expeditious remedy in case of default, and these may be said to enter as elements into the contract itself.

  2. Waddill v. Masten

    172 N.C. 582 (N.C. 1916)   Cited 23 times
    Endorsing taxpayer suit for "recoveries for money wrongfully disposed of or withheld from the counties" but cautioning that "the funds, if recovered, should be in proper custody and control"

    Connecticut and E. Ins. Co. v. Talbot, 113 Ind. 373; Ex Parte Brickley, 53 Ala. 42; People ex re Collins v. Spicer, 99 N.Y. 225. And well considered authority is to the effect that the rule does not prevail as to statutes concerning mere matters of court procedure and before action instituted, nor to the substitution or designation of new parties deemed necessary to a proper determination of a controversy, or, as in this case, duly authorized to maintain and enforce (585) a recognized or existent right. These positions, both as to remedies and parties, are approved in Tillery v. Candler, 118 N.C. 889; Worth v. Cox, 89 N.C. pp. 42-48; Oates v. Darden, 5 N.C. 500; Aultman, etc., Machinery Co. v. Arthur, Fish Co., 120 Ill., Appellate Court, 314; Thompkins v. Frestal, 54 Minn. 119; Black on Inter. Laws, pp. 380-403, 408-411; 36 Cyc., p. 1213. In the cases of Mann v. Allen and Elizabeth City v. Comrs., supra, a construction giving retrospective effect to the statute would have affected the right of the parties growing out of the transaction, and S. v. Pridgen, 151 N.C. 651; S. v. Littlefield, 93 N.C. 614; Merwin v. Ballard, 66 N.C. 398, to which we were referred, were cases of indictment found or causes already instituted, which usually come within the general rule, and on the principle further recognized, "that a legislative enactment will not be construed to oust a jurisdiction once regularly and fully vested unless such an intention is clearly expressed."

  3. McKinney v. Goins

    892 S.E.2d 460 (N.C. Ct. App. 2023)

    Hoke ’s implicit holding—and Hinton ’s explicit one—that constitutionally vested rights sound in corporeal or incorporeal property interests rather than procedure is seen throughout other cases of the era. CompareRobinson v. Barfield , 6 N.C. 391, 422 (1818) (holding a statute retrospectively validating deeds improperly executed under prior law was unconstitutional as violating vested rights), Scales v. Fewell , 10 N.C. 18, 18-20 (1824) (holding liens on real property create a vested right), Pratt v. Kitterell , 15 N.C. 168, 168-71 (1833) (holding a right to claim, control, and possess an estate as administrator is a vested right), Battle v. Speight , 31 N.C. 288, 292 (1848) (holding devises of property by will create a vested right), andGreen v. Cole , 35 N.C. 425, 428 (1852) ("The legislature cannot interfere with vested rights of property." (citing Hoke )), withOats v. Darden , 5 N.C. 500, 501 (1810) ("[W]hen an act of Assembly takes away from a citizen a vested right, its constitutionality may be inquired into; but when it alters the remedy or mode of proceeding as to rights previously vested, it certainly, in that respect, runs in a constitutional channel."), Harrison v. Burgess , 8 N.C. 384, 391-92 (1821) (holding a law authorizing the Supreme Court to order new trials for errors of law did not affect vested rights when applied to cases pending appeal at the time of enactment), andPhillips v. Cameron , 48 N.C. 390, 392 (1856) (stating "[w]e admit, that the Act of 1852, applying as it does to the remedy and not to the rights of the parties, might have been made retrospective in its operation," before opining that such intent could have been made clear by entitling the statute "[a]n act to encourage litigation, by reviving stale claims"). Importantly, as the later decisions of Bell and Hinton would demonstrate, the fact that a retroactive statute implicates a defendant's monetar