Opinion
Civil Action No. 97-1220.
February 18, 1998
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
After the parties had filed cross-motions for summary judgment, plaintiff sought leave to dismiss the action voluntarily. That motion was granted, and the action was dismissed without prejudice on October 13, 1997.
On February 10, 1998, plaintiff filed another motion, stating "The plaintiff requests that 97-CV-1220 be reopened."
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(d) permits the Court to impose conditions upon a plaintiff who wishes to reactivate an action which has previously been voluntarily dismissed. But in view of plaintiff's pro se status and apparent unfamiliarity with legal proceedings, and in the interest of judicial economy, it seems preferable in this case merely to permit reinstatement of the action, and then to dispose of the pending motions for summary judgment.
Plaintiff accuses the defendant Civil Service Commission of having committed perjury by providing false information to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, and by violating certain statutes concerning confidentiality of information regarding drug or alcohol treatment. But the statutes upon which he relies, 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2, 42 C.F.R. Part 2, and 18 U.S.C. § 1621, do not provide for private causes of action for their alleged violation. Stated otherwise, plaintiff lacks standing to complain about the alleged violations. Even if it were otherwise, the summary judgment record shows that the alleged untruths and disclosures were made in routine administrative proceedings, and were plainly privileged. The most the record shows is that plaintiff disagrees with the opinion of the Civil Service Commission.
Plaintiff has not alleged a § 1983 claim, and cannot usefully amend his complaint to assert such a claim: to succeed, "Plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights," Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, ___, U.S. ___, ___, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1388 (1997). Plaintiff was accorded due process of law; if his privacy was violated, it was because he himself disclosed at the civil service hearing that he had been treated for substance abuse; and no rational fact-finder could conclude that the defendant intentionally caused any violation of plaintiff's rights.
An Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of February, 1998, IT IS ORDERED:1. Plaintiff's motion to reopen the above-captioned case is GRANTED.
2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED; plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.