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granting employer's summary judgment motion where employee admitted he could not have returned to work when his FMLA leave expired and "at the time of Plaintiff's deposition on May 15, 2001, Plaintiff was still not physically able to perform the job he held"
Summary of this case from Jones v. Omega Cabinets, Ltd.Opinion
CA 3:00-CV-2116-R
February 15, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is before the Court. Plaintiff Donald Oatman ("Oatman" or "Plaintiff") filed this suit against Defendant Fuji Photo Film U.S.A., Inc. ("Fuji" or "Defendant"), alleging violation of his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), Sections 409, 502, and 510. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to all claims.
Plaintiff was employed by Fuji for over fifteen years, the majority of the time as Warehouse Supervisor. His supervisor at all pertinent times was Al Levine ("Levine"), Human Resources Manager. Oatman began having knee problems in the early 1990s. Oatman first sought medical attention for his knee problem in 1994, when he was granted leave to have knee surgery. Three weeks after the surgery, Oatman returned to work. Oatman again had problems with the same knee in 1998, and on March 31, 1998, was granted leave to have another surgery. Oatman was subsequently granted short term disability by Fuji's health insurance carrier, CIGNA, and was informed by his supervisor Levine in July 1998 that his leave had been continued as unpaid FMLA leave, expiring on October 9, 1998. Oatman was then terminated on October 5, 1998.
Defendant moved for summary judgment on all counts. Defendant argues Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under FMLA for the following reasons: (1) Plaintiff was not qualified for FMLA leave at the time of his termination; (2) Plaintiff was not entitled to reinstatement upon the expiration of his leave; and (3) Plaintiff cannot establish as a matter of law that Defendant's reason for termination was a pretext for discrimination. Defendant further argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under ERISA for the following reasons: (1) Plaintiffs claims under Sections 409 and 502 of ERISA are barred both because Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies and because Defendant is not a fiduciary as defined by ERISA; and (2) Plaintiff cannot show as a matter of law that his termination was a pretext for discrimination under Section 510 of ERISA.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows summary judgment when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Melton v. Teachers Ins. Annuity Ass'n of Am., 114 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1997). The court must resolve all reasonable doubts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1272 (5th Cir. 1994). As long as there appears to be some support for the disputed allegations such that reasonable minds could differ as to whether or not the allegation is true, the motion must be denied. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
A defendant who seeks summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact by either submitting summary judgment evidence that negates the existence of a material element of the plaintiffs claim or by identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrates the absence of evidence to support a material element of the plaintiff's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Lynch Props., Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1998). Once the defendant has satisfied its initial burden, the plaintiff must go beyond the pleadings and by its own affidavits or depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Summary judgment for the defendant will be granted if the plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish a material issue of fact as to the existence of an element essential to its case. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
B. Plaintiff's FMLA Claims
First, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's inability to return to work when his FMLA was set to expire renders Plaintiff unable to recover as a matter of law. The summary judgment evidence indicates that Plaintiff admitted in his deposition that he could not have returned to work on October 9, 1998, when Plaintiff thought his FMLA leave ended. Furthermore, the summary judgment evidence shows that, at the time of Plaintiff's deposition on May 15, 2001, Plaintiff was still not physically able to perform the job he held at Fuji.
Under the FMLA, the employee must show that he was eligible to be reinstated to his position of employment when his FMLA leave expires. "If the employee is unable to perform an essential function of the position because of a physical or mental condition, including the continuation of a serious health condition, the employee has no right to restoration to another position under the FMLA." 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(b); see also Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons Ives, Inc, 183 F.3d 155, 161-62 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that if, at the end of the FMLA's twelve week leave period, an employee is unable to perform the essential functions of her former job, then "[a]ny lack of notice of the statutory twelve week limitation on FMLA leave could not rationally be found to have impeded" the employee's return to work).
Defendant also relies on Holmes v. E. Spire Communications, Inc., 135 F. Supp.2d 657 (D. Md. 2001), arguing that for there to be a substantive violation of an employee's FMLA rights because they were terminated when they were on FMLA leave, the employee must have been able to return to work on the date that they thought their leave ended. Holmes, 135 F. Supp.2d at 665. In Holmes, the plaintiff alleged that her substantive rights were violated when she thought her FMLA leave, granted because of her pregnancy, ended on March 31, 1998, and she was terminated on March 17, 1998. The defendant moved for summary judgment, and the court determined that, even when making all inferences in favor of the non-movant, plaintiffs FMLA claim was precluded as a matter of law because of the admitted fact that the plaintiff could not have returned to work on March 31, 1998. The plaintiff testified that she was not able to return to work until April 16, 1998, at the earliest. See Holmes, 135 F. Supp.2d at 665.
The plaintiff and her employer had some confusion and differed on what was the start date of her FMLA leave.
The situation in Holmes is very analogous to the case at hand. In both cases, the employee was terminated before their FMLA leave had expired. Oatman's claim, however, appears to have less merit than the plaintiffs claim in Holmes. The plaintiff in Holmes was willing and able to return to work without restrictions a few weeks after the end of her leave, but Oatman admits that he still cannot perform the essential functions of his former job.
Furthermore, FMLA claims have been precluded where the plaintiff was no longer able to perform their former job for the same number of required hours. See Tardie v. Rehabilitation Hosp. of Rhode Island, 168 F.3d 538, 543-44 (1st Cir. 1999). Deposition testimony of the plaintiff conceding that he was still under work restriction when his FMLA leave expired also precluded pursuit of an FMLA claim. See Williams v. Toyota Motor Mfg. Kentucky, Inc., 224 F.3d 840, 844-45 (6th Cir. 2000). Courts have also dismissed FMLA claims based upon the employers refusal to provide alternate employment, as this is clearly not required under the FMLA. See Williams v. Saad's Healthcare, No. 99-1070-BH-S, 2000 WL 362038, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 16, 2000).
Under the FMLA, Oatman must show that he was eligible to be reinstated to his position of employment when his FMLA leave expired, and Oatman does not deny that at the end of his leave he was unable to perform the essential functions of his job at Fuji. Therefore, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's FMLA claims.
C. Plaintiff's ERISA claims
Plaintiff filed three separate ERISA claims, requesting relief under ERISA Section 502 for withholding of benefits, ERISA Section 409 for breach of fiduciary duty, and ERISA Section 510 for pretext for discrimination.
i. Plaintiff's claims under Section 409 and Section 502 of ERISA
The Section 409 claim and the Section 502 claim are easily handled together. This court has previously held that, in order to recover benefits under these sections, the claimant must exhaust all administrative remedies. See Bernal v. Randall's Food and Drugs, Inc., No. CA 3-96-CV-3464-R, 1998 WL 246640, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 1998). In Bernal, this Court dismissed the claims of an injured worker for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The plaintiff in Bernal was injured on the job and made no attempt to use the administrative remedies of the defendant before filing a suit for damages under ERISA.
The summary judgment evidence in this case indicates that Oatman, like the plaintiff in Bernal, did not exhaust his administrative remedies prior to bring his suit for damages under ERISA. Therefore, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims under Section 409 and Section 502 of ERISA.
ii. Plaintiff's claim under Section 510 of ERISA
The inquiry into whether Section 510 has been violated turns on whether the employer had the specific intent to interfere with the employee's rights. Interference with these rights does not have to be the "sole reason" for the termination but the plaintiff must show more than "the incidental loss of benefits as a result of the discharge." Bernal, 1998 WL 246640 at *11. This burden of proof can be met in two ways: (1) with direct evidence of discrimination; or (2) with circumstantial evidence through the Title VII burden-shifting scheme to establish a prima facie case.
Since Oatman provides no direct evidence of discrimination, this case must be analyzed under the Title VII burden-shifting scheme. In order to establish a prima facie case under Section 510, the employee must show: (1) prohibited employer conduct (2) taken for the purpose of interfering (3) with the attainment of any right to which the employee may become entitled. See Bernal, 1998 WL 246640 at *12 (citations omitted). In addition to these requirements, the Fifth Circuit requires the plaintiff to show that he was physically qualified for the position sought as a fourth element of the prima facie case. See Holtzclaw v. DSC Communications Corp., 255 F.3d 254, 260-61 (5th Cir. 2001). In Holtzclaw, the plaintiff was granted permanent disability and later attempted to regain his former position. When the plaintiff was denied his former position, he brought suit. The Fifth Circuit held that because the plaintiff did not show he is qualified for the position he seeks, either with or without accommodation, he could not pursue his ERISA claim further. Id. at 261. Oatman's situation is similar to the plaintiff in Holtzclaw because Oatman also admits he cannot physically perform the position in question. Therefore, because Oatman is unable to show he is physically qualified for his prior position as a required prima facie element, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim under Section 510 of ERISA.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to all claims. IT IS SO ORDERED.